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Abstract
The thesis consists of three parts. The first part studies the Glosten-Milgrom model [25] where the
risky asset value admits an arbitrary discrete distribution. In contrast to existing results on insider
model, the insiders optimal strategy in this model, if it exists, is not of feedback type. Therefore,
a weak formulation of equilibrium is proposed. In this weak formulation, the inconspicuous trade
theorem still holds, but the optimality for the insiders strategy is not enforced. However, the
insider can employ some feedback strategies whose associated expected profit are close to the
optimal value, when the order size is small. Moreover, this discrepancy converges to zero when the
order size diminishes.
The second part extends Peng’s monotone convergence result [37] to backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations (BSDEs in short) driven by marked point processes. We apply this result to
give a stochastic representation to the value function of the insiders problem in the previous part.
The last part studies an optimal trading problem in limit order market with asymmetry in-
formation. The market consists of a strategic trader and a group of noisy traders. The strategic
trader has private prediction on the fundamental value of a risk asset, and aims to maximise her
expected profit. Both types of market participants are allowed to place market and limit orders.
We aim to find a trading strategy for the strategic trader who uses both limit and market orders.
This is formulated as a stochastic control problem that we characterise in terms of a HJB system.
We also provide a numerical algorithm to obtain its solution and prove its convergence. Finally,
we consider an example to illustrate the optimal trading strategy of the strategic trader.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Trading on informational advantage
One main issue in trading is informational differences. Many trades originate not because indi-
viduals have investment or liquidation purposes, but because one agent has or believes she has
advanced information about what the price will be in the future. The primary reference in this
case is a study by Kyle [32]. In Kyle model, there is an agent denoted by insider or informed trader
who has strong informational advantage, i.e. she knows the true value of the asset. On the other
hand, other market participants do not have this information. The insider tries to optimally adjusts
her trading strategy based on the price impact that her trades generate. Back [5] formalises and
extends Kyle’s model in continuous time to allow any continuous distribution as the asset value.
Another influential model, Glosten-Milgrom [25] model, puts market makers at the centre of
the problem trading with counterparties who own advanced information. Market makers need to
set a positive bid-ask spread to compensate losses incurred by trading with informed traders even
when market makers are competitive and risk-neutral. There exists an equilibrium in which the
informed trader plays a mixed strategy.
Back and Baruch [6] connect Kyle and Glosten-Milgrom models by showing that a sequence
of the Glosten-Milgrom equilibria converges to the Kyle equilibrium when orders are smaller and
arrive more and more frequently. The convergence has been studied recently in a mathematical
framework in C¸etin and Xing [18]. However, in [6] and [18], the asset value, denoted by v˜, is
assumed to have Bernoulli distribution which is quite restricted comparing to general results in
Back’s paper [5].
In Chapter 2, we consider the Glosten-Milgrom model whose risky asset value v˜ has a discrete
distribution. This generalizes the setting in [6] and [18] that v˜ has a Bernoulli distribution. Then we
are interested to study whether the Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium still exists when the asset value v˜
has general discrete distributions. In contrast to existing results on the insider model, the insider’s
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optimal strategy in this model, if it exists, is not of feedback type. Therefore, a weak formulation
of equilibrium is proposed. In this weak formulation, the inconspicuous trade theorem still holds,
but the optimality for the insiders strategy is not enforced. However, the insider can employ some
feedback strategies whose associated expected profit are close to the optimal value, when the order
size is small. Moreover, this discrepancy converges to zero when the order size diminishes.
1.2 Backward stochastic differential equation
Backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs in short) were first introduced by Bismut [11].
Then Pardoux and Peng [36] considered non-linear BSDEs in a Brownian setting. A solution to a
BSDE is a pair of adapted processes (Y,Z) which satisfies
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
g(s, Ys, Zs)ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdWs, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
When the function g is Lipschitz continuous with respect to (y, z) and E[|ξ|2] < ∞, the existence
and uniqueness of the solution have been proved in [36].
Going beyond the Brownian framework, Barles et al. [8] consider a BSDE driven by a Brownian
motion and an independent Poisson random measure. Since then, many generalizations have been
considered. In particular, Confortola and Fuhrman [20] build up a connection between optimal
control problems and a class of BSDEs, both driven by a marked point process. They show that
there exists a unique solution to a BSDE which identifies the value function for the optimal control
problem.
Peng [37] studies a limit convergence of BSDEs driven by a Brownian motion such that
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
g(s, Ys, Zs)ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdWs + CT − Ct, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (1.2.1)
where C is a ca`dla`g increasing process with C0 = 0 and E[|CT |2] <∞.
Definition 1.2.1 Given a non-decreasing process C, a terminal value ξ and a generator g, if the
pair (Y,Z) solves (1.2.1), then we call Y a supersolution of BSDE with generator g or simply called
g-supersolution on [0, T ]. In particular, when C ≡ 0, Y is called a g-solution on [0, T ].
Peng proved a limit theorem that if a sequence of supersolutions Y n increasingly converging to Y
with E
[
supt |Yt|2
]
<∞, then Y itself is a ca`dla`g supersolution of the same BSDE. As an applica-
tion, he constructed a family of penalised BSDEs, which converges to the smallest supersolution of
a BSDE with a constraint.
In Chapter 2, we consider the value function of insider’s optimal trading problem. There has
a boundary layer in value function as the time goes to the terminal time. The source of the
boundary layer can be determined by a convergence in value functions as the trading intensities of
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the insider goes to infinity. Since the value functions can be represented by a sequence of penalised
BSDEs driven by marked point processes, we analyse the convergence in BSDEs. In Chapter
3, we first extend Confortola and Fuhrman [20] to prove the well-posedness of penalised BSDEs
driven by marked point processes. Then we extend Peng’s [37] monotone convergence theorem
from Brownian setting to a marked point process setting. Finally, we analyse the convergence in
BSDEs to determine the source of the boundary layer.
1.3 Trading on limit order book
In Chapter 2, we focus on a control problem which relays on market orders only. However, in
practise, agents frequently post limit orders as they are cheaper than market orders. Hence, in
Chapter 4, we study a problem how a strategy trader uses her private prediction on the asset and
trades both market and limit orders to maximise her trading profits.
Since there are very few papers considering asymmetric information in limit order book, we
borrow ideas from the literature of optimal execution in limit order book. For instance, Back and
Pedersen [7] show that a strategic trader uses her private prediction gradually and completely in
whole trading period. Avellaneda and Stoikov [4] investigate that a market marker maximises
terminal wealth by trading in and out of positions using limit orders. Guilbaud and Pham [27]
study that a market maker is to maximize her expected utility from revenue over a short term
horizon by a trade-off between limit and market orders, while controlling her inventory position. In
this case, the agent searches for both an optimal trading size and a sequence of optimal stopping
times at which to execute market orders.
In our model, there are two types of agents, noisy traders and a strategic trader, all of whom
are risk neutral but they have different information. Both market participants are allowed to place
market and limit orders. The strategic trader has some private signal, which is her private valuation
prediction of the asset price. She uses the private prediction to trade in the market and maximise
her expected profit. Rest market participants are aggregated to noise traders.
Moreover, for market orders, we assume that the size of buy or sell order k takes values from
the set of integers Km = {1, . . . , m¯} where the subscript m stands for market orders. These buy or
sell orders are modelled by Poisson processes. The strategic trader controls intensities of Poisson
processes, i.e. the speed of placing market orders. On the other hand, for limit orders, they are
executed when they are filled by incoming counterpart market orders. After previous execution of
limit orders, the strategic trader cancels unexecuted orders and submits new limit orders to wait
for next arrival of market orders. We assume that after each arrival of market orders, the strategic
trader can submit limit orders, either on buy or sell side, i.e. limit orders are submitted right after
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the last execution. If there is non-execution or partial execution of limit orders, she will cancel
the whole or rest orders immediately before placing new limit orders to wait a next execution.
Furthermore, for simplicity of the model, we assume that she always submits limit orders at best
bid or ask and those have highest priority to be executed compared to other outstanding limit
orders. Hence, according to our assumption, the strategic trader needs to control the size of limit
orders either on buy or sell side at each submission. In addition, we also consider the price impact
of limit and market orders in our model.
We formulate the problem as a stochastic control problem and prove that the value function
of the strategic trader is a solution to this HJB equation. We also investigate numerically the
strategic trader’s optimal strategy in a market where limit and market orders have two sizes, small
and large. We consider five different scenarios depending on sizes of orders allowed to trade by
strategic and noise traders. Our numerical solution shows that the strategic trader will place limit
and market buy orders when the magnitude of mispricing, which is the difference between her
private prediction on the asset and the current trading price, is higher than a threshold. In certain
cases, she may even employ a “round trip” strategy to first submit limit sell orders to push price
down, and subsequently uses market buy orders to make profit on low market price. In this round
trip of trade, the profits from the market buy are still more than losses from the limit sell.
Chapter 2
Asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom
equilibrium
2.1 Introduction
In the theory of market microstructure, two models, due to Kyle [32] and Glosten-Milgrom [25], are
particularly influential. In the Kyle model, buy and sell orders are batched together by a market
maker, who sets a unique price at each auction date. In the Glosten-Milgrom model, buy and sell
orders are executed by the market maker individually, hence bid and ask prices appear naturally.
In both models1, an informed agent (insider) trades to maximize her expected profit utilizing her
private information on the asset fundamental value, while another group of noise traders trade
independently of the fundamental value. The cumulative demand of these noise traders is modelled
by a Brownian motion in Kyle model, cf. [5], and by the difference of two independent Poisson
processes, whose jump size is scaled by the order size, in the Glosten-Milgrom model.
When the fundamental value, described by a random variable v˜, has an arbitrary continuous
distribution2, Back [5] establishes a unique equilibrium between the insider and the market maker.
Moreover, the cumulative demand process in the equilibrium connects elegantly to the theory of
filtration enlargement, cf. [35]. However much less is known about equilibrium in the Glosten-
Milgrom model. Back and Baruch [6] consider a Bernoulli distributed v˜. In this case, the insider’s
optimal strategy is constructed in [18]. Equilibrium with general distribution of v˜, as Cho [19] puts
it, “will be a great challenge to consider”.
In this paper, we consider the Glosten-Milgrom model whose risky asset value v˜ has a discrete
1A profit maximizing informed agent is introduced in the Glosten-Milgrom model in [6]
2Models with discrete distributed v˜ can be studied similarly as in [5].
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distribution:
P(v˜ = vn) = pn, n = 1, · · · , N, (2.1.1)
where N ∈ N∪{∞}, (vn)n=1,··· ,N is an increasing sequence and pn ∈ (0, 1) with
∑N
n=1 pn = 1. This
generalizes the setting in [6] where N = 2 is considered, i.e., v˜ has a Bernoulli distribution.
In models of insider trading, inconspicuous trade theorem is commonly observed, cf. e.g., [32],
[5], [7], [6], [14], and [15] for equilibria of Kyle type, and [18] for the Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium
with Bernoulli distributed fundamental value. The inconspicuous trade theorem states, when the
insider is trading optimally in equilibrium, the cumulative net orders from both insider and noise
traders have the same distribution as the net orders from noise traders, i.e., the insider is able to hide
her trades among noise trades. As a consequence, this allows the market maker to set the trading
price only considering current cumulative noise trades. Moreover, in all aforementioned studies,
the insider’s optimal strategy is of feedback form, which only depends on the current cumulative
total order. This functional form is associated to optimizers of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation for the insider’s optimization problem. However the situation is dramatically different in
the Glosten-Milgrom model with N in (2.1.1) at least 3. Theorem 2.2.6 below shows that, given
aforementioned pricing mechanism, the insider’s optimal strategy, if exists, does not correspond to
optimizers of the HJB equation. The result is consequence of the difference between bid and ask
prices in the Glosten-Milgrom model, which is contrast to the unique price in the Kyle model.
Therefore to establish equilibrium in these Glosten-Milgrom models, we propose a weak formu-
lation of equilibrium in Definition 2.2.11, which is motivated by the convergence of Glosten-Milgrom
equilibria to the Kyle equilibrium, as the order size diminishing and the trading intensities increas-
ing to infinity, cf. [6] and [18]. In this weak formulation, the insider still trades to enforce the
inconspicuous trading theorem, but the insider’s strategy may not be optimal. However, the in-
sider can employ some feedback strategy so that the loss to her expected profit (compared to the
optimal value) is small for small order size. Moreover this gap converges to zero when the order
size vanishes. We call this weak formulation asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium and establish
its existence in Theorem 2.2.12.
In the asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium, the insider’s strategy is constructed explicitly
in section 2.5, using a similar construction as in [18]. Using this strategy, the insider trades towards
a middle level of an interval, driving the total demand process into this interval at the terminal date.
This bridge behaviour is widely observed in the aforementioned studies on insider trading. On the
other hand, the insider’s strategy is of feedback form. Hence the insider can determine her trading
intensity only using the current cumulative total demand. Moreover, as order size diminishes,
the family of suboptimal strategies converge to the optimal strategy in Kyle model, cf. Theorem
2.2.13. In such an asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium, the insider loses some expected profit.
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The expression of this profit loss is quite interesting mathematically: it is the difference of two
stochastic integrals with respect to (scaled) Poisson occupation time. As the order size vanishes,
both integrals converge to the same stochastic integral with respect to Brownian local time, hence
their difference vanishes.
This chapter is organized as follows. Main results are presented in section 2.2. The mismatch
between insider’s optimal strategy and optimizers for the HJB equation is proved in section 2.3.
Then a family of suboptimal strategies are characterized and constructed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
Finally the existence of asymptotic equilibrium is established in section 2.6 and a technical result
is proved in Appendix.
2.2 Main results
2.2.1 The model
We consider a continuous time market for a risky and a risk free asset. The risk free interest
rate is normalized to 0, i.e., the risk free asset is regarded as the nume´raire. We assume that the
fundamental value of the risky asset v˜ has a discrete distribution of type (2.1.1). This fundamental
value will be revealed to all market participants at a finite time horizon, say 1, at which point the
market will terminate.
The micro-structure of the market and the interaction of market participants are modelled sim-
ilarly to [6] which we recall below. There are three types of agents: uninformed/noise traders, an
informed trader/insider, and a market maker, all of whom are risk neutral. These agents share the
same view toward future randomness of the market, but they possess different information. There-
fore, the probability space (Ω,P) with different filtration accommodates the following processes:
• Noise traders trade for liquidity or hedging reasons which are independent of the fundamental
value v˜. The cumulative demand Z is described by the difference of two independent jump
processes ZB and ZS which are the cumulative buy and sell orders, respectively. Therefore
Z = ZB − ZS and it is independent of v˜. Noise traders only submit orders of fixed sized δ
every time they trade. As in [6], ZB/δ and ZS/δ are assumed to be independent Poisson
processes with constant intensity β. Let (FZt )t∈[0,1] be the smallest filtration generated by Z
and satisfying the usual conditions. Then (FZt )t∈[0,1] describes the information structure of
noise traders.
• The insider knows the fundamental value v˜ at time 0 and observes the market price for the
risky asset between time 0 and 1. The insider also submits orders of fixed size δ in every
trade and tries to maximize her expected profit. The cumulative demand from the insider is
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denoted by X := XB−XS where XB and XS are cumulative buy and sell orders respectively.
Since the insider observes the market price of the risky asset, she can back out the dynamics
of noise orders, cf. discussions after Definition 2.2.1. Therefore the information structure of
the insider F It includes F
Z
t and σ(v˜), for any t ∈ [0, 1].
• A competitive market maker only observes the aggregation of the informed and noise trades,
so he cannot distinguish between informed and noise trades. Given Y := X+Z, the informa-
tion of the market maker is (F Yt )t∈[0,1] generated by Y and satisfying the usual conditions.
As the market maker is risk neutral, the competition will force him to set the market price
as E[v˜|F Yt ], t ∈ [0, 1].
In order to define equilibrium in the market, let us first describe admissible actions for the
market maker and the insider. The market maker looks for a Markovian pricing mechanism, in
which the price of the risky asset at time t is set using cumulative order Yt and a pricing rule p.
Definition 2.2.1 A function p : δZ× [0, 1]→ R is a pricing rule if
i) y 7→ p(y, t) is strictly increasing for each t ∈ [0, 1);
ii) limy→−∞ p(y, t) = v1 and limy→∞ p(y, t) = vN for each t ∈ [0, 1];
iii) t 7→ p(y, t) is continuous for each y ∈ δZ.
The monotonicity of y 7→ p(y, t) in i) is natural. It implies that the market price is higher whenever
the demand is higher. Moreover, because of the monotonicity, the insider fully observes the unin-
formed orders Z by inverting the price process and subtracting her orders from the total orders.
Item ii) means that the range of the pricing rule is wide enough to price in every possibility of
fundamental value. The insider trades to maximize her expected profit. Her admissible strategy is
defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.2 The strategy (XB, XS ;F I) is admissible, if
i) F I is a filtration satisfying the usual conditions and generated by σ(v˜), FZ , and H, where
(Ht)t∈[0,1] is a filtration independent of v˜ and FZ ;
ii) XB and XS , with XB0 = X
S
0 = 0, are F
I -adapted and integrable3 increasing point processes
with jump size δ;
iii) the (F I ,P)-dual predictable projections of XB and XS are absolutely continuous with respect
to time, hence XB and XS admit F I−intensities θB and θS , respectively;
3That is, E[XB1 ] and E[XS1 ] are both finite.
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iv) E
[∫ 1
0 |p(Yt, t)| |dXit − δθitdt|
]
< ∞, for i ∈ {B,S} and the pricing rule p fixed by the market
maker. Here |Xi − ∫ ·0 δθidt| is the variation of the compensated point process.
This set of admissible strategies is similar to [18, Definition 2.2]. Item i) assumes that the
insider is allowed to possess additional information H, independent of v˜ and FZ , which she uses to
generate her mixed strategy. Item iv) implies δE[
∫ 1
0 |p(Yt, t)| θitdt] < ∞, hence the expected profit
of the insider is finite. Item ii) does not exclude the insider trading at the same time with noise
traders. When the insider submits an order at the same time when an uniformed order arrives
but in the opposite direction, assuming the market maker only observes the net demand implies
that such pair of trades goes unnoticed by the market maker. This pair of opposite orders will be
executed without a need for a market maker. Hence the market maker only knows the transaction
when there is a need for him. Henceforth, when the insider makes a trade at the same time with
an uninformed trader but in an opposite direction, we say the insider cancels the noise trades. On
the other hand, item ii) also allows the insider to trade at the same time with noise traders in the
same direction. We call that the insider tops up noise orders in this situation. However, the insider
does not submit such orders in equilibrium, even when equilibrium is defined in a weak sense, cf.
Remark 2.4.6 below. The assumption that the insider is allowed to trade at the same time as noise
traders is different from assumptions for Kyle model where insider’s strategy is predictable. This
additional freedom for insider is not the source for Theorem 2.2.6 below, which states optimizers
for the insider’s HJB equation do not correspond to the optimal strategy; see Remark 2.2.8 below.
As described in the last paragraph, the insider’s cumulative buy orders may consist of three
components: XB,B arrives at different time than those of ZB, XB,T arrives at the same time as
some orders of ZB, and XB,S cancels some orders of ZS . Sell orders XS are defined analogously.
Therefore XB = XB,B +XB,T +XB,S and XS = XS,S +XS,T +XS,B.
As mentioned earlier, the insider aims to maximize her expected profit. Given an admissible
trading strategy X = XB −XS the associated profit at time 1 of the insider is given by∫ 1
0
Xt−dp(Yt, t) + (v˜ − p(Y1, 1))X1.
The last term appears due to a potential discrepancy between the market price and the liquidation
value. Since X is of finite variation and X0 = 0, applying integration by parts rewrites the profit as∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dXBt −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dXSt
=
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + δ, t)) dXB,Bt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + 2δ, t)) dXB,T
+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXB,St −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − δ, t)) dXS,St
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − 2δ, t)) dXS,T −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXS,Bt ,
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where Y increases (resp. decreases) δ when XB,B (resp. XS,S) jumps by δ, Y increases (resp.
decreases) 2δ when XB,T (resp. XS,T ) jumps at the same time with ZB (resp. ZS), and Y is
unchanged when XS,B (resp. XB,S) jumps at the same time with ZB (resp. ZS). Define
a(y, t) := p(y + δ, t) and b(y, t) := p(y − δ, t),
which can be viewed as ask and bid prices respectively. Then the expected profit of the insider
conditional on her information can be expressed as
E
[∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt−, t)) dXB,Bt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXB,St
+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt− + δ, t)) dXB,Tt −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Yt− − δ, t)) dXS,Tt
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Yt−, t)) dXS,St −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXS,Bt
∣∣∣v˜] .
(2.2.1)
Having described the market structure, an equilibrium between the market maker and the insider
is defined as in [6]:
Definition 2.2.3 A Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium is a quadruplet (p,XB, XS ,F I) such that
i) given (XB, XS ;F I), p is a rational pricing rule, i.e., p(Yt, t) = E[v˜|F Yt ] for t ∈ [0, 1];
ii) given p, (XB, XS ;F I) is an admissible strategy maximizing (2.2.1).
When N = 2, [18] establishes the existence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria. In equilibrium the
pricing rule is
p(y, t) = EP
y
[P (Z1−t)] , (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1]. (2.2.2)
Here Py is a probability measure under which Z is the difference of two independent Poisson
processes and Py(Z0 = y) = 1. P is a nondecreasing function such that P (Z1) has the same
distribution as v˜. Moreover the optimal strategy of the insider are given by jump processes Xi,j , i ∈
{B,S} and j ∈ {B, T, S}, with intensities δ θi,j(Yt−, t), t ∈ [0, 1]. These intensities are deterministic
functions of the state variable Y , hence this control strategy is a feedback control and it corresponds
to optimizers of insider’s HJB equation. However, when N ≥ 3, Theorem 2.2.6 below shows that,
given the pricing rule (2.2.2), the optimal strategy does not correspond to optimizers in the HJB
equation, for some values of v˜. This result is surprising, because it is contrast to existing results in
the Kyle and Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium; cf. [32], [5], [7], [6], [14], [15], and [18]. This mismatch
roots in the discrete state space of the demand process in the Glosten-Milgrom model. The discrete
state space yields different bid and ask prices, which is contrast to the unique price in the Kyle
model. See Remark 2.2.7 below for more discussion.
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2.2.2 Nonexistence of a feedback optimal control
To state aforementioned result, we introduce several additional notations. For each δ > 0, let
Ωδ = D([0, 1], δZ) be the space of δZ-valued ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1] with coordinate process Zδ,
(FZ,δt )t∈[0,1] is the minimal right continuous and complete filtration generated by Zδ, and Pδ is
the probability measure under which Zδ is the difference of two independent Poisson processes
starting from 0 with the same jump size δ and intensity βδ. We denote by Pδ,y the probability
measure under which Zδ0 = y a.s.. Henceforth, the superscript δ indicates the trading size in the
Glosten-Milgrom model.
For the fundamental value v˜δ, let us first consider the following family of distributions.
Assumption 2.2.4 Given v˜δ of type (2.1.1), there exists a δZ∪{−∞,∞}−valued strictly increas-
ing sequence (aδn)n=1,··· ,N+14 with aδ1 = −∞, aδN+1 = ∞, and
⋃N
n=1[a
δ
n, a
δ
n+1) = δZ ∪ {−∞}, such
that
P(v˜δ = vn) = Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
, n = 1, · · · , N. (2.2.3)
For any v˜ with discrete distribution (2.1.1), Lemma 2.6.1 below shows there exists a sequence
(v˜δ)δ>0, each satisfies Assumption 2.2.4 and converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0. Therefore any v˜ of type
(2.1.1) can be approximated by a v˜δ satisfying Assumption 2.2.4. Given v˜δ satisfying Assumption
2.2.4, define
hδn(y, t) := Pδ,y
(
Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
, y ∈ δZ, t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (2.2.4)
and
pδ(y, t) :=
N∑
n=1
vnh
δ
n(y, t) = Eδ,y
[
P (Zδ1−t)
]
, (2.2.5)
where the expectation is taken under Pδ,y and
P (y) = vn, when y ∈ [aδn, aδn+1). (2.2.6)
Then (2.2.3) implies that v˜δ and P (Zδ1) have the same distribution. If p
δ is chosen as the pricing
rule, it has the same form as in (2.2.2). Finally we impose a technical condition on pδ. This
assumption is clearly satisfied when N is finite.
Assumption 2.2.5 There exist positive constants C and n such that |pδ(y, t)| ≤ C(1 + |y|n) for
any (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1].
Given the pricing rule (2.2.5), let us first study the insider’s optimization problem and derive the
associated HJB equation via a heuristic argument. In this derivation, the superscript δ is omitted
4When N =∞, N + 1 =∞.
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to simplify notation. Definition 2.2.2 iii) implies that Xi,j − δ ∫ ·0 θi,jr dr defines an F I -martingale
for i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B, T, S}. On the other hand, Definition 2.2.2 iv) and [13, Chapter I, T6]
combined imply that
∫ ·
0(v˜− p(Yr− + δ, r))(dXB,Br − δθB,Br dr) =
∫ ·
0(v˜− p(Yr, r))(dXB,Br − δθB,Br dr)
is an F I -martingale. Similar argument applied to other terms allows us to rewrite (2.2.1) as
δE
[ ∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− + 2δ, r))θB,Tr dr −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− − δ, r))θS,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− − 2δ, r))θS,Tr dr
∣∣∣v˜].
This motivates us to define the following value function for the insider:
V δ(v˜, y, t) := sup
θi,j ; i∈{B,S},j∈{B,T,S}
δ E
[ ∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− + 2δ, r))θB,Tr dr −
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− − δ, r))θS,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr −
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− − 2δ, r))θS,Tr dr
∣∣∣Yt = y, v˜],
(2.2.7)
for v˜ = {v1, · · · , vN}, y ∈ δZ, t ∈ [0, 1). The terminal value of V δ is defined as V δ(v˜, y, 1) =
limt→1 V δ(v˜, y, t) 5. Lemma 2.3.2 and Proposition 2.4.4 below show that the optimization problem
in (2.2.7) is well defined and nontrivial, i.e., 0 < V δ < ∞, for each δ > 0. Let us now derive the
HJB equation which V δ satisfies via a heuristic argument. Since positive (resp. negative) part
of Y is Y B := XB,B + XB,T + ZB − XS,B (resp. Y S := XS,S + XS,T + ZS − XB,S). Hence
Y B − δ ∫ ·0(β − θS,Br − θB,Tr ) dr − δ ∫ ·0 θB,Br dr − 2δ ∫ ·0 θB,Tr dr (resp. Y S − δ ∫ ·0(β − θB,Sr − θS,Tr ) dr −
δ
∫ ·
0 θ
S,S
r dr − 2δ
∫ t
0 θ
S,T
r dr) is an F I -martingale.6 Then applying Itoˆ’s formula to V δ(v˜, Yr, r) and
employing the standard dynamic programming arguments yield the following formal HJB equation
for V δ:
−Vt(vn, y, t)−H(vn, y, t, V ) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1), (2.2.8)
where the Hamilton H is defined as (the v˜ argument is omitted in H to simplify notation)
H(vn, y, t, V ) :=(V (y + δ, t)− 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β
5Since the set of admissible control is unbounded, the HJB equation associated to (2.2.7) usually admits a boundary
layer, i.e., limt→1 V δ(v˜, y, t) is not identically zero even if there is no terminal profit in (2.2.1). Such phenomenon
also shows up in Kyle model, see [5].
6As discussed after Definition 2.2.2, the set of jumps of XB,S and XS,T (resp. XS,B and XB,T ) arrive at the same
time as some jumps of ZS (resp. ZB), then we necessarily have θB,S + θS,T ≤ β (resp. θS,B + θB,T ≤ β).
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+ sup
θB,B≥0
[
V (y + δ, t)− V (y, t) + (vn − p(y + δ, t))δ
]
θB,B
+ sup
θB,T≥0
[
V (y + 2δ, t)− V (y + δ, t) + (vn − p(y + 2δ, t))δ
]
θB,T
+ sup
θB,S≥0
[
V (y, t)− V (y − δ, t) + (vn − p(y, t))δ
]
θB,S (2.2.9)
+ sup
θS,S≥0
[
V (y − δ, t)− V (y, t)− (vn − p(y − δ, t))δ
]
θS,S
+ sup
θS,T≥0
[
V (y − 2δ, t)− V (y − δ, t)− (vn − p(y − 2δ, t))δ
]
θS,T
+ sup
θS,B≥0
[
V (y, t)− V (y + δ, t)− (vn − p(y, t))δ
]
θS,B.
Optimizers θi,j , i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B, T, S}, in (2.2.9), are deterministic functions of vn, y and
t, hence they are of feedback form. They are expected to be the optimal control intensities for
(2.2.7). This is indeed the case in many existing results in Kyle model and Glosten-Milgrom model
(with N = 2), compare [32], [5], [7], [6], and [18]. However, when N ≥ 3 in the Glosten-Milgrom
model, the following theorem shows any optimizers in (2.2.9) are not the optimal intensities when
v˜ is neither v1 nor vN .
Theorem 2.2.6 Let N ≥ 3 and v˜δ satisfy Assumption 2.2.4. Let pδ in (2.2.5) be the pricing
rule and satisfy Assumption 2.2.5. Then any optimizers θi,j(y, t), i ∈ {B,S}, j ∈ {B, T, S} and
(y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1), for (2.2.9) are not the optimal strategy for (2.2.7) when v˜δ = vn for 1 < n < N .
Remark 2.2.7 When v˜δ = v1 (resp. vN ), the insider knows the risky asset is always over-priced
(resp. under-priced). Hence she always sells (resp. buys) in equilibrium. This situation is exactly
the same as [18]. When v˜δ is neither minimal nor maximal, let us briefly describe the proof of
Theorem 2.2.6 here. To ensure (2.2.8) to be wellposed, H must be finite for all (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1).
Hence
(p(y, t)− vn)δ ≤ V (y + δ, t)− V (y, t) ≤ (p(y + δ, t)− vn)δ, for all (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1), (2.2.10)
where the second inequality comes from the first three maximization in (2.2.9) and the first inequal-
ity comes from the last three. Since V > 0, θi,j ≡ 0, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B, T, S}, in (2.2.9) does
not correspond to the optimal strategy. Hence there must exist (y0, t0) such that one inequality
in (2.2.10), say the first one, is an equality. However, in this case, the discrete state space forces
the first inequality to be an equality for all (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1), which implies the second inequality
in (2.2.10) is strict for all (y, t), due to p(y + δ, t) > p(y, t). Therefore the optimizers in the first
three maximization in (2.2.9) must be identically zero, which means the associated point process
X does not have positive jumps. On the other hand, the dynamic programming principle and the
boundary layer of (2.2.8) at t = 1 force Y1 = Z1 +X1 ∈ [aδn + δ, aδn+1] a.s.. This can never happen
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when X does not have positive jumps. Therefore, Theorem 2.2.6 is the joint effort of the discrete
state space and the boundary layer of the HJB equation.
Remark 2.2.8 The statement of Theorem 2.2.6 remains valid when the insider is prohibited from
trading with noise traders at the same time; i.e., XB,T , XB,S , XS,T , XS,B are all zero. In this case,
the second, third, fifth and sixth maximization do not present in (2.2.9). However, the first and
fourth maximization therein still lead to (2.2.10). Hence the same argument as in the previous
remark still applies.
Remark 2.2.9 Examples of control problems without optimal feedback control exist in literature
of the optimal control theory, cf., e.g. [43, Chapter 3, pp. 246] and [34, Example 1.1]. In these cases,
notion of relaxed control is employed to prove the existence of a relaxed optimal control, cf. [34] and
references therein. For the insider’s optimization problem, instead of {θ : δZ × [0, 1] → R+}, the
control set can be relaxed to {θ : δZ× [0, 1]→M1(R+)}, whereM1(R+) is the set of all probability
measures in R+. It is interesting to investigate whether (2.2.7) admits an optimal control in this
relaxed set. We leave this topic to future studies.
2.2.3 Asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium
To establish equilibrium of Glosten-Milgrom type when the risky asset v˜ has general discrete distri-
bution (2.1.1) with N ≥ 3, we introduce a weak form of equilibrium in what follows. To motivate
this definition, we recall the convergence of Glosten-Milgrom equilibria as the order size decreasing
to zero and intensity of noise trades increasing to infinity, cf. [6, Theorem 3] and [18, Theorem 5.3]:
Proposition 2.2.10 For any Bernoulli distributed v˜ (i.e. N = 2 in (2.1.1)), there exists a sequence
of Bernoulli distributed random variables v˜δ such that
i) v˜δ converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0;
ii) For each δ > 0, model with v˜δ as the fundamental value of the risky asset admits a Glosten-
Milgrom equilibrium (pδ, XB,δ, XS,δ,F I,δ);
iii) When the intensity of Poisson process is given by βδ := (2δ2)−1, XB,δ−XS,δ L−→ X0, as δ ↓ 0,
where X0 is the optimal strategy in the Kyle model and
L−→ represents the weak convergence
of stochastic processes7.
This result motivates us to define the following weak form of Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium:
7Refer to [10] or [30] for the definition of weak convergence of stochastic processes.
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Definition 2.2.11 For any v˜ with discrete distribution (2.1.1), an asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom
equilibrium is a sequence (v˜δ, pδ, XB,δ, XS,δ,F I,δ)δ>0 such that
i) v˜δ converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0;
ii) For each δ > 0, given (v˜δ, XB,δ, XS,δ,F I,δ) and set Y δ := Zδ + XB,δ −XS,δ, pδ is a rational
pricing rule, i.e., pδ(Y δt , t) = E[v˜δ |F Y
δ
t ] for t ∈ [0, 1];
iii) Given (v˜δ, pδ) and βδ = (2δ2)−1, let J δ(XB, XS) be insider’s expected profit associated to the
admissible strategy (XB, XS). Then
sup
(XB ,XS) admissible
J δ(XB, XS)− J δ(XB,δ, XS,δ)→ 0, as δ ↓ 0.
In the above definition, rationality of the pricing mechanism is not compromised. However opti-
mality of the insider’s strategy is not enforced. Instead, item iii) requires that, when the order
size is small, the loss of insider’s expected profit by employing the strategy (XB,δ, XS,δ;F δ,I) is
small, comparing to the optimal value. Moreover this discrepancy converges to zero when the order
size vanishes. Therefore if the insider is willing to give up a small amount of expected profit, she
can employ strategy (XB,δ, XS,δ;F I,δ) to establish a suboptimal equilibrium. The following result
establishes the existence of equilibrium in the above weak sense:
Theorem 2.2.12 Assume that v˜ satisfies (2.1.1) with N <∞. Then asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom
equilibrium exists.
In this asymptotic equilibrium, the pricing rule is given by (2.2.5). When the order size is δ,
the insider employs the strategy (XB,δ, XS,δ;F I,δ) with F I,δ-intensities
δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− + δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
+
+ δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− − δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
−
,
δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− − δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
+
+ δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− + δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
−
,
(2.2.11)
respectively. In particular, when the fundamental value is vn, the insider trades toward the middle
level mδn := (a
δ
n + a
δ
n+1 − δ)/2 of the interval [aδn, aδn+1): when the total demand is less than mδn,
the insider only places buy orders by either complementing noise buy orders or canceling some of
noise sell orders, when the total demand is larger than mδn, the insider does exactly the opposite.
More specifically, Lemma 2.5.2 below shows that y 7→ hδn(y, t) is strictly increasing when y < mδn
and strictly decreasing when y > mδn. Therefore, when Y
δ
t− < mδn, (2.2.11) implies that: XB,B,δ
has intensity 12δ
(
hδn(Y
δ
t−+δ,t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−,t)
− 1
)
, XB,S,δ has intensity 12δ
(
1− h
δ
n(Y
δ
t−−δ,t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−,t)
)
, meanwhile intensities of
XS,S,δ andXS,B,δ are both zero. When Y δt− > mδn, intensities can be read out from (2.2.11) similarly.
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Even though Theorem 2.2.6 remains valid when the insider is prohibited from trading at the same
time with noise traders, the strategy constructed above depends on the possibility of canceling
orders. However, in this strategy, the insider never tops up noise orders, i.e., XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0.
This allows the market maker to employ a rational pricing mechanism so that Definition 2.2.11 ii)
is satisfied, cf. Remark 2.4.6 below.
The processes (XB,δ, XS,δ;F I,δ) with intensities (2.2.11) will be constructed explicitly in section
2.5. The insider employs a sequence of independent random variables with uniform distribution
on [0, 1] to construct her mixed strategy. This sequence of random variables are also independent
of Zδ and v˜δ. This construction is a natural extension of [18]. In this construction, whenever a
noise order arrives, the insider uses a uniform distributed random variable to decide whether or
not submitting an opposite cancelling order. Hence this strategy is adapted to insider’s filtration,
rather than predictable as in the Kyle model. Such a cancelling strategy is called input regulation
and has been studied extensively in the queueing theory literature, see eg. [13, Chapter VII, Section
3].
When the fundamental value is vn and the insider follows the aforementioned strategy, the total
demand at time 1 will end up in the interval [aδn, a
δ
n+1). Therefore the insider’s private information
is fully, albeit gradually, revealed to the public so that the trading price does not jump when the
fundamental value is announced. On the other hand, the total demand, in its own filtration, has
the same distribution of the demand from noise traders, i.e., the insider is able to hide her trades
among the noise trades. This is another manifestation of inconspicuous trading theorem commonly
observed in the insider trading literature (cf. e.g., [32], [5], [7], etc.).
The insider’s strategy discussed above is of feedback form. The insider can determine her
trades only using the current total cumulative demand (and some additional randomness coming
from the sequence of i.i.d. uniform distributed random variables which are also independent of the
fundamental value and the noise trades). Even though this strategy is not optimal, its associated
expected profit is close to the optimal value when the order size is small. Moreover the discrepancy
converges to zero as the order size diminishes.
The Figure 2.1 presents a numeric example illustrates the convergence of the upper bound
for insider’s expected profit loss as the order size decreases to zero. In this example, v˜ takes
values in {1, 2, 3} with probability 0.55, 0.35, and 0.1, respectively. The expected profit in Kyle-
Back equilibrium is 0.512. Compared to this, the following figure shows that the loss to insider’s
expected profit is small.
Finally, similar to Proposition 2.2.10 iii), insider’s net order in the asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom
equilibrium converges to the optimal strategy in the Kyle model as the order size decreases to zero.
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Figure 2.1: The mean and standard deviation of the upper bound for insider’s expected profit loss.
The figure is generated by Monte Carlo simulation with 105 paths.
Theorem 2.2.13 Let (XB,δ, XS,δ,F I,δ)δ>0 be the sequence of insider’s strategy in Theorem 2.2.12.
Then
XB,δ −XS,δ L−→ X0 as δ ↓ 0,
where X0 is the optimal strategy in Kyle model.
2.3 Optimizers in the HJB equation are not optimal control
Theorem 2.2.6 will be proved in this section. Let us first make the heuristic argument for the
HJB equation rigorous by using the dynamic programming principle and standard arguments for
viscosity solutions. To this end, recall the domain of Hamilton:
dom(H) := {(vn, y, t, V ) ∈ {v1, · · · , vN} × δZ× [0, 1]× R
−valued functions |H(vn, y, t, V ) <∞} .
Observe that control variables for (2.2.9) are chosen in [0,∞). Hence (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H) if
V (y + δ, t)− V (y, t) + (vn − p(y + δ, t))δ ≤ 0, (2.3.1)
V (y − δ, t)− V (y, t)− (vn − p(y − δ, t))δ ≤ 0. (2.3.2)
Moreover, when (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H), the Hamilton is reduced to
H(vn, y, t, V ) = (V (y + δ, t)− 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β. (2.3.3)
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Hence (2.2.8) reads
−Vt − (V (y + δ, t)− 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β = 0 in dom(H). (2.3.4)
Proposition 2.3.1 The following statements hold for V δ, δ > 0:
i) V δ is a viscosity solution of (2.2.8);
ii) (vn, y, t, V
δ) ∈ dom(H) for any n ∈ {1, · · · , N} and (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1). Hence V δ satisfies
(2.3.1), (2.3.2), and is a viscosity solution of (2.3.4);
iii) t 7→ V δ(y, t) is continuous on [0, 1];
iv) V δ(y, t) = EPδ,y
[
V δ(Zs−t, s)
]
for any y ∈ δZ, and 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ 1.
The proof is postponed to Appendix 2.7.1 where the dynamic programming principle together with
the definition of viscosity solutions are recalled. The proof of Theorem 2.2.6 also requires the
following result.
Lemma 2.3.2 For any δ > 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1), V δ(vn, y, t) > 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we fix δ = 1, v˜ = vn for some n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and (y, t) = (0, 0).
The superscript δ is omitted throughout this proof. When n > 1, let us construct a strategy where
the insider buys once the asset is under-priced. Consider
τ := inf{r : p(Zr− + 1, r) < vn)} ∧ 1 and σ := inf{r > τ : ∆Yr 6= 0} ∧ 1.
Here τ is the first time that the asset is under-priced and σ is the arrival time of the first order
after τ . The insider employs a strategy with intensity θB,Br = I{τ≤r≤σ} and all other intensities
zero. Then the associated expected profit is
E
[∫ 1
0
(vn − a(Yr−, r)) I{τ≤r≤σ}dr
]
= E
[∫ σ
τ
(vn − p(Zr− + 1, r)) dr
]
> 0,
where the inequality follows from the definition of τ and the fact that P(τ < 1) > 0 due to Definition
2.2.1 ii). When n = 1, set τ := inf{t : p(Zt− − 1, t) > v1} ∧ 1 and θS,St = I{τ≤t≤σ}. Argument
similar as above shows that this selling strategy also leads to positive expected profit. Therefore,
in both cases, V > 0 is verified. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2.6. Without loss of generality, we set δ = 1 and omit the superscript δ
throughout the proof.
Step 1: For any n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, either one of the following situations holds:
• (2.3.1) holds as an equality and (2.3.2) is a strict inequality at all (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1);
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• (2.3.2) holds as an equality and (2.3.1) is a strict inequality at all (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
To prove the assertion, observe from (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) that
p(y, t)− vn ≤ V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) ≤ p(y + 1, t)− vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
Since y 7→ p(y, t) is strictly increasing for any t ∈ [0, 1), there exists η(y, t) ∈ [0, 1] such that
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = p(y, t) + η(y, t) (p(y + 1, t)− p(y, t))− vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
Assume that either (2.3.1) or (2.3.2) holds as an equality at some point. If such assumption fails,
both inequalities in (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) are strict at all points in Z × [0, 1). Then all optimizers in
(2.2.9) are identically zero, with the associated expected profit zero. Since V > 0, cf. Lemma 2.3.2,
these trivial optimizers are not optimal strategies for (2.2.7). Hence the statement of the theorem
is already confirmed in this trivial situation. Let us now assume (2.3.2) holds as an equality at
(y0 +1, t0), we will show (2.3.2) is an identity. On the other hand, combining the identity in (2.3.2)
and the strict monotonicity of y 7→ p(y, t), we obtain
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = p(y, t)− vn < p(y + 1, t)− vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
hence the inequality (2.3.1) is always strict. The other situation where (2.3.1) is an identity and
(2.3.2) is strict can be proved analogously.
Since (2.3.2) holds as an equality at (y0 + 1, t0), then, for any s ∈ (t0, 1),
Ey0 [p(Zs−t0 , s)]− vn = p(y0, t0)− vn = V (y0 + 1, t0)− V (y0, t0)
= Ey0 [V (Zs−t0 + 1, s)− V (Zs−t0 , s)] ,
where the first identity follows from (2.2.5) and the Markov property of Z, the third identity is
obtained after applying Proposition 2.3.1 iv) twice. On the other hand, the definition of η(y, t)
yields
Ey0 [V (Zs−t0 + 1, s)− V (Zs−t0 , s)]
= Ey0 [p(Zs−t0 , s) + η(Zs−t0 , s) (p(Zs−t0 + 1, s)− p(Zs−t0 , s))]− vn.
The last two identities combined imply
Ey0 [η(Zs−t0 , s) (p(Zs−t0 + 1, s)− p(Zs−t0 , s))] = 0. (2.3.5)
Recall that η ≥ 0, p(·+ 1, s)− p(·, s) > 0 for any s < 1, and the distribution of Zs0−t has positive
mass on each point in Z. We then conclude from (2.3.5) that η(y, s) = 0 for any y ∈ Z. Since s is
arbitrarily chosen,
η(y, s) = 0, for any y ∈ Z, t0 < s < 1. (2.3.6)
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Now fix s, the previous identity yields, for any t < s and y ∈ Z,
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = Ey [V (Zs−t + 1, s)− V (Zs−t, s)]
= Ey [p(Zs−t, s)]− vn = p(y, t)− vn,
where Proposition 2.3.1 iv) is applied twice again to obtain the first identity. Therefore η(y, t) = 0
for any y ∈ Z and t ≤ s, which combined with (2.3.6), implies (2.3.2) is an identity.
Step 2: Fix 1 < n < N . When (2.3.2) is an identity, any optimizers in (2.2.9) are shown not to be
the optimal strategy for (2.2.7). When (2.3.1) is an identity, a similar argument leads to the same
conclusion. Combined with the result in Step 1, the statement of the theorem is confirmed.
When (2.3.2) is an identity, sending t→ 1, V (y, 1), defined as limt→1 V (y, t), satisfies
V (y − 1, 1)− V (y, 1) = vn − P (y − 1).
The previous identity and (2.2.6) combined imply that V (y, 1) is strictly decreasing when y < an+1,
constant when y ∈ [an + 1, an+1 + 1), and strictly increasing when y ≥ an+1 + 1. Thus y 7→ V (y, 1)
attains its minimum value when y ∈ [an+1, an+1]. Let (XˆB, XˆS) be the point processes whose F I -
intensities are optimizers θˆi,j , i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B, T, S}, in (2.2.9), and set Yˆ = Z + XˆB − XˆS .
Assuming that (XˆB, XˆS) is the optimal strategy for (2.2.7), DPP i) in Appendix 2.7.1 implies
V (y, t) ≥ Ey,t
[
V (Yˆ1, 1)
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− + 1, r))dXˆB,Br +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− + 2, r))dXˆB,Tr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr−, r))dXˆB,Sr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− − 1, r))dXˆS,Sr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− − 2, r))dXˆS,Tr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr−, r))dXˆS,Br
]
,
where the expectation is taken under Py,t with Py,t(Yˆt = y) = 1. However, the value function V (y, t)
is exactly the expected profit when the insider employs the optimal strategy (XˆB, XˆS). Therefore,
the previous identity yields
Ey,t[V (Yˆ1, 1)] = 0.
Recall that V (·, 1), as limit of positive functions, is nonnegative, and it achieves the minimum at
[an + 1, an+1]. The previous identity implies V (y, 1) = 0 when y ∈ [an + 1, an+1] and
Yˆ1 ∈ [an + 1, an+1], Py,t − a.s.. (2.3.7)
However, when (2.3.2) is an identity and (2.3.1) is a strict inequality, any optimizer of (2.2.9)
satisfies θˆB,B = θˆB,S ≡ 0, i.e., XˆB ≡ 0. Therefore, Yˆ = ZB−ZS−XˆS with only negative controlled
jumps from XˆS cannot compensate ZS to satisfy (2.3.7), where [an + 1, an+1] is a finite interval in
Z when 1 < n < N . 
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2.4 A suboptimal strategy
We start to prepare the proof of Theorem 2.2.12 from this section.
For the rest of the paper, N <∞, assumed in Theorem 2.2.12, is enforced unless stated otherwise.
In this section we are going to characterize a suboptimal strategy of feedback form in the
Glosten-Milgrom model with order size δ, such that the pricing rule (2.2.5) is rational. To simplify
presentation, we will take δ = 1, hence omit all superscript δ, throughout this section. Scaling all
processes by δ gives the desired processes when the order size is δ.
The following standing assumption on distribution of v˜ will be enforced throughout this section:
Assumption 2.4.1 There exists a strictly increasing sequence (an)n=1,··· ,N+1 such that
i) an ∈ Z ∪ {−∞,∞}, a1 = −∞, aN+1 =∞, and ∪Nn=1[an, an+1) = Z ∪ {−∞};
ii) P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)) = P(v˜ = vn), n = 1, · · · , N ;
iii) The middle level mn = (an + an+1 − 1)/2 of the interval [an, an+1) is not an integer.
Item i) and ii) have already been assumed in Assumption 2.2.4. Item iii) is a technical assump-
tion which facilities the construction of the suboptimal strategy. In the next section, when an
arbitrary v˜ of distribution (2.1.1) is considered and the order size δ converges to zero, a sequence
(aδn)n=1,··· ,N+1,δ>0 together with a sequence of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0 will be constructed, such
that Assumption 2.4.1 is satisfied for each δ and v˜δ converges to v˜ in law. To simplify nota-
tion, we denote by mn := b(an + an+1 − 1)/2c the largest integer smaller than mn and by
mn := d(an + an+1 − 1)/2e the smallest integer larger than mn. Assumption 2.4.1 iii) implies
an ≤ mn < mn < mn < an+1 and mn −mn = 1 when both an and an+1 are finite.
Let us now define a function U , which relates to the expected profit of a suboptimal strategy and
also dominates the value function V . First the Markov property Z implies that p is continuously
differentiable in the time variable and satisfies8
pt + (p(y + 1, t)− 2p(y, t) + p(y − 1, t))β = 0, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
p(y, 1) = P (y).
(2.4.1)
Define
U(vn, y, 1) :=
an−1∑
j=y
(vn −A(j)) I{y≤mn} +
y∑
j=an+1
(B(j)− vn) I{y≥mn}, y ∈ Z, 1 ≤ n ≤ N, (2.4.2)
8This follows from the same argument as in [18, Footnote 4].
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where A(y) := P (y + 1) and B(y) := P (y − 1) can be considered as ask and bid pricing functions
right before time 1. Since (vn)n=1,··· ,N is increasing, U(·, ·, 1) is non-negative and
U(vn, y, 1) = 0 ⇐⇒ y ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1). (2.4.3)
Given U(·, ·, 1) as above, U is extended to t ∈ [0, 1) as follows:
U(vn, y, t) := U(vn, y, 1) + β
∫ 1
t
(p(y, r)− p(y − 1, r)) dr, y ≥ mn, (2.4.4)
U(vn, y, t) := U(vn, y, 1) + β
∫ 1
t
(p(y + 1, r)− p(y, r)) dr, y ≤ mn, (2.4.5)
for t ∈ [0, 1) and n = 1, · · · , N . Since N is finite, p is bounded, hence U takes finite value.
Proposition 2.4.2 Let Assumption 2.4.1 hold. Suppose that the market maker chooses p in (2.2.5)
as the pricing rule. Then for any insider’s admissible strategy (XB, XS ;F I), with F I-intensities
θi,j , i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B, T, S}, the associated expected profit function J (vn, y, t;XB, XS) satis-
fies
J (vn, y, t;XB, XS) ≤ U(vn, y, t)− L(vn, y, t), n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1]. (2.4.6)
where
L(vn, y, t) :=Ey
[ ∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r))
[(
β − θB,Sr + θS,Sr
)
I{Yr−=mn}
+θS,Tr I{Yr−=mn+1}
]
dr
∣∣∣v˜ = vn]
− Ey
[ ∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r))
[(
β − θS,Br + θB,Br
)
I{Yr−=mn}
+θB,Tr I{Yr−=mn−1}
]
dr
∣∣∣v˜ = vn].
(2.4.7)
Moreover (2.4.6) is an identity when the following conditions are satisfied:
i) Y1 ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1) a.s. when v˜ = vn;
ii) XS,St = X
S,B
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn, XB,Bt = XB,St ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn, θB,T ≡ 0 when y ≥ mn,
and θS,T ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn.
Before proving this result, let us derive equations that U satisfies. The following result shows
that U satisfies (2.3.4) except when y = mn and y = mn, and U satisfies the identity in either
(2.3.1) or (2.3.2) depending on whether y ≤ mn or y ≥ mn.
Lemma 2.4.3 The function U satisfies the following equations: (Here v˜ = vn is fixed and the
dependence on v˜ is omitted in U .)
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t))β = 0, y > mn or y < mn, (2.4.8)
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Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t))β = (p(mn, t)− vn)β, y = mn, (2.4.9)
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t))β = (vn − p(mn, t))β, y = mn, (2.4.10)
U(y, t)− U(y + 1, t)− (vn − p(y, t)) = 0, y ≥ mn, (2.4.11)
U(y, t)− U(y − 1, t) + (vn − p(y, t)) = 0, y ≤ mn. (2.4.12)
Proof. We will only verify these equations when y ≥ mn. The remaining equations can be proved
similarly. First (2.4.2) implies
U(y + 1, 1)− U(y, 1) = B(y + 1)− vn = P (y)− vn, y ≥ mn.
Combining the previous identity with (2.4.4),
U(y + 1, t)− U(y, t) = U(y + 1, 1)− U(y, 1)
+ β
∫ 1
t
(p(y + 1, r)− 2p(y, r) + p(y − 1, r)) dr
= p(y, t)− vn,
where (2.4.1) is used to obtain the second identity. This verifies (2.4.11). When y > mn, summing
up (2.4.11) at y and y + 1, and taking time derivative in (2.4.4), yield
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t))β
= −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)) + β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t))
= 0,
which confirms (2.4.8) when y > mn. When y = mn, observe from (2.4.2), (2.4.4) and (2.4.5) that
U(mn, ·) = U(mn, ·). Then
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t))β
= −β (p(mn, t)− p(mn, t)) + β (U(mn + 1, t)− U(mn, t))
= −β (p(mn, t)− p(mn, t))− β (vn − p(mn, t))
= β (p(mn, t)− vn) ,
where the second identity follows from (2.4.11). 
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2. Throughout the proof the v˜ = vn is fixed and the dependence on v˜ is
omitted in U . Let Y B = ZB+XB,B+XB,T −XS,B and Y S = ZS+XS,S+XS,T −XB,S be positive
and negative parts of Y respectively. Then Y B − ∫ ·0(β − θS,Br − θB,Tr )dr − ∫ ·0 θB,Br dr − 2 ∫ ·0 θB,Tr dr
and Y S−∫ ·0(β−θB,Sr −θS,Tr )dr−∫ ·0 θS,Sr dr−2 ∫ ·0 θS,Tr dr are F I -martingales. Applying Itoˆ’s formula
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to U(Y·, ·), we obtain
U(Y1, 1)
= U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
Ut(Yr−, r)dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] dY Br +
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] dY Sr
= U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
[Ut(Yr−, r) + (U(Yr− + 1, r)− 2U(Yr−, r) + U(Yr− − 1, r))β] dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− + 1, r)− U(Yr−, r)]
(
θB,Br − θS,Br
)
dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− + 2, r)− U(Yr− + 1, r)] θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− − 1, r)− U(Yr−, r)]
(
θS,Sr − θB,Sr
)
dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− − 2, r)− U(Yr− − 1, r)] θS,Tr dr +M1 −Mt,
(2.4.13)
where
M =
∫ ·
0
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] d
(
Y Br −
∫ r
0
(
β − θS,Bu + θB,Bu + θB,Tu
)
du
)
+
∫ ·
0
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] d
(
Y Sr −
∫ r
0
(
β − θB,Su + θS,Su + θS,Tu
)
du
)
.
Since (2.4.11) and (2.4.12) imply U(y+1, t)−U(y, t) is either p(y, t)−vn or p(y+1, t)−vn, which are
both bounded from below by v1−vn and from above by vN −vn, hence M is an F I -martingale (cf.
[13, Chapter I, T6]). On the right hand side of (2.4.13), splitting the second integral on {Yr− ≥ mn},
{Yr− = mn}, and {Yr− < mn}, splitting the fourth integral on {Yr− > mn}, {Yr− = mn}, and
{Yr− ≤ mn}, utilizing U(mn, ·) = U(mn, ·), as well as different equations in Lemma 2.4.3 in different
regions, we obtain
U(Y1, 1)
= U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
(p(mn, r)− vn)βI{Yr−=mn}dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r))βI{Yr−=mn}dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}(θB,Br − θS,Br )dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−<mn}(θB,Br − θS,Br )dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Tr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r)) I{Yr−<mn−1}θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−>mn}(θS,Sr − θB,Sr )dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}(θS,Sr − θB,Sr )dr
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+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r)) I{Yr−>mn+1}θS,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Tr dr +M1 −Mt.
Rearranging the previous identity by putting the profit of (XB, XS) to the left hand side, we obtain
U(y, t)− U(Y1, 1)−K − L+M1 −Mt
=
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r)) θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r))θS,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r)) θS,Tr dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr
(2.4.14)
where
K =
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 1, r)− p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Br dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr−, r)− p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 2, r)− p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr−, r)− p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 1, u)− p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Br dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− − 1, r)− p(Yr− − 2, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Tr dr,
L =
∫ 1
t
[vn − p(mn, r)]
[
(β − θB,Sr + θS,Sr )I{Yr−=mn} + θS,Tr I{Yr−=mn+1}
]
dr
−
∫ 1
t
[vn − p(mn, r)]
[
(β − θS,Br + θB,Br )I{Yr−=mn} + θB,Tr I{Yr−=mn−1}
]
dr.
Taking conditional expectation E[·|F It , Yt = y] on both sides of (2.4.14), the right hand side is
the expected profit J (XB, XS), while, on the left hand side, both U(·, 1) and K are non-negative
(cf. Definition 2.2.1 i)). Therefore (2.4.6) is verified. To attain the identity in (2.4.6), we need i)
Y1 ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1) a.s. so that U(Y1, 1) = 0 a.s. follows from (2.4.3); ii) θB,B = θB,S ≡ 0 when
y ≥ mn, θS,S = θS,B ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn, θB,T ≡ 0 when y ≥ mn, and θS,T ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn. 
Come back to the statement of Proposition 2.4.2. If the insider chooses a strategy such that
both conditions in i) and ii) are satisfied, then the identity in (2.4.6) is attained, hence the expected
profit of this strategy is U − L. On the other hand, define US : {v1, · · · , vN} × Z× [0, 1]→ R via
US(vn, y, t) =
 U(vn, y, t) y ≥ mnU(vn, y − 1, t) y ≤ mn . (2.4.15)
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The next result shows that US dominates the value function V , therefore US −U +L is the upper
bound of the potential loss of the expected profit. In section 2.6, we will prove this potential loss
converges to zero as δ ↓ 0. Therefore, when the order size is small, the insider losses little expected
profit by employing a strategy satisfying Proposition 2.4.2 i) and ii).
Proposition 2.4.4 Let Assumption 2.4.1 hold. Then V ≤ US, hence V <∞, on {v1, · · · , vN} ×
Z× [0, 1].
Proof. Fix vn and omit it as the first argument of U
S and U throughout the proof. We first verify
US(y, t)− US(y + 1, t)− (vn − p(y, t)) = 0, (2.4.16)
USt +
(
US(y + 1, t)− 2US(y, t) + US(y − 1, t))β = 0, (2.4.17)
for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1). Indeed, when y ≥ mn, (2.4.16) is exactly (2.4.11). When y = mn,
US(mn, t)− US(mn, t) = U(mn − 1, t)− U(mn, t)
= U(mn − 1, t)− U(mn, t) = vn − p(mn, t),
where the second identity follows from U(mn, t) = U(mn, t) and the third identity holds due to
(2.4.12). When y < mn,
US(y, t)− US(y + 1, t) = U(y − 1, t)− U(y, t) = vn − p(y, t),
where (2.4.12) is utilized again to obtain the second identity. Therefore (2.4.16) is confirmed for
all cases. As for (2.4.17), (2.4.16) yields
US(y + 1, t)− 2US(y, t) + US(y − 1, t) = p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t).
On the other hand, we have from (2.4.4) and (2.4.5) that
USt (y, t) =
 Ut(y, t) = −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)) y ≥ mnUt(y − 1, t) = −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)) y ≤ mn .
Therefore (2.4.17) is confirmed after combining the previous two identities.
Now note that US(·, 1) ≥ 0, moreover US satisfies (2.4.16) and (2.4.17). The assertion V ≤ US
follows from the same argument as in the high type of [18, Proposition 3.2]. 
Having studied the insider’s optimization problem, let us turn to the market maker. Given
(XB, XS ;F I), Definition 2.2.11 ii) requires the pricing rule to be rational. This leads to another
constraint on (XB, XS ;F I).
Proposition 2.4.5 If there exists an admissible strategy (XB, XS ;F I) such that
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i) Y B = ZB + XB,B + XB,T − XS,B and Y S = ZS + XS,S + XS,T − XB,S are independent
F Y−adapted Poisson processes with common intensity β;
ii) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = [v˜ = vn], n = 1, · · · , N .
Then the pricing rule (2.2.5) is rational.
Proof. For any t ∈ [0, 1],
p(Yt, t) = EYt [P (Z1−t)] = E [P (Z1) |Zt = Yt] = E
[
P (Y1) |F Yt
]
= E[v˜ |F Yt ],
where the third identity holds since Y and Z have the same distribution, the fourth identity follows
from ii) and (2.2.6). 
Remark 2.4.6 If the insider places a buy (resp. sell) order when a noise buy (resp. sell) order
arrives, Proposition 2.4.5 i) cannot be satisfied. Therefore in the asymptotic equilibrium the insider
will not trade in the same direction as the noise traders, i.e., XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0, so that the market
maker can employ a rational pricing rule.
Concluding this section, we need to construct point processes (XB, XS ;F I) which simultane-
ously satisfy conditions in Proposition 2.4.2 ii), Proposition 2.4.5 i) and ii)9. This construction is
a natural extension of [18, Section 4], where N = 2 is considered, and will be presented in the next
section.
2.5 Construction of a point process bridge
In this section, we will construct point processesXB andXS on a probability space (Ω,F I , (F It )t∈[0,1],P)
such that XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0, due to Remark 2.4.6, and satisfy
i) Y B = ZB +XB,B −XS,B and Y S = ZS +XS,S −XB,S are independent F Y -adapted Poisson
processes with common intensity β;
ii) XB,Bt = X
B,S
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn, XS,St = XS,Bt ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn;
iii) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = [v˜ = vn] P-a.s. for n = 1, · · · , N .
The construction is a natural extension of [18] where N = 2 is considered. As in [18], XB and XS
are constructed using two independent sequences of iid random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with
uniform distribution on [0, 1], moreover they are independent of Z and v˜. The insider uses (ηi)i≥1
to randomly contribute either buy or sell orders, and uses (ζi)i≥1 to randomly cancel noise orders.
9Note is Proposition 2.4.5 ii) implies Proposition 2.4.2 i).
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Throughout this section Assumption 2.4.1 is enforced. Moreover, we set δ = 1, hence suppress the
superscript δ. Otherwise XB and XS can be scaled by δ to obtain the desired processes.
In the following construction, we will define a probability space (Ω,F I , (F It )t∈[0,1], P) on which
Y takes the form
Y = Z +
N∑
n=1
I{An}(X
B −XS). (2.5.1)
Here Z is the difference of two independent F I -adapted Poisson processes with intensity β, An ∈
F I0 such that P(An) = P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)) for each n = 1, · · · , N .
Before constructing XB and XS satisfying desired properties, let us draw some intuition from
the theory of filtration enlargement. Let us define (D([0, 1],Z),F , (F t)t∈[0,1], P) be the canonical
space where D([0, 1],Z) is Z-valued ca`dla`g functions, P is a probability measure under which ZB and
ZS are independent Poisson processes with intensities β, (F t)t∈[0,1] is the minimal filtration gener-
ated by ZB and ZS satisfying the usual conditions, andF = ∨t∈[0,1]F t. Let us denote by (Gt)t∈[0,1]
the filtration (F t)t∈[0,1] enlarged with a sequence of random variables (I{Z1∈[an,an+1)})n=1,··· ,N .
In order to find the G-intensities of ZB and ZS , we use a standard enlargement of filtration
argument which can be found, e.g. in [35]. To this end, recall hn(y, t) = P[Z1 ∈ [an, an+1) |Zt = y].
Note that hn is strictly positive on Z × [0, 1). Moreover the Markov property of Z implies hn is
continuously differentiable in the time variable and satisfies
∂thn + (hn(y + 1, t)− 2hn(y, t) + hn(y − 1, t))β = 0, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
hn(y, 1) = I{y∈[an,an+1)}.
(2.5.2)
Lemma 2.5.1 The G-intensities of ZB and ZS at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zt− + 1, t)
hn(Zt−, t)
β and
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zt− − 1, t)
hn(Zt−, t)
β,
respectively.
Proof. We will only calculate the intensity for ZB. The intensity of ZS can be obtained similarly.
All expectations are taken under P throughout this proof. For s ≤ t < 1, take an arbitrary E ∈ F s
and denote MBt := Z
B
t − βt. The definition of hn and the F -martingale property of MB imply
E
[
(MBt −MBs )I{E}I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
]
= E
[
(MBt −MBs )I{E}hn(Zt, t)
]
= E
[
I{E}(〈MB, hn(Z·, ·)〉t − 〈MB, hn(Z·, ·)〉s)
]
= E
[
I{E}
∫ t
s
β (hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)) dr
]
= E
[
I{E}
∫ t
s
β I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)
hn(Zr−, r)
dr
]
.
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These computations for each n = 1, · · · , N imply that
MB −
∫ ·
s
β
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)
hn(Zr−, r)
dr
defines a G-martingale. Therefore the G-intensity of ZB follows from ZBt = MBt + βt. 
To better understand intensities in the previous lemma, let us collect several properties for hn:
Lemma 2.5.2 Let Assumption 2.4.1 hold. The following properties hold for each hn, n = 1, · · · , N :
i) hn(·, ·) = hn(2mn − ·, ·); in particular, hn(mn, ·) = hn(mn, ·).
ii) y 7→ hn(y, t) is strictly increasing when y ≤ mn and strictly decreasing when y ≥ mn.
Here, when n = 1 (resp. n = N), mn = mn = −∞ (resp. mn = mn =∞).
Proof. Recall that an + an+1 − 1 = 2mn. Then
hn(y, t) = P[Z1 ∈ [an, an+1) |Zt = y] = P[y + Z1−t ∈ [an, an+1)]
= P[2mn − y − Z1−t ∈ (2mn − an+1, 2mn − an]]
= P[2mn − y − Z1−t ∈ [an, an+1)] = hn(2mn − y, t),
where the last identity holds since Z and −Z have the same distribution. This verifies i). To prove
ii), rewrite hn(y, t) = P[Z1−t ∈ [an − y, an+1 − y)]. Then the statement ii) follows from the fact
that y 7→ P(Z1−t = y) is strictly increasing when y ≤ 0 and strictly decreasing when y ≥ 0. 
In what follows, given An ∈ F I0 such that P(An) = P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)), (XB, XS ; F I) on An
will be constructed so that F I -intensity of Y B (resp. Y S) on An match G-intensities of ZB (resp.
ZS) on [Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)]. Matching these intensities ensures that (XB, XS ;F I) satisfies desired
properties, cf. Proposition 2.5.5 below. Recall Y B = ZB+XB,B−XS,B and Y S = ZS+XS,S−XB,S .
Subtracting β from G-intensities of ZB (resp. ZS) in Lemma 2.5.1, we can read out intensities of
XB,B −XS,B (resp. XS,S −XB,S). Since property ii) at the beginning of this section implies that
θB and θS are never positive at the same time. Therefore, when the intensity of XB,B −XS,B is
positive, the insider contributes buy orders XB,B with such intensity, otherwise the insider submits
sell orders XS,B with the same intensity to cancel some noise buy orders from ZB. Applying the
same strategy to XS,S − XB,S and utilizing Lemma 2.5.2, we read out F I -intensities for Xi,j ,
i, j ∈ {B,S}:
Corollary 2.5.3 Suppose that F I-intensities of Y B and Y S match G-intensities of ZB and ZS
respectively, moreover XB,Bt = X
B,S
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn and XS,St = XS,Bt ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn.
Then F I-intensities of Xi,j, i, j ∈ {B,S}, have the following form on An when Yt− = y:
θB,B(y, t) =
(
hn(y + 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
+
β, θB,S(y, t) =
(
hn(y − 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
−
β,
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θS,S(y, t) =
(
hn(y − 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
+
β, θS,B(y, t) =
(
hn(y + 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
−
β.
In particular, θi,j, i, j ∈ {B,S}, satisfies the following properties:
i) θB,B(y, ·) = θB,S(y, ·) ≡ 0, θS,S(y, ·) > 0, and θS,B(y, ·) > 0, when y ≥ mn; θS,S(y, ·) =
θS,B(y, ·) ≡ 0, θB,B(y, ·) > 0, and θB,S(y, ·) > 0, when y ≤ mn;
ii) θB,B(·, ·) = θS,S(2mn − ·, ·), θB,S(·, ·) = θS,B(2mn − ·, ·);
iii) θB,B(mn, ·) = θS,S(mn, ·) ≡ 0.
As described in Corollary 2.5.3, when An ∈ F 0 is fixed, the state space is divided into two
domains S := {y ∈ Z : y ≥ mn} and B := {y ∈ Z : y ≤ mn}. As Y making excursions into these
two domains, either XS or XB is active. In the following construction, we will focus on the domain
B and construct inductively jumps of XB until Y leaves B. When Y excusers in S, XS can be
constructed similarly.
When Y is in B, one of the goals of XB is to make sure that Y1 ends up in the interval [an, an+1).
In order to achieve this goal, XB will add some jumps in addition to the jumps coming from ZB.
However this by itself will not be enough since Y also jumps downward due to ZS . Thus, XB also
needs to cancel some of downwards jumps from ZS . Therefore XB consists of two components
XB,B and XB,S , where XB,B complements jumps of ZB and XB,S cancels some jumps of ZS . Let
us denote by (τi)i≥1 the sequence of jump times for Y . These stopping times will be constructed
inductively as follows. Given τi−1 < 1 and Yτi−1 ≤ mn, the next jump time τi happens at the
minimum of the following three random times:
• the next jump of ZB,
• the next jump of XB,B,
• the next jump of ZS which is not canceled by a jump of XB,S .
HereXB,B andXB,S need to be constructed so that their intensities θB,B(Yt−, t) and θB,S(Yt−, t)
match the forms in Corollary 2.5.3. This goal is achieved by employing two independent sequences
of iid random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distribution on [0, 1]. They are also
independent of F and (An)n=1,··· ,N . These two sequences will be used to generate a random
variable νi and another sequence of Bernoulli random variables (ξj,i)j≥1 taking values in {0, 1}. Let
(σ+i )i≥1 and (σ
−
i )i≥1 be jump time of Z
B and ZS , respectively. Then, after τi−1, the next jump of
ZB is at σ+
ZBτi−1+1
, the next jump of XB,B is at νi, and the next jump of Z
S not canceled by jumps
of XB,S is at τ−i = min{σ−j > τi−1 : ξj,i = 1}. Then the next jump of Y is at
τi = σ
+
ZBτi−1+1
∧ νi ∧ τ−i .
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The construction of νi and (ξj,i)j≥1 using (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 is exactly the same as in [18, Section
4], only replacing h therein by hn.
All aforementioned construction is performed in a filtered probability space (Ω,F I , (F It )t∈[0,1],P)
such that there exist (An)n=1,··· ,N ∈ F I0 with P(An) = hn(0, 0) and two independent sequences of
iid F I -measurable random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distribution on [0, 1], more-
over these two sequences are independent of both Z and (An)n=1,··· ,N . These requirements can be
satisfied by extending F 0 (resp. F ) to F I0 (resp. F
I). As for the filtration (F It )t∈[0,1], we require
that it is right continuous and complete under P, moreover Z, as the difference of two indepen-
dent Poisson processes with intensity β, is adapted to (F It )t∈[0,1]. Therefore Z is independent of
(An)n=1,··· ,N , since Z has independent increments. Finally, we also assume that (F It )t∈[0,1] is rich
enough so that (νi)i≥1 and (τ−i )i≥1 discussed above are F
I -stopping times. An argument similar
to [18, Lemma 4.3] yields:
Lemma 2.5.4 Given point processes (XB, XS ;F I) constructed above, the F I-intensities of Y B
and Y S at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
N∑
n=1
I{An}
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
β and
N∑
n=1
I{An}
hn(Yt− − 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
β,
respectively.
Now we are ready to verify that our construction is as desired.
Proposition 2.5.5 The process Y as constructed above satisfies the following properties:
i) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = An a.s. for n = 1, · · · , N ;
ii) Y B and Y S are independent Poisson processes with intensity β with respect to the natural
filtration (F Yt )t∈[0,1] of Y ;
iii) (XB, XS ;F I) is admissible in the sense of Definition 2.2.2.
Proof. To verify that Y satisfies the desired properties, let us introduce an auxiliary process
(`t)t∈[0,1):
`t :=
N∑
n=1
I{An}
hn(0, 0)
hn(Yt, t)
, t ∈ [0, 1).
When n = 2, · · · , N − 1, there is only almost surely finite number of positive (resp. negative)
jumps of Y on An when Y· ≥ mn (resp. Y· ≤ mn). Therefore Yt is finite on these An when t < 1
is fixed. When n = 1 (resp. n = N), there is finite number of positive (resp. negative) jumps of Y
on A1 (resp. AN ) before t. Hence Yt < ∞ on A1 (resp. Yt > −∞ on AN ). This analysis implies
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hn(Yt, t) > 0 on An for each n = 1, · · · , N and t < 1. Therefore (`t)t∈[0,1) is well defined positive
process with `0 = 1.
To prove i), we first show that ` is a positive F I -local martingale on [0, 1). To this end, Itoˆ
formula yields that
d`t =
N∑
n=1
I{An}`t−
[
hn(Yt−, t)− hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
dMBt +
hn(Yt−, t)− hn(Yt− − 1, t)
hn(Yt− − 1, t) dM
S
t
]
,
where t ∈ [0, 1). Here
MB = Y B − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
I{An}
hn(Yr− + 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr,
MS = Y S − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
I{An}
hn(Yr− − 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr,
are all F I -local martingales. Define ζ+m = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] : Yt = m} and ζ−m = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] : Yt =
−m}. Consider the sequence of stopping time (ηm)m≥1:
ηm :=
(
I{∪N−1n=2 An}ζ
+
m ∧ ζ−m + I{A1}ζ+m + I{AN}ζ−m
)
∧ (1− 1/m).
It follows from the definition of hn that each hn(Yt, t) on An is bounded away from zero uniformly in
t ∈ [0, ηm]. This implies that `ηm is bounded, hence `ηm is anF I -martingale. The construction of Y
yields limm→∞ ηm = 1. Therefore, ` is a positiveF I -local martingale, hence also a supermartingale,
on [0, 1).
Define `1 := limt→1 `t, which exists and is finite due to Doob’s supermartingale convergence
theorem. This implies hn(Y1−, 1) > 0 on An. On the other hand, the construction of Y yields
Y S (resp. Y B) does not jump at time 1 P-a.s. when Y1− ≤ mn (resp. Y1− ≥ mn). Therefore
hn(Y1, 1) > 0 on An. However hn(·, 1) by definition can only be either 0 or 1. Hence Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)
on An, for each n = 1, · · · , N , and the statement i) is confirmed.
As for the statement ii), we will prove that Y B is an F Y -adapted Poisson process. The similar
argument can be applied to Y S as well. In view of the F I -intensity of Y B calculated in Lemma
2.5.4, one has that, for each i ≥ 1,
Y B·∧τi∧1 − β
(∫ ·∧τi∧1
0
N∑
n=1
I{An}
hn(Yu− + 1, u)
hn(Yu−, u)
du
)
is an F I -martingale, where τi is the ith jump time of Y . We will show in the next paragraph that,
when stopped at τi ∧ 1, Y B is Poisson process in F Y by showing that (Y Bτi∧t− β(τi ∧ t))t∈[0,1] is an
F Y -martingale. (Here note that τi is an F Y -stopping time.) This in turn will imply that Y B is
a Poisson process with intensity β on [0, τ ∧ 1) where τ = limi→∞ τi is the explosion time. Since
Poisson process does not explode, this will further imply Y Bτ∧1 <∞ and, therefore, τ ≥ 1, P-a.s..
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We proceed by projecting the above martingale into F Y to see that
Y B − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
P(An|F Yr )
hn(Yr− + 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr
is an F Y -martingale when stopped at τi ∧ 1. Therefore, it remains to show that, for almost all
t ∈ [0, 1), on [t ≤ τi],
N∑
n=1
P(An|F Yt )
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
= 1, P-a.s.. (2.5.3)
To this end, we will show, on [t ≤ τi],
P(An|F Yt ) = hn(Yt, t), for t ∈ [0, 1). (2.5.4)
Then (2.5.3) follows since Yt 6= Yt− only for countably many times.
We have seen that (`u∧τi)u∈[0,t] is a strictly positive F I -martingale for each i. Define a proba-
bility measure Qi ∼ P on F It via dQi/dP|F It = `τi∧t. It follows from Girsanov’s theorem that Y B
is a Poisson process when stopped at τi ∧ t and with intensity β under Qi. Therefore, they are
independent from An under Qi. Then, for t < 1, we obtain from the Bayes’s formula that
I{r≤τi∧t}P(An|F Yr ) = I{r≤τi∧t}
EQi [I{An}`−1r |F Yr ]
EQi [`−1r |F Yr ]
= I{r≤τi∧t}
EQi [I{An}
hn(Yr,r)
hn(0,0)
|F Yr ]
EQi [
∑N
n=1 I{An}
hn(Yr,r)
hn(0,0)
|F Yr ]
= I{r≤τi∧t}hn(Yr, r),
(2.5.5)
where the third identity follows from the aforementioned independence of Y and An under Qi
along with the fact that Qi does not change the probability of F I0 measurable events so that
Qi(An) = P(An) = hn(0, 0). As result, (2.5.4) follows from (2.5.5) after sending i→∞.
Since Y B and Y S are F Y -Poisson processes and they do not jump simultaneously by their
construction, they are then independent. To show the strategy (XB, XS ;F I) constructed is ad-
missible, it remains to show both E[XB1 I{An}] and E[XS1 I{An}] are finite for each n = 1, · · · , N . To
this end, for each n, E[XB1 I{An}] = E[X
B,B
1 I{An}]+E[X
B,S
1 I{An}], where E[X
B,S
1 I{An}] ≤ E[ZS ] <∞
and E[XB,B1 I{An}] ≤ E[Y B1 I{An}] + E[XS,B1 I{An}] ≤ E[ZB1 |Z ∈ [an, an+1)] + E[ZS1 ] < ∞. Similar
argument also implies E[XS1 I{An}] < ∞. Finally, since N < ∞, p is bounded, Definition 2.2.2 iv)
is verified using E[XB1 I{An}],E[XS1 I{An}] <∞ for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. 
2.6 Convergence
Collecting results from previous sections, we will prove Theorems 2.2.12 and 2.2.13 in this section.
Let us first construct a sequence of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0, each of which will be the fundamental
value in the Glosten-Milgrom model with order size δ.
2.6. Convergence 40
Adding to the sequence of canonical spaces (Ωδ,FZ,δ, (FZ,δt )t∈[0,1],Pδ), defined at the beginning
of section 2.2.2, we introduce (Ω0,F 0, (F 0t )t∈[0,1],P0), where Ω0 = D([0, 1],R) is the space of R-
valued ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1] with coordinate process Z0, and P0 is the Wiener measure. Denote
by P0,y the Wiener measure under which Z00 = y a.s.. Let us now define a R ∪ {−∞,∞}-valued
sequence (a0n)n=1,···N+1 via
a01 = −∞, a0n = Φ−1 (p1 + · · ·+ pn−1) , n = 2, · · · , N + 1,
where Φ(·) = ∫ ·−∞ 1√2pie−x2/2 dx. Using this sequence, one can define a pricing rule following the
same recipe in (2.2.5):
p0(y, t) :=
N∑
n=1
vnh
0
n(y, t), y ∈ R, t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (2.6.1)
where h0n(y, t) := P0,y
(
Z01−t ∈ [a0n, a0n+1)
)
= Φ(a0n+1 − y)− Φ(a0n − y).
As we will see later, this is exactly the pricing rule in the Kyle-Back equilibrium. Moreover,
the sequence (aδn)n=1,··· ,N+1, associated to (v˜δ)δ>0 constructed below, converges to (a0n)n=1,··· ,N+1
as δ ↓ 0, helping to verify Definition 2.2.11 i).
Lemma 2.6.1 For any v˜ with distribution (2.1.1) where N may not be finite, there exists a sequence
of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0, each of which takes value in {v1, · · · , vN}, such that
i) Assumption 2.4.1 is satisfied when v˜ therein is replaced by each v˜δ 10;
ii) Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜), as δ ↓ 0. Here =⇒ represents the weak convergence of probability
measures.
Proof. For each δ > 0, v˜δ will be constructed by adjusting pn in (2.1.1) to some p
δ
n, n = 1, · · · , N .
Starting from [v˜ = v1], choose a
δ
1 = −∞, aδ2 = inf{y ∈ δZ : Pδ(Zδ1 ≤ y) ≥ p1}, and set Pδ(v˜δ =
v1) = Pδ(Zδ1 ∈ [aδ1, aδ2)). Moving on to [v˜δ = v2], choose aδ3 = inf{y ∈ δZ : Pδ(Zδ1 ≤ y) ≥
p1 + p2 and (a
δ
2 + y − δ)/2 /∈ δZ} and set Pδ(v˜δ = v2) = Pδ(Zδ1 ∈ [aδ2, aδ3)). Following this step, we
can define aδn inductively. When N < ∞, we set aδN+1 = ∞. This construction gives a sequence
of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0 taking values in {v1, · · · , vN} such that Pδ(v˜δ = vn) = pδn := Pδ(Zδ1 ∈
[aδn, a
δ
n+1)) with
∑N
n=1 p
δ
n = 1, moreover each sequence (a
δ
n)n=1,··· ,N+1 satisfies Assumption 2.4.1.
It remains to show Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜) as δ ↓ 0. To this end, note that aδn is either the
(
∑n−1
i=1 pi)
th quantile of the distribution of Zδ1 or δ above this quantile. When β
δ is chosen as 1/(2δ2),
it follows from [24, Chapter 6, Theorem 5.4] that Pδ =⇒ P0, in particular, Law(Zδ1) =⇒ Law(Z01 ).
Therefore,
lim
δ↓0
aδn = a
0
n, n = 1, · · · , N + 1. (2.6.2)
10When the order size is δ, Assumption 2.4.1 iii) reads (aδn + a
δ
n+1 − δ)/2 /∈ δZ.
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For any  > 0 and n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the previous convergence yields the existence of a sufficiently
small δ,n, such that [a
0
n + , a
0
n+1 − ) ⊆ [aδn, aδn+1) ⊆ [a0n − , a0n+1 + ) for any δ ≤ δ,n. Hence
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
≤ Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [a0n − , a0n+1 + )
)
→ P0 (Z01 ∈ [a0n − , a0n+1 − )) ,
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
≥ Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [a0n + , a0n+1 − )
)
→ P0 (Z01 ∈ [a0n + , a0n+1 − )) ,
as δ ↓ 0, where both convergence follow from Law(Zδ1) =⇒ Law(Z01 ) and the fact that the distri-
bution of Z01 is continuous. Since  is arbitrarily chosen, utilizing the continuity of the distribution
for Z01 again, we obtain from the previous two inequalities
lim
δ↓0
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
= P0
(
Z01 ∈ [a0n, a0n+1)
)
.
Hence limδ↓0 pδn = p0n for each n ∈ {1, · · ·N} and Law(v˜δ)⇒ Law(v˜). 
After (v˜δ)δ>0 is constructed, it follows from Sections 2.4 and 2.5 that a sequence of strategies
(XB,δ, XS,δ;F I,δ)δ>0 exists, each of which satisfies conditions in Proposition 2.4.5. Hence p
δ in
(2.2.5) is rational for each δ > 0. It then remain to verify Definition 2.2.11 iii) to establish an
asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom equilibrium.
Before doing this, we prove Theorem 2.2.13 first. Let us recall the Kyle-Back equilibrium. Fol-
lowing arguments in [32] and [5], the equilibrium pricing rule is given by (2.6.1) and the equilibrium
demand satisfies the SDE
Y 0 = Z0 +
N∑
n=1
I{v˜=vn}
∫ ·
0
∂yh
0
n(Y
0
r , r)
h0n(Y
0
r , r)
dr,
where Z0 is a P0-Brownian motion modeling the demand from noise traders. Hence the insider’s
strategy in the Kyle-Back equilibrium is given by
X0 =
N∑
n=1
I{v˜=vn}
∫ ·
0
∂yh
0
n(Y
0
r , r)
h0n(Y
0
r , r)
dr.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.13. As we have seen in Lemma 2.6.1, Assumption 2.4.1 is satisfied by each
v˜δ. It then follows from Proposition 2.5.5 i) and ii) that the distribution of Y δ on [v˜δ = vn] is
the same as the distribution of Zδ conditioned on Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1). Denote Y 0,n = Y 0I{v˜=vn} as
the cumulative demand in Kyle Back equilibrium when the fundamental value is vn. The same
argument as in [18, Lemma 5.4] yields
Law(Zδ |Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)) =⇒ Law(Y 0,n), as δ ↓ 0,
for each n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. It then follows
Law(Y δ;F I,δ) =⇒ Law(Y 0;F I,0), as δ ↓ 0, (2.6.3)
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where the filtration F I,0 is F 0 initially enlarged by v˜. Recall from (2.5.1) that Y δ = Zδ +XB,δ −
XS,δ, moreover Y 0 = Z0 +X0. Combining (2.6.3) with Law(Zδ) =⇒ Law(Z0), we conclude from
[30, Proposition VI.1.23] that Law(XB,δ −XS,δ) =⇒ Law(X0) as δ ↓ 0. 
In the rest of the section, Definition 2.2.11 iii) is verified for strategies (XB,δ, XS,δ; F I,δ)δ>0,
which concludes the proof of Theorem 2.2.12. We have seen in Proposition 2.4.2 that the expected
profit of the strategy (XB,δ, XS,δ;F I,δ), constructed in section 2.5, satisfies
J δ(vn, 0, 0;XB,δ, XS,δ) = U δ(vn, 0, 0)− Lδ(vn, 0, 0), n ∈ {1, · · · , N},
where
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = δβ
δ Eδ,0
[∫ 1
0
(vn − pδ(mδn, r)) I{Y δr−=mδn}dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn]
− δβδ Eδ,0
[∫ 1
0
(vn − pδ(mδn, r)) I{Y δr−=mδn}dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] . (2.6.4)
This expression for Lδ follows from changing the order size in (2.4.7) from 1 to δ and utilizing
θB,S,δ(mδn, ·) = θS,S,δ(mδn, ·) = θS,B,δ(mδn, ·) = θB,B,δ(mδn, ·) = 0 from Corollary 2.5.3 i) and iii),
θB,T,δ = θS,T,δ ≡ 0 from Remark 2.4.6, and the expectations are taken under Pδ,0. Here mδn :=
δb(an + an+1 − δ)/2δc the largest integer multiple of δ smaller than mδn and by mδn := δd(an +
an+1 − δ)/2δe the smallest integer multiple of δ larger than mδn. To prove Theorem 2.2.13, let us
first show
lim
δ↓0
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. (2.6.5)
In the rest development, we fix vn and denote L
δ = Lδ(vn, 0, 0).
Before presenting technical proofs for (2.6.5), let us first introduce a heuristic argument. First,
since βδ = 1/(2δ2), (2.6.4) can be rewritten as
Lδ = Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn]− Eδ,0 [Iδ,n1 ∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] , (2.6.6)
where
I
δ,n
· =
∫ ·
0
(vn − pδ(Y δr− − δ, r)) dLδ,m
δ
n
r , I
δ,n
· =
∫ ·
0
(vn − pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)) dLδ,m
δ
n
r ,
and Lδ,y· = 12δ
∫ ·
0 I{Y δr−=y}dr is the scaled occupation time of Y
δ at level y. Here Y δ is, in its natural
filtration, the difference of two independent Poisson Y B,δ and Y S,δ with jump size δ and intensity
βδ, cf. Proposition 2.5.5 ii). For the integrands in I
δ,n
and Iδ,n, we expect that vn−pδ(Y δ· ±δ, ·) L−→
vn − p0(Y 0· , ·), where Y 0 is a P0-Brownian motion. As for the integrators, we will show both Lδ,m
δ
n·
and Lδ,mδn· converge weakly to Lmn· , which is the Brownian local time at level mn := (a0n + a0n+1)/2.
Then the weak convergence of both integrands and integrators yield
I
δ,n
· and I
δ,n
·
L−→ I0,n· :=
∫ ·
0
(vn − p0(Y 0r , r)) dLmnr , as δ ↓ 0.
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Finally passing the previous convergence to conditional expectation, the two terms on the right
hand side of (2.6.6) cancel each other in the limit.
Proposition 2.6.2 On the family of filtration (F Y,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, generated by (Y δ)δ≥0,
pδ(Y δ· ± δ, ·) L−→ p0(Y 0· , ·) on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. To simplify presentation, we will prove
pδ(Y δ· , ·) L−→ p0(Y 0· , ·) as δ ↓ 0. (2.6.7)
The assertions with ±δ can be proved by replacing Y δ by Y δ± δ. First, applying Itoˆ’s formula and
utilizing (2.4.1) yield
pδ(Y δ· , ·) = pδ(0, 0) +
∫ ·
0
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)
)
dY
B,δ
r
+
∫ ·
0
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δr− − δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)
)
dY
S,δ
r ,
(2.6.8)
where Y
B,δ
· = Y
B,δ
· − δβδ· and Y S,δ· = Y S,δ· − δβδ· are compensated jump processes. For pδ(0, 0) on
the right hand side, the same argument in Lemma 2.6.1 yields limδ↓0 pδ(0, 0) = p0(0, 0). As for the
other two stochastic integrals, we will show that they converge weakly to
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r)dW
B
r and −
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r)dW
S
r , respectively,
where WB and WS are two independent Brownian motion. These estimates then imply the right
hand side of (2.6.8) converges weakly to
p0(0, 0) +
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r) dWr,
where W = WB/
√
2 −WS/√2 is another Brownian motion. Since p0 satisfies ∂tp0 + 12∂2yyp0 = 0,
the previous process has the same law as p0(Y 0· , ·). Therefore (2.6.7) is confirmed.
To prove the aforementioned convergence of stochastic integrals, let us first derive the conver-
gence of (pδ(·+ δ, ·)− pδ(·, ·))/δ on R× [0, 1). To this end, it follows from (2.2.5) that
1
δ
(pδ(y + δ, t)− pδ(y, t))
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
Pδ,y+δ(Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1))− Pδ,y(Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1))
]
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
Pδ,y(Zδ1−t = aδn − δ)− Pδ,y(Zδ1−t = aδn+1 − δ)
]
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
P1,0
(
Z11−t =
aδn − δ − y
δ
)
− P1,0
(
Z11−t =
aδn+1 − δ − y
δ
)]
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=
N∑
n=1
vn
1
δ
e−
1−t
δ2 I∣∣∣∣aδn−δ−yδ ∣∣∣∣
(
1− t
δ2
)
− 1
δ
e−
1−t
δ2 I∣∣∣∣aδn+1−δ−yδ ∣∣∣∣
(
1− t
δ2
)
→
N∑
n=1
vn
[
1√
2pi(1− t) exp
(
−(a
0
n − y)2
2(1− t)
)
− 1√
2pi(1− t) exp
(
−(a
0
n+1 − y)2
2(1− t)
)]
= ∂yp
0(y, t), as δ ↓ 0.
Here Z11−t is the difference of two independent Poisson random variables with common parameter
(1− t)βδ = (1− t)(2δ2)−1 under P1,0. Hence the fourth identity above follows from the probability
distribution function of the Skellam distribution: P1,0(Z11−t = k) = e−2µI|k|(2µ), where I|k|(·) is
the modified Bessel function of the second kind and µ = (1 − t)(2δ2)−1, cf. [40]. The convergence
above is locally uniformly in R× [0, 1) according to [3, Theorem 2]. The last identity above follows
from taking y derivative to p0(y, t) =
∑N
n=1
(
Φ
(
a0n+1−y√
1−t
)
− Φ
(
a0n−y√
1−t
))
, cf. (2.6.1). Combining
the previous locally uniform convergence of (pδ(· + δ, ·) − pδ(·, ·))/δ with the weak convergence
Y δ
L−→ Y 0 in their natural filtration, we have from [10, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.5]:
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δ· + δ, ·)− pδ(Y δ· , ·)
) L−→ ∂yp0(Y 0· , ·) on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
As for the integrators in (2.6.8), Y
B,δ L−→ WB/√2 and Y S,δ L−→ WS/√2. Moreover, both
(Y
B,δ
)δ>0 and (Y
S,δ
)δ>0 are predictable uniform tight (P-UT), since 〈Y B,δ〉t = 〈Y S,δ〉t = t/2, for
any δ > 0, cf. [30, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.13 (iii)]. Then combining weak convergence of both
integrands and integrators, we obtain from [30, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.22] that∫ ·
0
1
δ
(pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)) dY B,δr L−→
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r) dW
B
r on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
A similar weak convergence holds for the other stochastic integral in (2.6.8) as well. Therefore
the claimed weak convergence of stochastic integrals on the right hand side of (2.6.8) is confirmed.

Having studied the weak convergence of integrands in I
δ,n
and Iδ,n, let us switch our attention
to the integrators Lδ,mδn and Lδ,mδn .
Proposition 2.6.3 On the family of filtration (F Y,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, for any n ∈ {1, · · · , N},
Lδ,mδn L−→ Lmn and Lδ,mδn L−→ Lmn on D[0, 1] as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we will prove
Lδ,0 L−→ L0 as δ ↓ 0. (2.6.9)
Since limδ↓0mδn = limδ↓0mδn = mn follows from (2.6.2), the statement of the proposition follows
from replacing Y δ by Y δ −mδn (or by Y δ −mδn) and Y 0 by Y 0 −mn in the rest of the proof. To
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prove (2.6.9), applying Itoˆ’s formula to |Y δ· | yields
|Y δ· | =
∑
r≤·
(
|Y δr | − |Y δr−|
)
=
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
d(Y B,δr /δ − βδr)
+
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
d(Y S,δr /δ − βδr)
+
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ|+ |Y δr− − δ| − 2|Y δr−|
)
βδdr
=
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
B,δ
r /δ +
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
S,δ
r /δ
+
∫ ·
0
1
δ
I{Y δr−=0}dr,
(2.6.10)
where the third identity follows from |y+ δ|+ |y− δ|− 2|y| = 2δ I{y=0} for any y ∈ R. On the other
hand, Tanaka formula for Brownian motion is
|Y 0· | =
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dY
0
r + 2L0· , (2.6.11)
where sgn(x) = 1 when x > 0 or −1 when x ≤ 0.
The convergence (2.6.9) is then confirmed by comparing both sides of (2.6.10) and (2.6.11).
To this end, since Y δ
L−→ Y 0 and the absolute value is a continuous function, then |Y δ| L−→ |Y 0|
follows from [10, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.1]. Then (2.6.9) is confirmed as soon as we prove the
martingale term on the right hand side of (2.6.10) converges weakly to the martingale in (2.6.11),
which we prove in the next result. 
Lemma 2.6.4 Let M δ :=
∫ ·
0
(|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|) dY B,δr /δ+∫ ·0 (|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|) dY S,δr /δ and M0 :=∫ ·
0 sgn(Y
0
r ) dY
0
r . Then M
δ L−→M0 on D[0, 1] as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. Define f δ(y) := 1δ (|y + δ| − |y|) for y ∈ R and observe
f δ(y) =

1 y ≥ 0
2y/δ + 1 −δ < y < 0
−1 y ≤ −δ
.
It is clear that f δ converges to sgn(·) locally uniformly on R \ {0}. On the other hand, Y δ L−→ Y 0
and the law of Y 0 is continuous. It then follows from [10, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.5] that f δ(Y δ)
L−→
sgn(Y 0). As for the integrators (Y
B,δ
)δ>0, as we have seen in the proof of Proposition 2.6.2, they
converge weakly to WB/
√
2 and are P-UT. Then [30, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.22] implies∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
B,δ
r /δ
L−→ 1√
2
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dW
B
r .
Similar argument yields∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
S,δ
r /δ
L−→ − 1√
2
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dW
S
r .
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Here WB and WS are independent Brownian motion. Defining W = WB/
√
2−WS/√2, we obtain
from the previous two convergence that
M δ
L−→
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dWr which has the same law as M
0. 
Propositions 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 combined yields the weak convergence of (I
δ,n
)δ>0 and (I
δ,n)δ>0. More-
over the sequence of local time in Proposition 2.6.3 also converge in expectation.
Corollary 2.6.5 On the family of filtration (F Y,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, for any n ∈ {1, · · · , N},
I
δ,n
and Iδ,n
L−→ I0,n on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. The statement follows from combining Propositions 2.6.2 and 2.6.3, and appealing to [30,
Chapter VI, Theorem 6.22]. In order to apply the previous result, we need to show that both
(Lδ,mδn)δ>0 and (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 are P-UT. This property will be verified for (Lδ,mδn)δ>0. The same argu-
ment works for (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 as well. To this end, since Lδ,mδn is a nondecreasing process, (Lδ,mδn)δ>0
is P-UT as soon as (V ar(Lδ,mδn)1)δ>0 is tight, where V ar(X) is the variation of the process X, cf.
[30, Chapter VI, 6.6]. Note V ar(Lδ,mδn)1 = Lδ,m
δ
n
1 , since Lδ,m
δ
n is nondecreasing. Then the tightness
of (V ar(Lδ,mδn)1)δ>0 is implied by Proposition 2.6.3. 
Corollary 2.6.6 For any n ∈ {1, · · · , N} and t ∈ [0, 1],
lim
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
Lδ,mδnt
]
= lim
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
Lδ,mδnt
]
= E0,0 [Lmnt ] .
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we will prove limδ↓0 Eδ,0[Lδ,0t ] = E0,0[L0t ]. Then the statement
of the corollary follows from replacing Y δt by Y
δ
t −mδn or Y δt −mδn in the rest of the proof. Since
the stochastic integrals in (2.6.10) are Pδ,0-martingales,
2Eδ,0[Lδ,0t ] = Eδ,0[|Y δt |].
Since E[(Y δt )2] = t for any δ > 0, (|Y δt |;Pδ,0)δ>0 is uniformly integrable. It then follows from
[24, Appendix, Proposition 2.3] and Law(|Y δt |) =⇒ Law(|Y 0t |) that limδ↓0 Eδ,0[|Y δt |] = E0,0[|Y 0t |].
Therefore the claim follows since E0,0[|Y 0t |] = 2E0,0[L0t ] cf. (2.6.11). 
Collecting previous results, the following result confirms (2.6.5).
Proposition 2.6.7 For the strategies (XB,δ, XS,δ;F I,δ)δ>0 constructed in section 2.5,
lim
δ↓0
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
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Proof. Fix any  ∈ (0, 1). Corollary 2.6.5 implies that Law(Iδ,n1−;F Y,δ) =⇒ Law(I0,n1−;F 0). Recall
Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜) from Lemma 2.6.1. It then follows
Law
(
I
δ,n
1− I{v˜δ=vn};F
Y,δ
)
=⇒ Law
(
I0,n1− I{v˜=vn};F
0
)
.
On the other hand, since N is finite, pδ is bounded uniformly in δ. Then there exists constant
C such that |Iδ,n1−| I{v˜δ=vn} ≤ CLδ,m
δ
n
1− , where the expectation of the upper bound converges, cf.
Corollary 2.6.6. Therefore appealing to [24, Appendix Theorem 1.2] and utilizing limδ↓0 Pδ(v˜δ =
vn) = P0(v˜ = vn) from Lemma 2.6.1, we obtain
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1− | v˜δ = vn
]
=
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1− I{v˜δ=vn}
]
Pδ(v˜δ = vn)
→
E0,0
[
I0,n1− I{v˜=vn}
]
P0(v˜ = vn)
= E0,0
[
I0,n1− | v˜ = vn
]
,
(2.6.12)
as δ ↓ 0. On the other hand, since limδ↓0 Pδ(v˜δ) = P0(v˜ = vn) > 0, there exists a constant C such
that
Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ≤ C Eδ,0 [Lδ,mδn1 − Lδ,mδn1− ] → C E0,0 [Lmn1 − Lmn1−] ,
as δ ↓ 0, where the convergence follows from applying Corollary 2.6.6 twice. For the difference of
Brownian local time, Le´vy’s result (cf. [31, Chapter 3, Theorem 6.17]) yields
E0,0
[Lmn1 − Lmn1−] = E0,−mn [L01 − L01−]
=
1
2
E0,−mn
[
sup
r≤1
Y 0r − sup
r≤1−
Y 0r
]
=
√
2
pi
(1−√1− ),
where Y 0 is a P0-Brownian motion and E0,y[supr≤t Y 0r ] =
√
2t/pi+ y is utilized to obtain the third
identity. Now the previous two estimates combined yield
lim sup
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ≤ C(1−√1− ), for another constant C. (2.6.13)
Estimates in (2.6.12) and (2.6.13) also hold when I
δ,n
is replaced by Iδ,n. These estimates then
yield
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn
]
≤ Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1− − Iδ,n1− | v˜δ = vn
]
+ Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn]
+ Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] .
Sending δ ↓ 0 in the previous inequality, the first term on the right side vanishes in the limit,
because both conditional expectations converge to the same limit, the limit superior of both second
and third terms are less than C(1−√1− ). Now since  is arbitrarily choose, sending → 1 yields
lim supδ↓0 Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn
]
≤ 0. Similar argument leads to
lim inf
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn
]
≥ 0,
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which concludes the proof. 
Finally the proof of Theorem 2.2.12 is concluded.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.12. It remains to verify Definition 2.2.11 iii). Fix vn and (y, t) = (0, 0)
throughout the proof. We have seen from Proposition 2.4.4 that V δ ≤ US,δ. On the other hand,
Proposition 2.4.2 yields J (XB,δ, XS,δ) = U δ − Lδ. Therefore
sup
(XB ,XS) admissible
J δ(XB, XS)− J δ(XB,δ, XS,δ) ≤ US,δ − U δ + Lδ.
Since limδ↓0 Lδ = 0 is proved in Proposition 2.6.7, it suffices to show limδ↓0 US,δ − U δ = 0. To this
end, from the definition of US,δ,
US,δ(0, 0)− U δ(0, 0) = (U δ(−δ, 0)− U δ(0, 0)) I{0≤mδn} = δ(vn − pδ(0, 0))I{0≤mδn}. (2.6.14)
The second identity above follows from (2.4.12) which reads U δ(y, t)−U δ(y−1, t)+δ(vn−pδ(y, t)) =
0 for y ≤ mδn when the order size is δ. Therefore limδ↓0 US,δ − U δ = 0 is confirmed after sending
δ ↓ 0 in (2.6.14). 
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Viscosity Solution
Proposition 2.3.1 will be proved in this section. To simplify notation, δ = 1 and v˜ = vn are fixed
throughout this section. First let us recall the definition of (discontinuous) viscosity solution to
(2.2.8). Given a locally bounded function11 v : Z × [0, 1] → R, its upper-semicontinuous envelope
v∗ and lower-semicontinuous envelope v∗ are defined as
v∗(y, t) := lim sup
t′→t
v(y, t′), v∗(y, t) := lim inf
t′→t
v(y, t′), (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1]. (2.7.1)
Definition 2.7.1 Let v : Z× [0, 1]→ R be locally bounded.
i) v is a (discontinuous) viscosity subsolution of (2.2.8) if
−ϕt(y, t)−H(y, t, v∗) ≤ 0,
for all y ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, 1), and any function ϕ : Z × [0, 1] → R continuously differentiable in the
second variable such that (y, t) is a maximum point of v∗ − ϕ.
11Since the state space Z is discrete, v is locally bounded if v(y, ·) is bounded in any bounded neighborhood of t
and any fixed y ∈ Z.
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ii) v is a (discontinuous) viscosity supersolution of (2.2.8) if
−ϕt(y, t)−H(y, t, v∗) ≥ 0,
for all y ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, 1), and any function ϕ : Z × [0, 1] → R continuously differentiable in the
second variable such that (y, t) is a minimum point of v∗ − ϕ.
iii) We say that v is a (discontinuous) viscosity solution of (2.2.8) if it is both subsolution and
supersolution.
For the insider’s optimization problem, let us recall the dynamic programming principle (cf.
e.g. [38, Remark 3.3.3]). Given an admissible strategy (XB, XS), any [t, 1]−valued stopping time
τ , and the fundamental value vn, denote the associated profit by
Int,τ :=
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r))dXB,Br +
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r))dXB,Tr
+
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))dXB,Sr −
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r))dXS,Sr
−
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r))dXS,Tr −
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))dXS,Br ,
where Y = Z +XB −XS . Then the dynamic programming principle reads:
DPP i) For any admissible strategy (XB, XS) and any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ ,
V (y, t) ≥ Ey,t[V (τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ ].
DPP ii) For any  > 0, there exists an admissible strategy (XB, XS) such that for all [t, 1]-valued
stopping time τ ,
V (y, t)−  ≤ Ey,t[V (τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ ].
The viscosity solution property of the value function V follows from the dynamic programming prin-
ciple and standard arguments in viscosity solutions, (see e.g. [38, Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2]12.)
Therefore Proposition 2.3.1 i) is verified.
Remark 2.7.2 The proof of DPP ii) utilizes the measurable selection theorem. To avoid this
technical result, one could employ the weak dynamic programming principle in [12]. For the
insider’s optimization problem, the weak dynamic programming principle reads:
WDPP i) For any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ ,
V (y, t) ≤ sup
(XB ,XS)
Ey,t
[
V ∗(τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ
]
.
12Therein the stopping time τm can be chosen as the first jump time of Y where Ytm = y for a sequence (tm)m → t
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WDPP ii) For any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ and any upper-semicontinuous function ϕ on
Z× [0, 1] such that V ≥ ϕ, then
V (y, t) ≥ sup
(XB ,XS)
Ey,t
[
ϕ(τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ
]
.
Conditions A1, A2, and A3 from Assumption A in [12] are clearly satisfied in the current context.
Condition A4 from Assumption A can be verified following the same argument in [12, Proposition
5.4]. Therefore aforementioned weak dynamic programming principle holds. Hence the value
function is a viscosity solution to (2.2.8) following from arguments similar to [12, Section 5.2].
Now the proof of Proposition 2.3.1 ii) is presented. To prove (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H), observe from
the viscosity supersolution property of V that H(vn, y, t, V∗) < ∞, hence (vn, y, t, V∗) ∈ dom(H).
On the other hand, for any integrable intensities θi,j , i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B, T, S}, due to Definition
2.2.2 iv), one can show Ey,t[Int,1] is a continuous function in t. As a supremum of a family of
continuous function (cf. (2.2.7)), V is then lower-semicontinuous in t. Therefore V∗ ≡ V , which
implies (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H) for any vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1). It then follows from (2.3.1) and (2.3.2)
that
V (y−1, t)+p(y−1, t)−vn ≤ V (y, t) ≤ V (y−1, t)+p(y, t)−vn, for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1). (2.7.2)
Taking limit supremum in t in the previous inequalities and utilizing the continuity of t 7→
p(y, t), it follows that the previous inequalities still hold when V is replaced by V ∗, which means
(vn, y, t, V
∗) ∈ dom(H) for any vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1). As a result, H(vn, y, t, V∗) and H(vn, y, t, V ∗)
have the reduced form (2.3.3) where V is replaced by V∗ and V ∗, respectively. Hence Definition
2.7.1 implies that V is a viscosity solution of (2.3.4).
To prove Proposition 2.3.1 iii) and iv), let us first derive a comparison result for (2.3.4). The
function v : Z× [0, 1]→ R has at most polynomial growth in its first variable if there exist C and
n such that |v(y, t)| ≤ C(1 + |y|n), for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1].
Lemma 2.7.3 Assume that u (resp. v) has at most polynomial growth and that it is upper-
semicontinuous viscosity subsolution (resp. lower-semicontinuous supersolution) to (2.3.4). If
u(·, 1) ≤ v(·, 1), then u ≤ v in Z× [0, 1).
Assume this comparison result for a moment. Inequalities (2.7.2) and Assumption 2.2.5 com-
bined imply that V is of at most polynomial growth. Then Lemma 2.7.3 and (2.7.1) combined yield
V∗ ≤ V ∗ ≤ V∗, which implies the continuity of t 7→ V (y, t), hence Proposition 2.3.1 iii) is verified.
On the other hand, one can prove V˜ (y, t) := Ey,t [V (Z1, 1)] is of at most polynomial growth and is
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another viscosity solution to (2.3.4)13. Then Lemma 2.7.3 yields
V (y, t) = V˜ (y, t) = Ey,t [V (Z1, 1)] ,
which confirms Proposition 2.3.1 iv) via the Markov property of Z.
Proof of Lemma 2.7.3. For λ > 0, define u˜ = eλtu and v˜ = eλtv. One can check u˜ (resp. v˜) is a
viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) to
−wt + λw − (w(y + 1, t)− 2w(y, t) + w(y − 1, t))β = 0. (2.7.3)
Since the comparison result for (2.7.3) implies the comparison result for (2.2.8), it suffices to consider
u (resp. v) as the viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) of (2.7.3).
Let C and n be constants such that |u|, |v| ≤ C(1 + |y|n) on Z × [0, 1]. Consider ψ(y, t) =
e−αt(y2n + C˜) for some constants α and C˜. It follows
−ψt + λψ + (ψ(y + 1, t)− 2ψ(y, t) + ψ(y − 1, t))β
> e−αt
(
(α+ λ)(y2n + C˜)− 2βy2n
)
> 0,
when α + λ > 2β. Choosing α satisfying the previous inequality, then v + ξψ, for any ξ > 0, is
a viscosity supersolution to (2.7.3). Once we show u ≤ v + ξψ, the statement of the lemma then
follows after sending ξ ↓ 0.
Since both u and v have at most linear growth
lim
|y|→∞
(u− v − ξψ)(y, t) = −∞. (2.7.4)
Replacing v by v+ξψ, we can assume that u (resp. v) is a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution)
to (2.7.3) and
sup
Z×[0,1]
(u− v) = sup
O×[0,1]
(u− v), for some compact set O ⊂ Z.
Then u ≤ v follows from the standard argument in viscosity solutions (cf. e.g. [38, Theorem 4.4.4]),
which we briefly recall below.
Assume M := supZ×[0,1](u − v) = supO×[0,1](u − v) > 0 and the maximum is attained at
(x, t) ∈ O × [0, 1]. For any  > 0, define
Φ(x, y, t, s) := u(x, t)− v(y, s)− φ(x, y, t, s),
where φ(x, y, t, s) :=
1
 [|x − y|2 + |t − s|2]. The upper-semicontinuous function Φ attains its
maximum, denoted by M, at (x, y, t, s). One can show, using the same argument as in [38,
13Write V˜ (y, t) = E0 [V (Z1−t + y, 1)]. One can utilize the Markov property of Z to show that V˜ is continuous
differentiable and V˜ is a classical solution to (2.3.4).
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Theorem 4.4.4],
M →M and (x, y, t, s)→ (x, x, t, t) ∈ O2 × [0, 1]2 as  ↓ 0.
Here (x, y, t, s) ∈ O2 × [0, 1]2 for sufficiently small . Now observe that
• (x, t) is a local maximum of (x, t) 7→ u(x, t)− φ(x, y, t, s);
• (y, s) is a local minimum of (y, t) 7→ v(y, s) + φ(x, y, t, s).
Then the viscosity subsolution property of u and the supersolution property of v imply, respectively,
− 2

(t − s) + λu(x, t)− (u(x + 1, t)− 2u(x, t) + u(x, t))β ≤ 0,
− 2

(t − s) + λv(y, s)− (u(y + 1, s)− 2v(y, s) + v(y, s))β ≥ 0.
Taking difference of the previous inequalities yields
(λ+ 2β)(u(x, t)− v(y, s))
≤ β (u(x + 1, t) + u(x − 1, t))− β (v(y + 1, s) + v(y − 1, s)) .
Sending  ↓ 0 on both sides, we obtain
(λ+ 2β)M = (λ+ 2β)u(x, t)
≤ β (u(x+ 1, t)− v(x+ 1, t))+ β (u(x− 1, t)− v(x− 1, t)) ≤ 2βM,
which contradicts with λM > 0. 
Chapter 3
Monotone convergence of BSDEs
driven by marked point processes and
an application
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, the value function of the insider presented in (2.2.7) has a boundary layer V δ(v˜, y, 1) =
limt→1 V δ(v˜, y, t). The boundary layer is due to the unbounded trading intensities of the insider.
Where does this boundary layer comes from? To answer the question, we consider a family of
control problems where insider’s trading intensity is at most n ∈ N. For each constrained value
function, we represent it via solutions of a BSDE driven by a marked point process. The value
function of these problems increasingly converges to the original value function as n → ∞, which
implies there also has a convergence in BSDEs.
To take the monotone limit, we extend Peng’s [37] monotone convergence of BSDEs from
Brownian setting to market point processes. Before considering the monotone convergence, we use
[20] to prove the well-posedness of a family of penalised BSDEs.
Confortola and Fuhrman [20] studied a class of BSDEs driven by marked point processes.
They prove existence, uniqueness, a priori estimates and continuous dependence upon data of the
BSDE. They also apply this family of BSDEs to study a class on non-Markovian optimal control
problems whose randomness is driven by marked point processes. In the Brownian setting, Peng
[37] proved a monotone convergence result for supersolutions to BSDEs. More precisely, if there
exists a sequence of ca`dla`g supersolutions Y n (cf. Definition 1.2.1) converging to a process Y
with E
[
sup0≤t≤T |Yt|2
]
< ∞, the process Y is also a ca`dla`g supersolution of the same BSDE.
In addition, Peng considers a family of penalised BSDEs converging to the smallest supersolution
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satisfying the constrained BSDE.
First we consider a sequence of BSDEs
Y nt = ξ
n +
∫ T
t
gs(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zns (y)q(ds dy) + C
n
T − Cnt , (3.1.1)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and n ∈ N, where g is Lipschitz continuous and Cn is a continuous increasing process
representing penalty of violation of a constraint. Rewriting (3.1.1) as a Lipschitz BSDE, we use
[20] to establish existence and uniqueness of a solution to (3.1.1). Next we establish a comparison
theorem in Theorem 3.3.7 to show that the sequence (Y n)n∈N is increasing. If the sequence of
supersolutions Y n increasingly converges to the process Y in (3.1.1) with E
[
sup0≤s≤T |Ys|2
]
<∞,
we show that the process Y is also a supersolution. Moreover, there exist C which is the weak limit
of Cn and Z which is the strong limit of Zn. Both Y and Z satisfy the BSDE with the constraint.
Finally the general result described above is applied to the insider’s optimisation problem to give
a stochastic representation of the boundary layer.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section introduces a market point process and
defines spaces of functions, random variables and processes. In section 3.3, we prove the well-
posedness of a BSDE and provides a comparison theorem which is used in the following sections.
In section 3.4 we provide a monotone convergence theorem in Theorem 3.4.2 and consider the
smallest supersolution subject to a given constraint on (Y, Z). Finally, in section 3.5, we consider
an application, insider trading problem and represent the value function by a monotone sequence
of BSDE solutions.
3.2 Marked point process
In this section, following [13, Chapter VIII], we introduce marked point processes and stochastic
integrals with respect to them.
3.2.1 Definitions
Consider a measurable space (E,E ), and a random sequence (Tn, ζn)n≥0 ∈ [0,∞) × E, where
(Tn)n≥0, starting from T0 = 0, is an increasing sequence of non-anticipating random times to
describe the occurrence of events and ζn ∈ E is a quantity observed at time Tn. We assume that Tn
is non-explosive, i.e. Tn → ∞ P-a.s. as n → ∞, which guarantees the number of events occurring
on any finite interval, is almost surely finite. The random sequence (Tn, ζn)n≥0 is called a marked
point process, where (Tn)n≥0 is a point process and (ζn)n≥0 are marks. Define a counting process
Nt(K) by
Nt(K) =
∑
n≥1
I{Tn≤t}I{ζn∈K}, K ∈ E . (3.2.1)
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We associate to each K ∈ E the counting measure µ such that
µ((0, t],K) = Nt(K), t ≥ 0. (3.2.2)
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be a probability space and satisfying the usual conditions. Denote by P the
F -predictable algebra on Ω× [0, T ]. If any process H is P ⊗ E -measurable satisfying
E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
E
|Ht(k)|µ(dt dk)
]
<∞, (3.2.3)
it follows from [13, Chapter VIII, T14] that there exists a function φt and an increasing process A
with A0 = 0, such that
i) K → φt(K) is a probability measure on (E,E );
ii) t→ φt(K) is a predictable process;
iii) we have
E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
E
Ht(k)µ(dt dk)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
E
Ht(k)φt(dk)dAt
]
. (3.2.4)
The predictable random measure φt(dk)dAt is denoted by ν(dt, dk) and called the compensator
of µ or dual predictable projection of µ. For H satisfies (3.2.3), we can define the compensated
stochastic integral
Mt :=
∫ t
0
∫
E
Hr(k)q(dr dk), (3.2.5)
where q(dt dk) := µ(dt dk)−ν(dt dk) is called the compensated measure. It follows from [13, Chapter
VIII, C4] that M is a martingale.
3.2.2 Spaces of functions, random variables and stochastic processes
Assumption 3.2.1 The process A is an absolutely continuous increasing process with respect to
time. There exists a constant α such that AT ≤ α a.s..
Now let us introduce the following spaces of functions, random variables and stochastic processes.
• Let L2(E;R) denote the space of E -measurable functions ϕ: E → R satisfying∫
E
|ϕ(y)|2 φt(dy) <∞;
• Let L2(Ω;R) denote the space of random variables ξ: Ω→ R satisfying
|ξ|2 := E
[
|ξ|2
]
<∞;
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• Let L2G (Ω× [0, T ];R) denote the space of adapted ca`dla`g processes Y : Ω× [0, T ]→ R, which
are G -measurable, satisfying
|Y |2 := E
[ ∫ T
0
|Ys|2 dAs
]
<∞,
where G denoted by the (Ft)t≥0-progressive algebra on Ω× [0, T ];
• Let L2P(Ω × [0, T ] × E;R) denote the space of processes Z: Ω × [0, T ] × E → R, which are
P ⊗ E -measurable, satisfying
||Z||2 := E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
E
|Zs(y)|2 φs(dy)dAs
]
<∞;
• Let S2G (Ω× [0, T ];R) denote the space of adapted ca`dla`g processes Y : Ω× [0, T ]→ R, which
are G -measurable, satisfying
|Y |2sup := E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|Ys|2
]
<∞;
• Let S2inc,G (Ω× [0, T ];R) denote the subspace of S2G (Ω× [0, T ];R) which consists processes with
non-decreasing trajectories;
• Let S2inc,c,G (Ω× [0, T ];R) denote the subspace of S2inc,G (Ω× [0, T ];R) which consists processes
with continuous and non-decreasing trajectories;
To simplify notations, let K2(R) denote the space of L2G (Ω × [0, T ];R) × L2P(Ω × [0, T ] × E;R),
endowed with the norm ||(Y,Z)||2 := |Y |2 + ||Z||2.
3.3 Backward stochastic differential equation
In this section, we will consider a BSDE driven by a marked point process. Under suitable assump-
tions, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution. Finally we state a comparison principle
which allows us to compare solutions of BSDEs.
3.3.1 Uniqueness and existence of the BSDE solution
Let us consider a pair of processes (Y,Z) ∈ K2(R) satisfying
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
gs(Ys, Zs(·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + CT − Ct, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.3.1)
which is called the backward stochastic differential equation. In the above equation (3.3.1), the
function g is called a generator, and the process Z is called control process as it controls an adapted
process Y so that Y satisfies the terminal condition YT = ξ.
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Definition 3.3.1 Given a non-decreasing process C, a terminal value ξ and a generator g, if the
pair (Y,Z) solves (3.3.1), then we call Y a supersolution of BSDE with generator g or simply called
g-supersolution on [0, T ]. In particular, when C ≡ 0, Y is called a g-solution on [0, T ].
Assumption 3.3.2 There exist the process C, the random variable ξ and the generator g satisfying
following conditions:
1) C ∈ S2inc,G (Ω× [0, T ];R) with C0 = 0;
2) ξ is a FT -measurable random variable and ξ ∈ L2(Ω;R);
3) for t ∈ [0, T ], r ∈ R, a mapping gt(r, ·): L2(E;R)→ R is given, then
i) for every Z ∈ L2P(Ω × [0, T ] × E;R), the mapping (t, r) → gt(r, Zt(·)) is G ⊗ B(R)-
measurable;
ii) we have E
[ ∫ T
0 gs(0, 0)dAs
]
<∞;
iii) there exist γ1 ≥ 0 and γ′1 ≥ 0 such that r, r′ ∈ R and z, z′ ∈ L2(E;R), we have
∣∣gt(r, z(·))− gt(r′, z′(·))∣∣ ≤ γ′1 ∣∣r − r′∣∣+ γ1(∫
E
∣∣z(y)− z′(y)∣∣2 φt(dy)) 12 . (3.3.2)
Proposition 3.3.3 When Assumption 3.3.2 holds, there exists a unique solution (Y,Z) ∈ K2(R)
solving the BSDE (3.3.1), and Y ∈ S2G (Ω× [0, T ];R).
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3. We introduce a fixed positive constant β > γ21 + 2γ
′
1 and denote
K2,β(R) by a space satisfying the norm of (Y,Z) such that
||(Y, Z)||2β := |Y |2β + ||Z||2β ,
where
|Y |2β := E
[ ∫ T
0
eβAs |Ys|2 dAs
]
<∞,
||Z||2β := E
[ ∫ T
0
eβAs
∫
E
|Zs(y)|2 φs(dy)dAs
]
<∞.
The weighted space K2,β(R) is equivalent to the unweighted space K2(R) defined in section 3.2.2
due to AT ≤ α in Assumption 3.2.1.
Next we define a process Y := Y + C and a random variable ξ := ξ + CT to construct an
equivalent BSDE
Y t = ξ +
∫ T
t
gs(Y s − Cs, Zs(·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.3.3)
Once we can show there exists a unique solution (Y , Z) solving (3.3.3), it is equivalent to show that
there exists a unique solution (Y,Z) solving (3.3.1).
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We also define a mapping Γ : K2,β(R)→ K2,β(R) satisfying (Y , Z) = Γ(U, V ) if (Y , Z) satisfies
Y t = ξ +
∫ T
t
gs(U s − Cs, Vs)dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.3.4)
The Assumption 3.3.2 on the generator g implies that E
[∫ T
0 e
βAs
∣∣gs(U s − Cs, Vs)∣∣2 dAs] < ∞, so
by [20, Lemma 3.3], there exists a unique solution (Y , Z) ∈ K2,β(R) to (3.3.4) and Γ is well-defined.
Then we apply [20, Theorem 3.4] to represent that there exists a unique solution solving (3.3.3).
The sketch of the proof is shown as below. Let us (U
i
, V i), i = 1, 2, be elements of K2,β(R) and let
(Y
i
, Zi) = Γ(U
i
, V i). Denote ∆Y = Y
1 − Y 2, ∆Z = Z1 −Z2, ∆U = U1 −U2 and ∆V = V 1 − V 2.
Using the Lipschitz conditions of g, [20, Theorem 3.4] establishes that(
β − γ
2
1
c3
− c4γ′1
) ∣∣∆Y ∣∣2
β
+ ||∆Z||2β ≤ c3 ||∆V ||2β +
γ′1
c4
∣∣∆U ∣∣2
β
,
for every c3, c4 > 0. By the assumption on β, i.e. β > γ
2
1 + 2γ
′
1, it is possible to find c3 ∈ (0, 1)
such that
β >
γ21
c3
+
2γ′1√
c3
If γ′1 = 0 we see that Γ is a contraction on K2,β(R) endowed with the equivalent norm (Y , Z) →(
β − γ21c3
) ∣∣Y ∣∣2
β
+ ||Z||2β. If γ′1 > 0 we choose c4 = 1/
√
c3 and obtain
γ′1√
c3
∣∣∆Y ∣∣2
β
+ ||∆Z||2β ≤ c3 ||∆V ||2β + γ′1
√
c3
∣∣∆U ∣∣2
β
= c3
(
γ′1√
c3
∣∣∆U ∣∣2
β
+ ||∆V ||2β
)
,
so that Γ is a contraction on K2,β(R) endowed with the equivalent norm (Y , Z)→ γ′1√c3
∣∣Y ∣∣2
β
+ ||Z||2β.
In all cases there exists a unique fixed point which is the required unique solution to the BSDE
(3.3.3). 
Proposition 3.3.3 illustrates that a supersolution Y on [0, T ] is uniquely determined once the
terminal value ξ, the increasing ca`dla`g process C and the generator function g are given. On the
other hand, we can extend [37, Proposition 1.6] for (3.3.1) to show:
Lemma 3.3.4 Given a supersolution Y on [0, T ], there exists a unique pair (Z,C) ∈ L2P(Ω ×
[0, T ]× E;R)× S2inc,G (Ω× [0, T ];R) with C0 = 0.
Proof. We suppose two triplets (Y, Z,C) and (Y,Z ′, C ′) simultaneously satisfying (3.3.1). Applying
Itoˆ formula to |Yt − Yt|2 ≡ 0, we have∫ T
0
∫
E
∣∣Zs(y)− Z ′s(y)∣∣2 φs(dy)dAs + ∑
t<s≤T
(
∆
∣∣Cs − C ′s∣∣)2
+
∫ T
0
∫
E
∣∣Zs(y)− Z ′s(y)∣∣2 q(ds dy) = 0.
Then taking expectation on both sides, we have
E
[∫ T
0
∫
E
∣∣Zs(y)− Z ′s(y)∣∣2 φs(dy)dAs]+ E
 ∑
0≤s≤T
(
∆
∣∣Cs − C ′s∣∣)2
 = 0,
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which makes sure Z ≡ Z ′ and C ≡ C ′ a.s.. 
Definition 3.3.5 If (Z,C) is uniquely determined by the supersolution Y , (Z,C) is called the
unique decomposition of Y .
3.3.2 Comparison theorem
Now we have proved the uniqueness and existence of the solution to the BSDE (3.3.1) under
Assumption 3.3.2. In the next section, we can go further to consider the convergence of BSDEs.
Before moving on to the next section, we present Comparison Theorem. The Comparison Theorem
in [22] is used to compare two supersolutions of BSDEs driven by Brownian motions. Here we can
present the comparison theorem for supersolutions of BSDEs driven by a marked point process.
Assumption 3.3.6 For any t ∈ [0, T ], r ∈ R and z, z′ ∈ L2(E;R), there exist two constants
c1 ≥ c2 > −1 such that we can find a measurable map ρ: Ω× [0, T ]× E × R3 → [c2, c1] satisfying
gt(r, z(·))− gt(r, z′(·)) ≤
∫
E
(z(y)− z′(y))ρr,z,z′t (y)φt(dy). (3.3.5)
Theorem 3.3.7 (Comparison Theorem)
Given (ξi, gi, Ci) satisfying Assumption 3.3.2, let (Y i, Zi) ∈ K2(R), i = 1, 2, be the unique solution
to the following BSDE
Y it = ξ
i +
∫ T
t
gis(Y
i
s , Z
i
s(·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zis(y)q(ds dy) + C
i
T − Cit , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where g2 also satisfies Assumption 3.3.6. Moreover we assume that
i) ξ2 − ξ1 ≥ 0, a.s.,
ii) g2t (Y
1
t , Z
1
t (·))− g1t (Y 1t , Z1t (·)) ≥ 0, a.s., a.e.,
iii) C2t − C1t is a ca`dla`g increasing process,
then we have Y 2t ≥ Y 1t as for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. The proof is motivated by [23, Proposition 4.1] with proper modifications. Let us denote
∆Y := Y 2 − Y 1, ∆ξ := ξ2 − ξ1, ∆Z := Z2 − Z1, ∆g := g2(Y 2, Z2(·)) − g1(Y 1, Z1(·)) and
∆C := C2 − C1 such that
∆Yt = ∆ξ +
∫ T
t
∆gsdAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
∆Zs(y)q(ds dy) + ∆CT −∆Ct, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.3.6)
Let us define a process a by
at :=
g2t (Y
2
t , Z
2
t (·))− g2t (Y 1t , Z2t (·))
∆Yt
I{∆Yt 6=0}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
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Note that the process a are bounded a.s. since g2 is Lipschitz continuous. Observe also that the
process ∆K defined on [0, T ] by
∆Kt := ∆Ct −
∫ t
0
∫
E
ρY
1
s ,Z
1
s ,Z
2
s
s (y)∆Zs(y)φs(dy)dAs +
∫ t
0
[
g2s(Y
1
s , Z
2
s (·))− g1s(Y 1s , Z1s (·))
]
dAs
is a non-decreasing process since
g2t (Y
1
t , Z
2
t (·))− g1t (Y 1t , Z1t (·)) ≥ g2t (Y 1t , Z2t (·))− g2t (Y 1t , Z1t (·))
≥
∫
E
ρ
Y 1t ,Z
1
t ,Z
2
t
t (y)∆Zt(y)φt(dy),
where the first inequality follows the assumption ii) in this Theorem and the second inequality
follows Assumption 3.3.6. With these notations, we rewrite (3.3.6) as
∆Yt =∆ξ +
∫ T
t
as∆YsdAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
∆Zs(y)q(ds dy)
+
∫ T
t
∫
E
ρY
1
s ,Z
1
s ,Z
2
s
s (y)∆Zs(y)φs(dy)dAs + ∆KT −∆Kt.
Consider the positive process Ξ which is the solution of the following SDE
dΞt = Ξt
(
atdAt +
∫
E
ρ
Y 1t ,Z
1
t ,Z
2
t
t (y)q(dt dy)
)
, Ξ0 = 1.
Notice that E
[
sup0≤s≤T |Ξs|2
]
<∞ since a and ρ are bounded, and Ξ is positive since ρ > −1 in
Assumption 3.3.6. Applying the product rule to d(Ξt∆Yt), we have
d(Ξt∆Yt) = Ξt
∫
E
∆Zt(y)q(dt dy) + Ξt
∫
E
∆Zt(y)ρ
Y 1t ,Z
1
t ,Z
2
t
t (y)q(dt dy)
+ ∆YtΞt
∫
E
ρ
Y 1t ,Z
1
t ,Z
2
t
t (y)q(dt dy)− Ξtd(∆Kt).
Hence, the process Ξ∆Y is a supermartingale because of Ξ > 0. Therefore
Ξt∆Yt ≥ E [ΞT∆ξ|Ft] ≥ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
makes sure ∆Y ≥ 0. 
3.4 Monotone convergence of supersolutions
3.4.1 Monotone convergence theorem
In this section, we want to extend Peng’s monotonic limit theorem in [37] for BSDEs driven by
marked point processes. In order to show the monotone theorem of g-supersolutions, we need to
introduce a sequence of triplets (Y n, Zn, Cn) satisfying the assumption as below.
Assumption 3.4.1 The following conditions hold for all n ∈ N.
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i) ξn ∈ L2(Ω;R) is a FT -measurable random variable;
ii) Y n increasingly converges to Y with Y ∈ S2G (Ω× [0, T ];R);
iii) Cn ∈ S2inc,c,G (Ω× [0, T ];R) with Cn0 = 0.
Given Cn, ξn and g satisfying Assumption 3.3.2, Proposition 3.3.3 implies the existence of a unique
solution (Y n, Zn) solving
Y nt = ξ
n +
∫ T
t
gs(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (·))dAs−
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zns (y)q(ds dy) +C
n
T −Cnt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, n ∈ N. (3.4.1)
Theorem 3.4.2 (Monotone convergence theorem)
When item 3) in Assumption 3.3.2, 3.3.6 and Assumption 3.4.1 are satisfied,
i) there exists a constant L such that |Y n|2sup + ||Zn||2 + |Cn|2sup ≤ L for all n;
ii) there exists a unique decomposition (Z,C) ∈ L2P(Ω× [0, T ]×E;R)×S2inc,G (Ω× [0, T ];R), such
that
|Y − Y n|2 + ||Z − Zn||α → 0, 1 ≤ α < 2,
and C is the weak limit of Cn. Moreover, (Y,Z,C) is the weak limit of (Y n, Zn, Cn).
iii) (Y,Z) is the solution of the BSDE
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
gs(Ys, Zs(·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + CT − Ct, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.4.2)
The proof of Theorem 3.4.2 is postponed to the Appendix.
3.4.2 BSDE with constraints
Now we will study the BSDE of type (3.3.1) with a constraint imposed to the solution, i.e.
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
gs(Ys, Zs(·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + CT − Ct, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.4.3)
as well as the constraint
ht(Yt, Zt(y)) = 0, as for all (t, y) ∈ [0, T ]× E. (3.4.4)
Definition 3.4.3 Given a constraint function h, a terminal value ξ and a generator g, if the
(Y, Z,C) solves (3.4.3), then we call Y a supersolution of BSDE subject to the constraint (3.4.4).
Assumption 3.4.4 The constrained function h : Ω × [0, T ] × R × R → R+ satisfies following
conditions:
i) h is F -predictable and non-negative;
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ii) there exist γ2 ≥ 0 and γ′2 ≥ 0 such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and r, r′, z, z′ ∈ R, we have∣∣ht(r, z)− ht(r′, z′)∣∣ ≤ γ′2 ∣∣r − r′∣∣+ γ2 ∣∣z − z′∣∣ ; (3.4.5)
iii) for any t ∈ [0, T ], z, z′ ∈ R and z ≥ z′, ht(·, z) ≥ ht(·, z′);
iv) E
[∫ T
0 |hs(0, 0)|2 dAs
]
<∞.
Assumption 3.4.5 We assume that there exists at least one g-supersolution Ŷ ∈ L2G (Ω× [0, T ];R)
solving (3.4.3)-(3.4.4) with unique decomposition (Ẑ, Ĉ) ∈ L2P(Ω × [0, T ] × E;R) × S2inc,G (Ω ×
[0, T ];R).
We will find the minimal g-supersolution later.
Definition 3.4.6 A g-supersolution Y on [0, T ] with the decomposition (Z,C) regarded as the
smallest g-supersolution, given YT = ξ subject to the constraint (3.4.4), whenever Y ≤ Ŷ a.e., a.s.,
for any other g-supersolution Ŷ satisfying (3.4.3) and (3.4.4).
Theorem 3.4.7 When Assumptions 3.3.2, 3.3.6, 3.4.1, 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 hold along with a sequence
of BSDEs
Y nt = ξ +
∫ T
t
gs(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
K
Zns (y)q(ds dy) + C
n
T − Cnt , (3.4.6)
where
Cnt := n
∫ t
0
∫
E
hs(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (y))φs(dy)dAs. (3.4.7)
then
i) there exists the smallest g-supersolution Y ∈ S2G (Ω× [0, T ];R) to (3.4.3)-(3.4.4);
ii) the sequence Y n increasingly converges to Y ;
iii) there exists a unique decomposition (Z,C) ∈ L2P(Ω× [0, T ]×E;R)×S2inc,G (Ω× [0, T ];R), such
that
|Y − Y n|2 + ||Z − Zn||α → 0, for each 1 ≤ α < 2,
and C is the weak limit of Cn. Moreover, (Y, Z,C) is the weak limit of (Y n, Zn, Cn).
Proof. Let us first prove the existence of the unique solution to (3.4.6). Define fn := g + nh and
rearrange (3.4.6) to have
Y nt = ξ +
∫ T
t
(
gs(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (·)) + n
∫
E
hs(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (y))φs(dy)
)
dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
K
Zns (y)q(ds dy)
= ξ +
∫ T
t
(gs + nhs) (Y
n
s , Z
n
s (·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
K
Zns (y)q(ds dy)
= ξ +
∫ T
t
fns (Y
n
s , Z
n
s (·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
K
Zns (y)q(ds dy).
(3.4.8)
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The Lipschitz property of fn is satisfied since both g and h are Lipschitz. Moreover, for any
t ∈ [0, T ], r ∈ R and z, z′ ∈ L2(E;R), we have
fnt (r, z(·))− fnt (r, z′(·))
≤
∫
E
(z(y)− z′(y))ρr,z,z′t (y)φt(dy) + n
∫
E
(h(r, z(y)− h(r, z′(y))φt(dy)
≤
∫
E
(z(y)− z′(y))ρ̂r,z,z′t (y)φt(dy)
(3.4.9)
where ρ̂r,z,z
′
t (·) := ρr,z,z
′
t (·) + nγ2I{z(·)>z′(·)} is located in [c2, c1 + nγ2] where c2 > −1. The first
inequality follows (3.3.5) and the second inequality follows the non-decreasing property of h in z
(cf. Assumption 3.4.4 iii)). Then applying Proposition 3.3.3 by assuming C ≡ 0, it shows that
there exists a unique solution (Y n, Zn) to (3.4.8), which implies the existence of the unique solution
to (3.4.6).
Now let us prove that (Y n)n is increasing by Comparison Theorem 3.3.7. Consider (Y
n, Zn) as
a solution to (3.4.8). Items i) - iii) of Theorem 3.3.7 are obviously satisfied. Moreover fn satisfies
(3.4.9) and fn is increasing. Hence Theorem 3.3.7 implies that (Y n)n is non-decreasing. For the
g-supersolution (Ŷ , Ẑ, Ĉ) in Assumption 3.4.5, consider (Y n, Zn) as a solution to (3.4.8). Since
(Ŷ , Ẑ, Ĉ) satisfies the constraint (3.4.4), (Ŷ , Ẑ, Ĉ) is a supersolution to (3.4.8). Hence Theorem
3.3.7 implies Y n ≤ Ŷ for all n.
To prove convergence of (Y n, Zn, Cn), we directly apply Theorem 3.4.2. In addition since there
exists a constant L such that |Cn|2sup ≤ L, i.e.
E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|Cns |2
]
= n2E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
(∫ t
0
∫
E
ht(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (y))φs(dy)dAs
)2]
≤ L,
the constraint (3.4.4) is satisfied. In conclusion, (Y,Z,C) is one of the candidate solutions to
(3.4.3)-(3.4.4).
Since the sequence of Y n is upper-bounded by Ŷ , i.e. Y n ≤ Ŷ , we take the limit on both sides
to obtain
lim
n↑∞
Y n = Y ≤ Ŷ ,
which illustrates Y with decomposition (Z,C) is the minimal solution. Finally, by applying Lemma
3.3.4, we can state that there exists a unique decomposition (Z,C) of Y . 
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3.5 Application in an insider trading problem
3.5.1 Glosten-Milgrom model
Here we follow the assumptions and definitions in the last chapter. We consider a continuous time
market for the risky asset whose fundamental value v˜ follows a discrete distribution,
P(v˜ = vi) = pi, i = 1, · · · , N, (3.5.1)
where N ∈ N ∪ {∞}, (vi)i=1,··· ,N is an increasing sequence and pi ∈ (0, 1) with
∑N
n=1 pi = 1.
The risk free interest rate is 0. Without loss of generality, we assume the trading period is [0, 1]
which can be scaled to any time interval. All of participants are risk neutral and will know this
fundamental value at terminal time 1, at which point the market will terminate.
Noisy traders trade for liquidity reasons, and their aggregated demand is the difference of two
pure jump processes ΓB and ΓS , which represents the cumulative buy and sell orders respectively.
Noisy traders only submit orders with fixed size δ. ΓB/δ and ΓS/δ are assumed to be two in-
dependent Poisson processes with intensity λ. The net demand from noisy traders is defined as
Γ := ΓB − ΓS . Then (FΓt )t∈[0,1] describes the information structure of noise traders.
The insider observes the market price and knows the fundamental value v˜. The net order from
the insider is defined as I := IB−IS . The admissibility of insider’s strategy is defined in Definition
2.2.2. The insider’s filtration F It includes F
Γ
t and σ(v˜), for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, the insider’s
buy orders IB consist two components: we denote by IB,B the cumulative buy orders which arrive
at different time than those of ΓB, and by IB,S the cumulative buy orders which cancel some of ΓS .
Sell orders IS,S and IS,B are defined analogously. According to Definition 2.2.2 (iii) together with
[30, Chapter1, Theorem 3.15], we have that Ii,jt − δλ
∫ t
0 θ
i,j
s ds is a F I -martingale for i ∈ {B,S}
and j ∈ {B,S} for any t ∈ [0, 1], where λθi,j is F I -intensity.
A competitive market maker only observes the aggregated demand M := I + Γ and sets the
price only based on it. The market maker’s filtration FM is the smallest σ-field generated by M .
Moreover, the net buy orders consists three components: MB := IB,B + ΓB − IS,B. The net sell
orders MS := IS,S + ΓS − IB,S is defined analogously. In addition, MB − λδ ∫ ·0 ηBs ds (resp. MS −
λδ
∫ ·
0 η
S
s ds) is a F
I -martingale where ηB := 1 + θB,B − θS,B (resp. ηS := 1 + θS,S − θB,S).
To simplify the presentation, we assume the order size δ = 1. The definition of pricing rule, l,
is the same as Definition 2.2.1. Given an admissible trading strategy I := IB − IS , we follow the
similar way (cf. [18]) to derive the associated profit at time 1 for the insider conditional on her
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private information,
E
[∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Mt−, t)) dIB,Bt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − l(Mt−, t)) dIB,St
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Mt−, t)) dIS,St −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − l(Mt−, t)) dIS,Bt
∣∣∣v˜] , (3.5.2)
where a(m, t) := l(m+ 1, t) is ask price and b(m, t) := l(m− 1, t) is bid price for any m ∈ Z. Since
the insider always aims to maximize her expected profit and Ii,j − δλ ∫ ·0 θi,js ds is a F I -martingale
for i, j ∈ {B,S}, the insider’s value function can be expressed such as
V (v˜,m, t) = sup
ηB ,ηS≥0
λE
[∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Ms− + 1, s))(ηBs − 1)+ds+
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Ms−, s))(ηBs − 1)−ds
−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Ms− − 1, s))(ηSs − 1)+ds−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Mt−, t))(ηSs − 1)−ds
∣∣∣Mt = m, v˜] ,
(3.5.3)
for v˜ = {v1, · · · , vN}, m ∈ Z and t ∈ [0, 1). The terminal value of V is defined as V (v˜,m, 1) =
limt↑1 V (v˜,m, t). Since ηB and ηS are uniquely determined by insider’s strategy (θi,j), we consider
ηB and ηS as insider’s control in (3.5.3).
Remark 3.5.1 The equation (3.5.3) is consistent with the value function (2.2.7), since the insider
will hide her trades among noisy trades, i.e. not placing any buy (resp. sell) order to compensate
a noisy buy (resp. sell) order. Therefore, second and fourth terms in (2.2.7) are equal to 0.
Instead of unbounded control in (3.5.3), we consider a family of control problems where the trading
intensities ηB and ηS are bounded by n. The value function of the bounded control problem is
V n(v˜,m, t) = sup
ηB ,ηS∈[0,n]
λE
[∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Ms− + 1, s))(ηBs − 1)+ds+
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Ms−, s))(ηBs − 1)−ds
−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Ms− − 1, s))(ηSs − 1)+ds−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − l(Mt−, t))(ηSs − 1)−ds
∣∣∣Mt = m, v˜] ,
(3.5.4)
where the superscript n stands for the upper bound of trading intensities ηB and ηS . The terminal
value V n(v˜,m, 1) = 0. According to HJB equation (2.2.9), we can obtain HJB equation of V n such
that
V nt (vi,m, t) + λ
[
V n(vi,m+ 1, t)− 2V n(vi,m, t) + V n(vi,m− 1, t)
]
+ (n− 1)[(vi − l(m+ 1, t)) + V n(vi,m+ 1, t)− V n(vi,m, t)]+
+ (n− 1)[(vi − l(m− 1, t)) + V n(vi,m, t)− V n(vi,m− 1, t)]− (3.5.5)
+
[
vi − l(m, t) + V n(vi,m, t)− V n(vi,m− 1, t)
]+
+
[
vi − l(m, t) + V n(vi,m+ 1, t)− V n(vi,m, t)
]−
= 0,
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where i = {1, · · · , N} and (m, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
We notice that the terminal value of V in (3.5.3) is non-zero. This is so called “boundary layer”
or “face-lifting” which usually appears when controls are unbounded. However, the terminal value
of V n is zero because the control is bounded. Our question is where this face-lifting comes from?
Since the value functions V n can be represented by the solution Yn of a BSDE driven by a marked
point process, the convergence of (Yn) leads to a non-decreasing process C which we interpret as
the boundary layer. In Lemma 3.5.2, by applying (4.17) and Theorem 4.10 in [20], we can find
an expression of Y n to represent the value functions V n. Finally, in Proposition 3.5.3, we apply
Theorem 3.4.7 to show the existence of the smallest supersolution Y which is exactly the value
function V as n goes to infinity.
For any n ∈ N, consider the following BSDE
Y nt =
∫ 1
t
gs(Z
n
s (·))ds−
∫ 1
t
∫
{−1,1}
Zns (y)q(ds dy) + C
n
1 − Cnt , t ∈ [0, 1], (3.5.6)
where
Cn1 − Cnt = (n− 1)
∫ 1
t
hs(Z
n
s (·))ds, (3.5.7)
Znt (y) = V
n(v˜,Mt− + y, t)− V n(v˜,Mt−, t), (3.5.8)
gt(Z
n
t (·)) = (v˜ − l(Mt−, t)− Znt (−1))+ + (v˜ − l(Mt−, t) + Znt (1))−, (3.5.9)
ht(Z
n
t (·)) = (v˜ − l(Mt− + 1, t) + Znt (1))+ + (v˜ − l(Mt− − 1, t)− Znt (−1))−, (3.5.10)
q(dt dy) = d(Nt(y)− 2λt). (3.5.11)
Here Nt(y) is the counting process for y ∈ {−1, 1} where 1 (resp. −1) represents a buy order (resp.
sell order) to compensate the net order M .
Lemma 3.5.2 The equation (3.5.6) admits a unique solution (Y n, Zn) and Y nt = V
n(v˜,Mt, t) for
all t ∈ [0, 1].
We put the proof of Lemma 3.5.2 in the Appendix. Now let us consider a scenario that the
upper bound of the insider’s intensity goes to infinity, i.e. V n = Y n ↑ V = Y as n ↑ ∞. We first
assume that the supersolution Y with a unique decomposition (Z,C) to satisfy
Yt =
∫ 1
t
gs(Zs(·))ds−
∫ 1
t
∫
{−1,1}
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + C1 − Ct, t ∈ [0, 1], (3.5.12)
where Y1 = 0, Zt(y) = V (v˜,Mt− + y, t)− V (v˜,Mt−, t), the definitions of the functions g and h are
(3.5.9) and (3.5.10). Furthermore, there exists the inequality (2.2.10), for all (m, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1) and
i = {1, . . . , N}, so we have
l(m, t)− vi ≤ V (vi,m+ 1, t)− V (vi,m, t) ≤ l(m+ 1, t)− vi,
vi − l(m, t)− ≤ V (vi,m− 1, t)− V (vi,m, t) ≤ vi − l(m+ 1, t),
(3.5.13)
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which implies that the generator function gt(Zt(·)) = ht(Zt(·)) ≡ 0. When t = 1, we have the
similar result. Hence the following supersolution Y of the BSDE to represent the insider’s value
function V such that
Yt = −
∫ 1
t
∫
{−1,1}
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + C1 − Ct, t ∈ [0, 1], (3.5.14)
with the constraint
ht(Zt(·)) = 0 a.e. a.s..
In Proposition 3.5.3 below, we use Theorem 3.4.7 to show the convergence from (3.5.6) to (3.5.14)
as n ↑ ∞.
Proposition 3.5.3 The sequence (Y n)n∈N in Lemma 3.5.2 increasingly converges to Y which is
the smallest supersolution of (3.5.14) and
|Y − Y n|2 + ||Z − Zn||α → 0, 1 ≤ α < 2,
and C is the weak limit of Cn.
Proof. Let us check that all assumptions of Theorem 3.4.7 are satisfied. Then the statement readily
follows from Theorem 3.4.7. Assumptions 3.3.2, 3.3.6 and 3.4.4 are automatically satisfied because
of Lemma 3.5.2. Moreover Assumption 3.4.5 holds obviously. Now let us check Assumption 3.4.1.
The item (i) is automatically satisfied as Y n1 = 0. As Y
n represents the value function V n when
the intensities ηB and ηS are bounded by n, Y n is increasing. In addition, according to (2.4.15),
there exists a upper bound for the value function, such that
0 < V n(vi,m, t) ≤ V (vi,m, t) ≤ US(vi,m, t), for m ∈ Z and i = {1, · · · , N}.
Moreover, as the definition of US , we have US(vi,m, t) = λ
∫ t
0 (l(m, s)− l(m− 1, s))ds. Combining
with |vi|2 < ∞ for i = {1, · · · , N}, we confirm US ∈ L2G (Ω × [0, 1];R) which implies Y ∈ S2G (Ω ×
[0, 1];R). We can also determine Cn ∈ S2inc,c,G (Ω × [0, 1];R) with Cn0 = 0 by (3.5.7). Hence
Assumption 3.4.1 is satisfied. Finally we apply Theorem 3.4.7 to obtain for t ∈ [0, 1],
Yt =
∫ 1
t
gs(Zs(·))ds−
∫ 1
t
∫
{−1,1}
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + C1 − Ct,
= −
∫ 1
t
∫
{−1,1}
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + C1 − Ct,
(3.5.15)
with the constraint
ht(Zt(·)) = 0 a.e. a.s.. 
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3.5.2 Numerical results
In the following numeric example, we investigate the convergence rate of V n to V as n → ∞. In
this example, we assume v˜ follows Bernoulli distribution {0, 1} with equal probabilities. We also
assume that the intensity of noisy orders λ is 300 and the order size δ is defined as 1/
√
2λ. Hence
the value V is 0.3787 by applying equation (3.6) in [18] when insider’s intensities ηB and ηS are
unbounded. Next we also need to solve HJB equation (3.5.5) numerically to obtain V n when the
insider’s intensities ηB and ηS are bounded by n. The Figure 3.1 shows that V − V n ∼ n−0.32.
Figure 3.1: Simulation results and regression line for (ln(n), ln(V − V n)). The slope of the regression line
is about -0.32.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. 1. Boundedness. Since (Y n) is monotonic, there exists a constant L′
such that
sup
n∈N
|Y n|2sup ≤
∣∣Y 0∣∣2
sup
+ |Y |2sup ≤ L′, (3.6.1)
where L′ is independent of index n. Applying Itoˆ formula to |Y nt |2, recalling Cn is continuous and
taking the expectation, we have
E
[
|Y n0 |2
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
E
|Zns (y)|2 φs(dy)dAs
]
(3.6.2)
= E
[
|ξn|2
]
+ 2E
[∫ T
0
Y ns g
n
s (Y
n
s , Zs(·))dAs
]
+ 2E
[∫ T
0
Y ns dC
n
s
]
≤ E
[
|ξn|2
]
+ 2E
[∫ T
0
|Y ns |
[
|gs(0, 0)|+ γ′1 |Y ns |+ γ1
(∫
E
|Zns (y)|2 φs(dy)
) 1
2
]
dAs
]
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+ 2E
[
CnT sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y ns |
]
≤ E
[
|ξn|2
]
+ 2E
∫ T
0
[
(γ′1 + γ
2
1 + 1) |Y ns |2 +
1
4
∫
E
|Zns (y)|2 φs(dy) +
1
4
|gs(0, 0)|2
]
dAs
+ 2E
[
CnT sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y ns |
]
,
where the first inequality follows the Lipschitz condition of g. Then we rearrange the above in-
equality to have
||Zn||2 ≤ 2E
[
|ξn|2
]
+ 4E
[
CnT sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y ns |
]
+ 4E
[∫ T
0
[
(γ′1 + γ
2
1 + 1) |Y ns |2 +
1
4
|gs(0, 0)|2
]
dAs
]
.
(3.6.3)
Since
CnT ≤ |Y n0 |+ |ξn|+
∫ T
0
|gs(Y ns , Zns (·))| dAs +
∫ T
0
∫
E
|Zns (y)| q(ds dy),
there exists a constant γ3 > 0 such that
|Cn|2sup ≤ γ3
(
1 + |Y n|2sup + ||Zn||2
)
. (3.6.4)
Applying the inequality 4ab ≤ 8γ3 |a|2 + |b|
2
2γ3
for a, b ∈ R, we have
4E
[
CnT sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y ns |
]
≤ 8γ3 |Y n|2sup +
|Cn|2sup
2γ3
≤ 8γ3 |Y n|2sup +
1
2
(
1 + |Y n|2sup + ||Zn||2
)
≤ 8γ3 |Y n|2sup +
1
2
||Zn||2 + 1
2
|Y n|2sup +
1
2
.
Combining the last inequality with (3.6.1) and (3.6.3), we obtain a constant γ4 such that
||Zn||2 + |Y n|2sup ≤ γ4.
Then combining the last inequality with (3.6.4), there exists a constant L such that
||Zn||2 + |Y n|2sup + |Cn|2sup ≤ L.
2. Weak convergence. According to the uniform boundedness, we need to show that there exists
a subsequence of (Zn, Cn, g·(Y n, Zn)) weakly converging to (Z,C,G) ∈ L2P(Ω × [0, T ] × E;R) ×
S2inc,G (Ω× [0, T ];R)×L2G (Ω× [0, T ];R). Identifying the limits of (Y n)n and (Zn, Cn, g·(Y n, Zn))n,
there exists a G such that
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
GsdAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + CT − Ct, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.6.5)
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To prove the above identity, we first claim that the stochastic integral
∫ T
t
∫
E Z
n
s (y)q(ds dy) converges
weakly to
∫ T
t
∫
E Zs(y)q(ds dy). For any η ∈ L2(Ω;R), by martingale representation theorem, there
exists a predictable process ϕ such that
η = E
[
η
]
+
∫ T
0
ϕs(y)q(ds dy). (3.6.6)
It implies a convergence such that
E
[[∫ T
t
∫
E
Zns (y)q(ds dy), η
]]
= E
[∫ T
t
∫
E
Zns (y)ϕs(y)q(ds dy)
]
→ E
[∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)ϕs(y)q(ds dy)
]
= E
[[∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy), η
]]
.
Now define Int,T and It,T such that
Int,T := −Y nt + ξ +
∫ T
t
gs(Y
n
s , Z
n
s (·))dAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zns (y)q(ds dy) + C
n
T − Cnt ,
It,T := −Yt + ξ +
∫ T
t
GsdAs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
Zs(y)q(ds dy) + CT − Ct.
Due to Int,T = 0, the weak convergence of all terms on the right implies It,T = 0 a.s.. Therefore
(3.6.5) is satisfied.
3. Properties of the process C. All of proofs in this part have been done by Peng in [37].
According to [37, Lemma 2.2], we know the process C is ca`dla`g. In addition, [37, Lemma A.1] tells
us the process C has a finite number of jumps. We can construct a successive jump times (σn)
N+1
n=0
with σ0 = 0, σN+1 = T and jump size bigger than a sufficiently small constant ν > 0. Moreover,
[37, Lemma 2.3] allows us to find another a sequence of jump times (τn)n=0 and construct a finite
number of pairs of jump times (σu, τu)0≤u≤N with 0 ≤ σu ≤ τu ≤ T such that
(i) (σj , τj ] ∩ (σk, τk] = ∅ for each j 6= k;
(ii) E
[∑N
u=0(τu − σu)
]
≥ T − ;
(iii) E
[∑N
u=0
∑
σu<t≤τu(∆Ct)
2
]
≤ δ.
This result means that for any ca`dla`g increasing process defined on [0, T ], the total size of jumps
in the process mainly concentrated within a finite number of time intervals is sufficiently small.
4. Strong convergence. Since
∣∣Y 0t − Yt∣∣2 ≥ |Y nt − Yt|2 → 0 a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ], and
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣Y 0s − Ys∣∣2 dAs] <∞,
applying dominated convergence theorem, we have
|Y − Y n|2 → 0, as n→∞. (3.6.7)
Now let us prove the strong convergence of Z. According to the statement of part 3, there exists
a finite number of disjoint intervals (σu, τu], u = 0, 1, · · · , N , satisfying
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(i) E
[∑N
u=0(τu − σu)
]
≥ T − 2 ;
(ii) E
[∑N
u=0
∑
σu<t≤τu(∆Ct)
2
]
≤ δ3 .
Applying Itoˆ formula to |Yt − Y nt |2 on (σu, τu] and summing over u, we have
N∑
u=0
E
[∫ τu
σu
∫
E
|Zns (y)− Zs(y)|2 φs(dy)dAs
]
+
N∑
u=0
E
[∣∣Y nσu − Yσu∣∣2]
=
N∑
u=0
E
[∣∣Y nτu − Yτu∣∣2]+ 2 N∑
u=0
E
[∫ τu
σu
(Y ns − Ys)(gs(Y ns , Zns (·))−Gs)dAs
]
− E
 N∑
u=0
∑
σu<s≤τu
|∆Cs|2
− 2 N∑
u=0
E
[∫ τu
σu
(Y ns − Ys)dCs
]
+ 2
N∑
u=0
E
[∫ τu
σu
(Y ns − Ys)dCns
]
.
As the last term of the above identity are less than zero and E
[∑N
u=0(τu − σu)
]
≤ T , we have
N∑
u=0
E
[∫ τu
σu
∫
E
|Zns (y)− Zs(y)|2 φs(dy)dAs
]
(3.6.8)
≤
N∑
u=0
E
[∣∣Y nτu − Yτu∣∣2]+ 2E [∫ T
0
|Y ns − Ys| |gs(Y ns , Zns (·))−Gs| dAs
]
+ E
 N∑
u=0
∑
σu<s≤τu
|∆Cs|2
+ 2E [∫ T
0
|Y ns − Ys| dCs
]
.
As
N sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y ns − Ys|2 ≥
N∑
n=0
∣∣Y nτn − Yτn∣∣2 → 0,
and
NE
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Y ns − Ys|2
]
<∞,
applying dominated convergence theorem, we have
N∑
u=0
E
[∣∣Y nτu − Yτu∣∣2]→ 0, as n→∞. (3.6.9)
Moreover, as
∣∣Y 0t − Yt∣∣ ≥ |Y nt − Yt| → 0 for t ∈ [0, T ] and
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣Y 0t − Yt∣∣ dCs] ≤
(
E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
∣∣Y 0s − Ys∣∣2
]) 1
2 (
E
[
|CT |2
]) 1
2
<∞,
applying dominated convergence theorem, we have
E
[∫ T
0
|Y ns − Ys| dCs
]
→ 0, as n→∞. (3.6.10)
Finally, applying Cauchy Schwartz inequality, we have
E
[∫ T
0
|Y ns − Ys| |gs(Y ns , Zns (·))−Gs| dAs
]
(3.6.11)
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≤
(
E
[∫ T
0
|gs(Y ns , Zns (·))−Gs|2
]) 1
2
(
E
[∫ T
0
|Y ns − Ys|2 dAs
]) 1
2
≤ L
(
E
[∫ T
0
|Y ns − Ys|2 dAs
]) 1
2
→ 0, as n→∞,
where the second inequality holds since g satisfies Assumption 3.3.2 and G ∈ L2G (Ω × [0, T ];R).
Combining (3.6.8), (3.6.9), (3.6.10) and (3.6.11), we have
lim
n↑∞
N∑
u=0
E
[∫ τu
σu
∫
E
|Zns (y)− Zs(y)|2 φs(dy)dAs
]
≤ E
 N∑
u=0
∑
σu<s≤τu
|∆Cs|2
 ≤ δ
3
.
Thus there exists an integer lδ, > 0 such that when n > lδ, ≥ 0,
N∑
u=0
E
[∫ τu
σu
∫
E
|Zns (y)− Zs(y)|2 φs(dy)dAs
]
≤ δ
2
.
Therefore, in the product space (Ω× [0, T ]× E, P ⊗ E ), for n ≥ lδ,, we have
p˜⊗ P
(
(s, y, ω) ∈ ∪Nu=0(σu, τu]× E × Ω; |Zns (y)− Zs(y)|2 ≥ δ
)
≤ ,
where p˜ is predictable random measure on P ⊗ E . This implies that
lim
n↑∞
p˜⊗ P
(
(s, y, ω) ∈ ∪Nu=0(σu, τu]× E × Ω; |Zns (y)− Zs(y)|2 ≥ δ
)
= 0.
Thus Zn converges in measure to Z. Since Zn is bounded in L2P(Ω× [0, T ]× E;R), then for each
α ∈ [1, 2), it converges in LαP(Ω× [0, T ]× E;R). Combining (3.6.7) and strong convergence of Z,
we have
|Y − Y n|2 + ||Z − Zn||α → 0, for each 1 ≤ α < 2.
Since we already know the strong convergence of (Y n, Zn) to (Y,Z), we know gt(Y
n
t , Z
n
t (·)) strongly
converges to gt(Yt, Zt(·)) by showing
E
[∫ T
t
|gs(Y ns , Zns (·))− gs(Ys, Zs(·))| dAs
]
≤ E
[∫ T
t
γ′1 |Y ns − Ys| dAs
]
+ E
[∫ T
t
γ1
(∫
E
|Zns (y)− Zs(y)|2 φs(dy)
) 1
2
dAs
]
→ 0.
Here gt(Yt, Zt(·)) identifies with Gt, i.e.
Gt = gt(Yt, Zt(·)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
which immediately shows (Y, Z) is the solution of the BSDE (3.4.2). 
Proof of Lemma 3.5.2. Thanks to Theorem 4.11 in [20], we can apply it to prove this lemma.
Before applying the theorem, we need to check whether we have satisfied Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.9
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of [20]. In the insider problem, control space is a measurable space. When the controller ηi,
i ∈ {B,S}, bounded by n, the profit of the insider is bounded. The value function V n(v˜,M1, 1)
is FM1 -measurable. In addition, for each of n, there exists an optimal strategy to maximise her
expected profit. Therefore Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.9 in [20] are satisfied. Now we can apply Theorem
4.10 in [20] to generate a sequence of BSDEs
Y nt =(n− 1)
∫ 1
t
[(
v˜ − l(Ms− + 1, s) + Zns (1)
)+
+
(
v˜ − l(Ms− − 1, s)− Zns (−1)
)−]
ds
+
∫ 1
t
[(
v˜ − l(Ms−, s)− Zns (−1)
)+
+
(
v˜ − l(Ms−, s) + Zns (1)
)−]
ds (3.6.12)
−
∫ 1
t
∫
{−1,1}
Zns (y)q(ds dy),
where q(dt dy) = d(Nt(y)−2λt). Moreover, the functions g and h automatically satisfy Assumption
3.3.2 and 3.4.4 respectively since both functions come from (4.8) in [20] which satisfies Hypothesis
3.1 of [20].
Compared to (3.5.6), once we determine the value of Zn(y) for y ∈ {−1, 1}, the proof will be
done. Since V n = Y n, we can take the differentiation on V n to have
Y nt =−
∫ 1
t
∫
{−1,1}
[
V n(v˜,Ms− + y, s)− V n(v˜,Ms−, s)
]
q(ds dy) (3.6.13)
−
∫ 1
t
[
V nt (v˜,Ms−, s) + λ(V
n(v˜,Ms− + 1, s)− 2V n(v˜,Ms−, s) + V nt (v˜,Ms− − 1, s))
]
ds.
Now combining (3.5.5), (3.6.12) and (3.6.13) together, the processes Zn(y) for y ∈ {−1, 1} can be
determined. 
Chapter 4
Trading in limit order market with
asymmetric information
4.1 Introduction
In the study of asymmetric information, a continuous time model, Glosten-Milgrom model [25] and
Kyle model [32] are influential. In both model, market participants submit market orders to a risk-
neutral market maker. Other than the market maker, traders are of two types: informed traders
(insiders) and noise traders. The insider possesses the knowledge of value of the asset before the
trade and aims to maximise her expected profit by utilizing her private information on the asset.
In addition, there are plenty of works extending Glosten-Milgrom model [25] and Kyle model [32]
e.g. [6], [5] [18] [33], etc. In these studies, agents are only allowed to submit market orders with
unique order size.
In recent years, with growth of electronic exchanges, more than half of the markets use a limit
order book (LOB) mechanism to facilitate trades. In LOB market, there is no market maker or
specialist who provides bid and ask quotes. There are many papers studying models of LOB. For
instance, Ros¸u [39] considers an equilibrium model that insiders arrive randomly to the market
according to an independent Poisson process. Informed investors learn the current value of the
asset, and decide whether to buy or sell one unit of the asset, and whether to trade with a market
order or a limit order. He illustrates that each informed trader observes the value of mispricing
to decide submit which types of orders depending on a given threshold. Moreover, he also states
that compared to market orders, limit orders have a smaller price impact by a factor about four.
Avellaneda and Stoikov [4] follow early work by Ho and Stoll [29], and represent an inventory
management problem that an agent controls the distances between limit orders and mid price to
maximise expected terminal profits of the inventory. Guilbaud and Pham [26] propose a framework
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to study optimal trading strategies in a one-tick pro-rata LOB. The trader decides to submit either
market orders or limit orders, which are represented, respectively, by impulse controls and regular
controls. Furthermore, several papers, e.g., [16], [27], [41], describe optimal strategies for high
frequency trading on cash equities or foreign exchange.
In this chapter, we study an optimal trading problem of a strategic trader, who has a private
prediction or signal on asset value. She maybe wrong on her prediction but wants to maximise
her trading profits by using this private prediction together with market and limit orders. Rest
market participants without this private prediction are aggregated to noisy traders. All of market
participants are allowed to submit market or limit orders with multiple sizes. We know that market
orders are costly but execution is immediately, and limit orders guarantee the price but execution
is uncertain. Hence, the strategic trader faces a trade-off between immediate execution but at a
less favourable price, or waiting to be executed but at a better price. From the modelling point of
view, for market orders, she tries to control intensities of point processes for associated different
order size. On the contrary, we model the strategy of limit orders as continuous controls for order
size, due to the fact that these orders can be cancelled immediately with no cost. We also consider
the price impact of limit and market orders in our model. In this context, the strategic trader
maximises the expected profit over a short time horizon by submitting between limit and market
orders.
We formulate the problem as a stochastic control problem and prove that the value function
of the strategic trader is a solution to this HJB equation. We also investigate numerically the
strategic trader’s optimal strategy in a market where limit and market orders have two sizes, small
and large. We consider five different scenarios depending on sizes of orders allowed to trade by
strategic and noise traders. Our numerical solution shows that the strategic trader will place limit
and market buy orders when the magnitude of mispricing, which is the difference between her
private prediction on the asset and the current trading price, is higher than a threshold. In certain
cases, she may even employ a “round trip” strategy to first submit limit sell orders to push price
down, and subsequently uses market buy orders to make profit on low market price. In this round
trip of trade, the profits from the market buy is still more than losses from the limit sell.
In this chapter, we first recall market point processes to build up our model and explicitly write
down the optimization problem. Then we derive Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the
optimization problem. Finally, we provide a computational algorithm for the resolution of HJB,
and illustrate numerically the behavior of the strategic trader under specific scenarios.
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4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Marked point process
Consider a measurable space (E,E ), and a random sequence (Tn, ζn)n≥0 ∈ [0,∞) × E, where
(Tn)n≥0, starting from T0 = 0, is an increasing sequence of non-anticipating random times to
describe the occurrence of events and ζn ∈ E is a quantity observed at time Tn. We assume that Tn
is non-explosive, i.e. Tn → ∞ P-a.s. as n → ∞, which guarantees the number of events occurring
on any finite time interval, is almost surely finite. The random sequence (Tn, ζn)n≥0 is called a
marked point process, where (Tn)n≥0 is a point process and (ζn)n≥0 are marks. Define a counting
process Nt(K) by
Nt(K) =
∑
n≥1
I{Tn≤t}I{ζn∈K}, K ∈ E . (4.2.1)
We associate to each K ∈ E the counting measure µ such that
µ((0, t],K) = Nt(K), t ≥ 0. (4.2.2)
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be a probability space where F satisfies the usual conditions. Denote by P
the F -predictable algebra on Ω× [0, T ]. If any process H is P ⊗ E -measurable satisfying
E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
E
|Ht(k)|µ(dt, dk)
]
<∞, (4.2.3)
it follows from [13, Chapter VIII, T14] that there exists a function φt and an increasing process A
with A0 = 0, such that
i) K → φt(K) is a probability measure on (E,E );
ii) t→ φt(K) is a predictable process;
iii) we have
E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
E
Ht(k)µ(dt, dk)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
E
Ht(k)φt(dk)dAt
]
. (4.2.4)
Assumption 4.2.1 The process A is an absolutely continuous increasing process and with respect
to time.
The predictable random measure φt(dk)dAt is denoted by ν(dt, dk) and called the compensator
of µ or dual predictable projection of µ. For H satisfies (4.2.3), we can define the compensated
stochastic integral
Mt :=
∫ t
0
∫
E
Hr(k)µ˜(dr, dk), (4.2.5)
where µ˜(dt, dk) := µ(dt, dk) − ν(dt, dk) is called the compensated measure. It follows from [13,
Chapter VIII, C4] that M is a martingale.
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4.2.2 Trading model
After recalling marked point processes, let us consider the trading model. In this paper, the micro-
structure of the market are modelled similar to [6], [18] and Chapter 2. There is a market in
continuous time for a risky asset, whose fundamental value denoted by v˜. We assume that v˜ has
the upper bound and the lower bound denoted by νU and νL respectively and νU > νL. For
simplicity, the risk free interest rate is normalised to 0, i.e. the risk free asset is regarded as the
nume´raire. There are two types of agents, noisy traders and a strategic trader, all of whom are risk
neutral but they have different information. The strategic trader has some private signal about
v˜, which is private valuation/prediction of the asset price based on strategic trader’s information
advantage. This information advantage will lose its value in a future time, say 1. Therefore we
assume that the value of v˜ will be revealed to all market participants at time 1. She uses the private
value prediction to trade in the market and maximise her expected profit. Rest market participants
without this private information are aggregated to noise traders. As the strategic trader always
has advance private information on the market, the probability space (Ω,P) with different filtration
accommodates these two types of market participants.
In our model, both market participants are allowed to place market and limit orders. Let us
consider the model of market orders for both market participants.
Noisy traders are allowed to place buy or sell market orders with maximum m¯ ∈ N shares
each time. This maximal order size is usually determined by the stock exchange. We assume that
the asset is indivisible, therefore the size of buy or sell order k takes values from Km = {1, . . . , m¯}
where the subscript m stands for market orders. The arrival of these buy or sell orders are modelled
by exogenous Poisson processes. To count the number of buy or sell market orders, we denote by
µB and µS counting measures associated to market buy and sell orders. We also denote by λk the
buy or sell intensity for order size k. The buy and sell are assumed to be symmetric, i.e. the same
λk for both buy and sell of order size k. We assume that λk is decreasing against k because of
large orders arrivals less frequent than small orders. The compensator of µB(dt, k) and µS(dt, k) is
φ(k)dAt, defined in (4.2.4), where φ(k) =
λk∑m
j=1 λ
j and dAt =
∑m
j=1 λ
jdt. Here the A represents the
arrival of buy/sell market orders of any size and φ(k) represents the probability that an incoming
market buy/sell order is of size k. We denote by ZB and ZS market cumulative buy and sell orders
respectively. They can be represented as
ZB =
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
kµB(dt, k), ZS =
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
kµS(dt, k).
The cumulative demand is denoted by Z = ZB − ZS with initial condition Z0 = z ∈ Z.
The other market participant is the strategic trader. She has an object to maximise her expected
profit out of trading. She applies her private prediction on the asset to place market orders with
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arbitrary size in Km. We denote by µˆ
B and µˆS the counting measures for her market buy and
sell orders. For each jump size k, the two processes have intensities θB,k and θS,k respectively. We
assume that these two intensities are bounded by θ¯ > 0. The strategic trader controls the values
of trading intensities to maximise her expected profit, so the intensities are regarded as control
variables. The compensator of µˆB(dt, k) is φ(k)dAt, where φ(k) =
θB,k∑m
j=1 θ
B,j and dAt =
∑m
j=1 θ
B,jdt.
We use similar notation for sell side with superscript S. The cumulative market buy and sell orders,
XB and XS , for the strategic trader can be represented by
XB =
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
kµˆB(dt, k), XS =
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
kµˆS(dt, k). (4.2.6)
The cumulative order is denoted by X = XB −XS with initial condition X0 = 0.
Now let us consider limit orders for both market participants. We assume that limit orders
submission or cancellation are free of charge. We also assume that any market order submitted by
the strategic trader will be executed against existing orders on the market. Therefore, limit orders
from noisy traders are not explicitly modelled.
The limit orders placed by the strategic trader are executed when they are filled by incoming
counterpart market orders. After previous execution of limit orders, the strategic trader cancels
unexecuted orders and submits new limit orders to wait for next arrival of market orders. We
assume that after each arrival of market orders, the strategic trader can submit limit orders, either
on buy or sell side, i.e. limit orders are submitted right after the last execution at time Tn, n ∈ N0,
which is defined as below with initial value T0 = 0. If there is non-execution or partial execution of
limit orders, she will cancel the whole or rest orders immediately before placing new limit orders
to wait a next execution. Furthermore, for simplicity of the model, we assume that she always
submits limit orders at best bid or ask and those have highest priority to be executed compared to
other outstanding limit orders. The limit order size is denoted by li ∈ Kl, where Kl = {0, 1, . . . , l¯}1
and l¯ ∈ N. Here the subscript l of Kl stands for limit orders. The cumulative submitted buy/sell
limit orders up to time t ∈ [0, 1) is denoted by Lit, which is defined as Lit =
∑∞
n=0 l
i
Tn
I{Tn≤t}, where
i ∈ {B,S}. In addition, we define σ = inf{t > Tn : ∆ZSt 6= 0} and τ = inf{t > Tn : ∆ZBt 6= 0}
to represent the execution time of buy and sell limit orders after last execution time Tn, then
the next market order arrives at Tn+1 = σ ∧ τ . As the submission time of limit orders is earlier
than the next arrival of market orders, we might need a shifted limit order processes defined as
L˜it = L
i
Tn−, where Tn ≤ t < Tn+1. According to the definition of Li, L˜i jumps at the same time
with counterpart X and ∆L˜iTn+1 = ∆L
i
Tn
= liTn represents how many limit orders are waiting
to be executed by incoming market orders at Tn+1. Hence, the number of executed limit buy at
1If the jump size is 0, it implies the insider does not place any limit order.
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time σ can be modelled as ∆L˜Bσ ∧∆ZSσ . The executed limit sell can be represented analogously.
The aggregated limit orders from the strategic trader can be defined as L˜ = L˜B − L˜S with initial
condition lB0 if a limit buy order of size l
B
0 is submitted at time 0 or −lS0 if a limit sell order of size
lS0 is submitted at time 0.
Now let us consider an example to understand how the strategic trader places limit orders.
There are four market order arrivals from T1 to T4. At T0 = 0, she places a limit buy order with
lBT0 size. A market sell order comes at T1 with ∆Z
S
T1
size. At the same time, if ∆ZST1 ≥ lBT0 , the
limit buy is fully filled. Otherwise, she cancels unexecuted buy orders and places a new limit buy
with size lBT1 . At T2 a market buy comes in but it cannot fill any limit buy order, so the strategic
trader cancels limit buy and places another limit buy order with size lBT2 . After the last market
order arrivals at T4, LT4 = l
B
T0
+ lBT1 + l
B
T2
− lST3 − lST4 and L˜t = LT4− = lBT0 + lBT1 + lBT2 − lST3 for t > T4.
-
Time
6
lBT0
T0 T1
?∆ZST1
6
lBT1
6
T2
∆ZBT2
6
lBT2
6
T3
∆ZBT3
?lST3
T4
?∆ZST4
?lST4
Now let us consider the aggregation of the informed and noise trades from buy and sell, i.e. Y B =
ZB +XB + L˜B, Y S = ZS +XS + L˜S respectively. The total aggregation is Y = Y B − Y S , which
can be regarded as order flow imbalance defined in [21], since it is aggregated orders from buy and
sell sides.
4.2.3 Pricing rule
We consider market participants who are price takers with respect to an exogenously given pricing
rule for shares bought or sold of this stocks within the trading interval. Instead of market partici-
pants facing the same price for any order size, they now face a pricing rule that depends on their
order demand. Moreover, we also assume that there exists a price impact generated by market and
limit orders in our model. The price impact of trades has been extensively studied in the literature.
It is usually classified as permanent and temporary price impacts. The permanent price impact is
the price change that is due to the information content of the trade. The temporary price impact is
the transitory change in prices due to market frictions such as the liquidity effect and the imbalance
between demand and supply. In our model, we simply introduce an coefficient of the price impact
to combine permanent and temporary price impacts together.
To achieve the properties we assume above, we might define a pricing rule which is the function
of Y and t such that:
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Definition 4.2.2 A function p : [0, 1]× Z→ R+ is a pricing rule if
i) y → p(t, y) is strictly increasing for each t ∈ [0, 1);
ii) limy→−∞ p(t, y) = νL and limy→+∞ p(t, y) = νU for each t ∈ [0, 1] where νL and νU are
constants and νL ≤ νU .
The monotonicity of y → p(t, y) is natural in asset pricing markets, which implies that when the
demand is higher, it generates higher price impact and pushes the price higher. The quantity
impact on the price is due to either information effects from the strategic trader or supply/demand
imbalances from all market participants.
Now let us consider the price impact on market orders. C¸etin et al. [17] study a stochastic supply
curve for a security’s price as a function of trade size. In Kyle-Back [5], [32] and Glosten-Milgrom
[25] models, informed trades cannot be distinguished from non-informed trades, then all trades
will generate permanent impact on the price since other agents will believe that a fraction of these
trades might contain some private information. For instance, after a buy market order submitted
by the strategic trader with ∆XBt size, as the price will become p(t, Yt− + ∆XBt ) compared to
p(t, Yt−), the strategic trader needs to pay ∆XBt p(t, Yt− + ∆XBt ). For a sell market order, it has a
similar result. For temporary price impact on market orders, Alzahrani et al. [2] illustrate that the
temporary price impact only contributes one tenth of permanent price impact. On the contrary,
Almgren et al. [1] state that permanent and temporary components have equal weight to contribute
the total price impact. To compromise different conclusions about permanent/temporary price
impacts, we introduce a price impact coefficient m > 1, which combine permanent and temporary
components together. For instance, after a buy market order submitted by the strategic trader with
∆XBt size, the price will become p(t, Yt− + m∆XBt ) compared to p(t, Yt−) for any time t ∈ [0, 1).
The permanent price impact is p(t, Yt− + ∆XBt ) − p(t, Yt−) and the temporary price impact is
p(t, mYt−+ ∆XBt )− p(t, Yt−+ ∆XBt ). The m− 1 can be regarded as the temporary price impact
factor. If we want to exclude the temporary price impact, we just make m be 1. Here, the
superscript m of m stands for market orders.
Next let us consider the price impact on limit orders. Hautsch and Huang [28] show that limit
orders do have significant effects on the price. Cont et al. [21] also state that the price changes are
mainly driven by the order flow imbalance, i.e. the aggregation order Y in our model. They also
present that there exists a linear relation between price impact and order flow imbalance in short
period. To consider the price impact on limit orders, we can also introduce another coefficient
l > 1, which aggregates permanent and temporary components together. For instance, if the
strategic trader submits ∆L˜Bt limit buy orders followed by ∆X
S
t noisy sell market orders, the price
will become to p(t, Yt−+ l∆L˜Bt −∆XSt ) compared to price p(t, Yt−) for any original time t ∈ [0, 1).
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For a sell limit order, it has a similar result. The l − 1 can be regarded as the temporary price
impact factor. Here, the superscript l of l stands for limit orders.
Before considering the strategic trader’s profit, let us first consider an admissible strategy for
her.
Definition 4.2.3 The strategy (XB, XS , LB, LS ;F I) is admissible, if
i) XB and XS are F I -adapted and integrable marked point processes with initial condition
XB0 = X
S
0 = 0;
ii) LB and LS are F I -adapted and integrable marked point processes with initial condition which
may not be zero;
iii) the (F I ,P)-dual predictable projections of XB and XS are absolutely continuous functions of
time and intensities bounded by θ¯ > 0.
It implies that for each jump size k ∈ Km from buy side there exists F I -intensity θB,k such that
XB − ∫ ·0∑m¯k=1 kθB,kr dr = ∫ ·0∑m¯k=1 k(µˆB(dr, k) − θB,kr dr) is an F I -martingale. The sell side has a
similar result.
4.2.4 Strategic trader’s profit
As mentioned earlier, the strategic trader aims to maximise her expected profit. Given an admissible
trading strategy from market orders (XB, XS), the associated profit from market orders at time 1
is given by∫ 1
0
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + m∆XBr )
)
dXBr −
∫ 1
0
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− − m∆XSr )
)
dXSr
=
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + mk)
)
kµˆB(dr, k)−
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− − mk)
)
kµˆS(dr, k).
Therefore the expected profit of the strategic trader from market orders conditional on her private
prediction is
E
[ ∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + mk)
)
kµˆB(dr, k)−
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− − mk)
)
kµˆS(dr, k)
∣∣∣v˜]. (4.2.7)
Since pricing rule p is bounded, combined with (4.2.5), we have
∫ ·
0
∑m¯
k=1
(
v˜−p(r, Yr−+mk)
)
k(µˆB(dr,
k)− θB,kr dr) is an F I -martingale. The sell side has a similar result. Therefore, the expected profit
from market orders can be expressed as
E
[ ∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + mk)
)
kθB,kr dr −
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(u, Yr− − mk)
)
kθS,kr dr
∣∣∣v˜]. (4.2.8)
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According to our assumption, given admissible strategy from limit orders (LB, LS), the associ-
ated profit from limit orders at time 1 is given by∫ 1
0
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + l∆L˜Br −∆ZSr )
)
(dL˜Br ∧ dZSr )
−
∫ 1
0
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− − l∆L˜Sr + ∆ZBr )
)
(dL˜Sr ∧ dZBr )
=
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + l∆L˜Br − k)
)
(∆L˜Br ∧ k)µS(dr, k)
−
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− − l∆L˜Sr + k)
)
(∆L˜Sr ∧ k)µB(dr, k).
We also know that the expected profit of the strategic trader from limit orders conditional on her
information is
E
[ ∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + l∆L˜Br − k)
)
(∆L˜Br ∧ k)µS(dr, k)
−
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− − l∆L˜Sr + k)
)
(∆L˜Sr ∧ k)µB(dr, k)
∣∣∣v˜]. (4.2.9)
Since pricing rule p is bounded, combined with (4.2.5), we have
∫ ·
0
∑m¯
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + l∆L˜Br −
k)
)
(∆L˜Br ∧ k)(µˆS(dr, k)−λkdr) is an F I -martingale. The sell side has a similar result. Therefore,
the expected limit profit (4.2.9) can be expresses as
E
[ ∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− + l∆L˜Br − k)
)
(∆L˜Br ∧ k)λkdr
−
∫ 1
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
v˜ − p(r, Yr− − l∆L˜Sr + k)
)
(∆L˜Sr ∧ k)λkdr
∣∣∣v˜]. (4.2.10)
4.2.5 Control problem
Let U be a set of admissible controls, which consists of [0, θ¯]2m¯ × [0, l¯]2-valued processes. For given
u = (θB,1, . . . , θB,m¯, θS,1 . . . , θS,m¯, lB, lS),
we define a function for the insider at time t as
C(t, y, u) :=
m¯∑
k=1
{(
v˜ − p(t, y + mk))kθB,kt + (p(t, y + mk)− v˜)kθS,kt
+
(
v˜ − p(t, y + llB − k))(lB ∧ k)λk + (p(t, y − llS + k)− v˜)(lS ∧ k)λk}.
Therefore, when the strategic trader uses a control u ∈ U , the expected profit is
Ju(t, y) = E
[ ∫ 1
t
C(r, Yr−, ur)dr
∣∣∣Yt = y, v˜]. (4.2.11)
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The value function can be defined as
V (t, y, v˜) = ess sup
u∈U
Ju(t, y). (4.2.12)
Now employing the standard dynamic programming arguments yields the following HJB equation
for V : 
−Vt(t, y, v˜)−H(t, y, v˜, V, p) = 0,
V (1, y, v˜) = 0,
(4.2.13)
where v˜ ∈ {0, 1}, (t, y) ∈ [0, 1)× Z. The Hamilton H is defined as
H(t, y, v˜, V, p) := H(1)(t, y, v˜, V ) + sup
u∈U
H(2)(t, y, v˜, V, p), (4.2.14)
where U = [0, θ¯]2m¯ × [0, l¯]2,
H(1)(t, y, v˜, V ) =
m¯∑
k=1
[
V (t, y + k)− 2V (t, y) + V (t, y − k)
]
λk
and
H(2)(t, y, v˜, V, p)
=
m¯∑
k=1
[
V (t, y + k)− V (t, y) + (v˜ − p(t, y + mk))k]θB,k
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
V (t, y − k)− V (t, y) + (p(t, y − mk)− v˜)k]θS,k
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
V (t, y + lB − k)− V (t, y − k) + (v˜ − p(t, y + llB − k))(lB ∧ k)]λk
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
V (t, y − lS + k)− V (t, y + k) + (p(t, y − llS + k)− v˜)(lS ∧ k)]λk.
Theorem 4.2.4 The system (4.2.13) admits a unique bounded solution V continuously differen-
tiable in the time variable. Moreover, there exists a measurable function u∗ satisfying
u∗(t, y) = arg max
u∈U
H(2)(t, y, v˜, V, p). (4.2.15)
Proof. This proof is motivated by [13, Chapter VII, T3 Theorem]. To simplify notation, we suppress
v˜ in V and also p in H throughout the proof. We know U is a compact set. We also notice that
the mappings t→ θB,kt (y), t→ θS,kt (y), for any k ∈ Km and (t, u)→ C(t, y, u) are continuous and
bounded. The pricing rule p is bounded as well.
Let l∞ be the Banach space of real bounded sequences. The supermum norm is defined as |l|l∞ =
supn∈N |ln| for l = (. . . , l−1, l0, l1, . . . ). Then let us consider the following ordinary differential
equation in l∞:
V˙(t) = −H(t,V) , V(1) = 0,
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where
V(t) = (. . . , V (t,−1), V (t, 0), V (t, 1), . . . ),
H(t,V) = (. . . , H(t,−1, V ), H(t, 0, V ), H(t, 1, V ), . . . ),
(4.2.16)
and H comes from (4.2.14). The symbol V˙ denotes differentiation with respect to t and relative
to the sup norm on l∞. In fact, the differentiability of t → V(t) in the l∞ sense implies the
differentiability of t→ V (t, y) for all y in the usual sense, and moreover
V˙(t) =
(
. . . ,
dV (t,−1)
dt
,
dV (t, 0)
dt
,
dV (t, 1)
dt
, . . .
)
.
Now the mappings V→ (AjV)k, where j = {1, 2, 3, 4} from l∞ into l∞ given by
(A1V)k = V (·, ·+ k)− V (·, ·),
(A2V)k = V (·, · − k)− V (·, ·),
(A3V)k = V (·, ·+ lB − k)− V (·, ·),
(A4V)k = V (·, · − lS + k)− V (·, ·),
are Lipschitz operators for li ∈ KL, i ∈ {B,S}, and k ∈ Km since
∣∣AjV∣∣
l∞ ≤ 2 |V|l∞ . Under the
conditions of boundedness for the intensities θB,k, θS,k and λk, combined with the profit per unit
time C, it is not difficult to show that the mapping from R4m¯ to R defined by
(x1,x2,x3,x4)→ supu∈U
{ m¯∑
k=1
x1kθ
B,k +
m¯∑
k=1
x2kθ
S,k +
m¯∑
k=1
(x3k + x
4
k)λ
k + C(t, y, u)
}
(4.2.17)
is Lipschitz and this for all y and t ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, by composition of (AjV)k and (4.2.17), i.e.
replacing xjk by (A
jV )k(y), V→ H(t,V) is Lipschitz map for all t ∈ [0, 1]. We can therefore apply
the classical results on differential equations on Banach spaces that guarantee the existence of a
unique solution of (4.2.13) in l∞. The last assertion follows from the classical results on measurable
selections in [42]. 
Proposition 4.2.5 We have stated in Theorem 4.2.4 that there exists a function V (t, y, v˜) ∈ C1
in time t ∈ [0, 1] satisfying the system (4.2.13). Then u∗t defined by
u∗t = u
∗(t, Yt), (4.2.18)
where u∗ comes from (4.2.15), is an optimal control.
Proof. To simplify notation, we ignore v˜ in V . Applying Itoˆ’s formula to V (·, Y·), we obtain
V (1, Y1) =V (t, y) +
∫ 1
t
Vt(r, Yr−)dr +
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− + k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
θB,kr dr
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+
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− − k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
θS,kr dr
+
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− + ∆L˜Br − k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
λkdr
+
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− −∆L˜Sr + k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
λkdr +M1 −Mt,
where
M =
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− + k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
(µˆB(dr, k)− θB,kr dr)
+
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− − k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
(µˆS(dr, k)− θS,kr dr)
+
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− + ∆L˜Br − k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
(µS(dr, k)− λkdr)
+
∫ ·
0
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− −∆L˜Sr + k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
(µB(dr, k)− λkdr)
is a martingale. Now, we add
∫ 1
t C(t, Yr−, ur)dr on both sides in above equation, we have∫ 1
t
C(r, Yr−, ur)dr =− V (1, Y1) + V (t, y) +
∫ 1
t
Vt(r, Yr−)dr
+
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− + k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
θB,kr dr
+
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− − k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
θS,kr dr
+
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− + ∆L˜Br − k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
λkdr
+
∫ 1
t
m¯∑
k=1
(
V (r, Yr− −∆L˜Sr + k)− V (r, Yr−)
)
λkdr
+
∫ 1
t
C(t, Yr−, ur)dr +M1 −Mt.
Moreover, taking the conditional expectation with respect toF It on both sides, by the HJB equation
(4.2.13), we have
Ju(t, y) ≤ V (t, y)− V (1, Y1) = V (t, y), (4.2.19)
where the equality is attained at u∗ by the definition in (4.2.18), and the identity is because of the
terminal condition of V . 
4.3 Numerical example
In this section, we solve (4.2.13) numerically then illustrate the strategic trader’s optimal value and
strategy. We assume that the asset price v˜ follows a Bernoulli distribution with P(v˜ = 0) = p and
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P(v˜ = 1) = 1− p. To ease of notation, we suppress v˜ in each function below.
4.3.1 Pricing function
In our model, the pricing function defined in Definition 4.2.2 is general. To observe the behaviour
of the strategic trader, we need to specify a pricing function in the numerical scheme. We can
borrow the pricing rule from literature [18], who illustrates that when there only exists market
orders with unique order size, the pricing function is p(t, Zt) = E
[
v˜|Ft
]
set by a market maker
to achieve an equilibrium. Even though we do not consider the equilibrium here, we want to see
the impact of limit orders with the same order size as well on strategic trader’s optimal value once
limit orders are allowed. In particular, p(t, Zt) = E
[
v˜|Ft
]
describes market’s implied probability
that v˜ = 1 since v˜ has Bernoulli distribution. The price p(t, Zt) is market’s evaluation of the asset
at time t and satisfies (3.5) in [18] due to the Markov property in Z. Here we assume that p(t, Yt)
is market’s evaluation and satisfies
pt +
m¯∑
k=1
{
p(t, y + k)− p(t, y) + p(t, y − k)
}
λk = 0, (t, y) ∈ [0, 1)× Z,
p(1, y) = P (y), y ∈ Z,
(4.3.1)
where
P (y) :=

0 y < z
1 y ≥ z
, (4.3.2)
for any value of z ∈ Z.
4.3.2 Numerical results
Let us introduce parameters in the computational scheme which numerically solve the system
(4.2.13). The time interval [0, 1] can be discretised with time step ∆t = 1/N and a regular
time grid TN = {tn = n∆t, n = 0, . . . , N}. We assume that the interval of aggregated demand
Y is [−MY ,MY ] which implies the state space Y is truncated at −MY and MY for large MY .
Then we can discretise the state space with size step ∆y = 2MY /NY and a finite regular grid
YMY = {ym = −MY + m∆y, m = 0, . . . , NY }. To find the optimal strategy for the strategic
trader, we need to perform the algorithm (4.4.4) with parameters shown in Table 4.1. The details
of the numerical scheme are deferred to the Appendix.
In Table 4.1, we assume that v˜ follows Bernoulli distribution with 0 or 1 values. When the value
p = 0.5, it illustrates that v˜ is an unbiased Bernoulli random variable. In addition, we assume that
the strategic trader predicts v˜ being equal to 1 by using her advanced information. As the whole
trading period is [0, 1], we set terminal time T as 1. For simplicity reason, we also suppose that
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all of agents are allowed to place orders with maximum two units of orders. One unit size can be
regarded as small orders, which arrives frequently with intensity λ1 = 200. Two units size can be
regarded as large orders with intensity λ2 = 20, which only has one tenth of λ1 as large orders
arrivals much less frequent than small orders. The intensities of market orders θi,k, where i ∈ {B,S}
and k ∈ {1, 2}, is bounded by θ¯, which is 400. We assume that the number of time partitions is
N = 5, 000, which means the time interval ∆t = 1/N = 0.0002. In addition, we assume that the
interval of aggregated orders is defined as 1/
√
2λ1, which is motivated by [6] and [18]. The value of
MY is three times of standard deviation of results obtained by 10
6 times of Monte Carlo simulation
for the difference of two independent of Poisson processes with the intensity λ1 +λ2. Once we have
values of ∆y and MY , the value of NY will be determined. Since p = 0.5 and the difference of
independent Poisson processes, the value of z in (4.3.2) is the middle point of [−MY ,MY ] which
is 0. Finally, we assume that the price impact of market orders will generated three times effect
compared to limit ones, i.e. 6 and 2 respectively.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
p 0.5 T 1 z 0
v˜ 1 λ1 200 λ2 20
θ¯ 400 N 5000 ∆t 0.0002
∆y 1√
2λ1
= 0.05 MY 72 NY 2880
m 6 l 2
Table 4.1: Parameters for numerical scheme
Here we consider five different scenarios listed in Table 4.2. The range of scenarios is from all of
market participants only allowed to place market orders with small unit order size to all of them
allowed to place market and limit orders with small and large order size. The second column is the
values of V ∆t,∆y.My(0, 0) defined in (4.4.4) when the strategic trader applies her optimal strategy to
trade each time. The first three scenarios are classified to the first group and the rest are aggregated
to the second group as the values in last two scenarios have a significant jump. The reason will be
explained later. In the each of group, the values gradually increase along with extending trading
options. Now let us consider these five scenarios one by one.
The numerical results are listed in section 4.4.3, the y-axis is the trading period from 0 to 1 and
the x-axis is the number of order units for aggregated orders. In general, as the private prediction
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Scenarios Value at y = 0 and t = 0
1 Market Order Size Only 0.2658
1 Market Order Size, 1 Limit Order Size 0.3508
2 Market Order Size, 1 Limit Order Size 0.4024
1 Market Order Size, 2 Limit Order Size 8.2242
2 Market Order Size, 2 Limit Order Size 8.8654
Table 4.2: Optimal values for different scenarios
of v˜ is 1, the strategic trader always wants to push the aggregated demand y above the z = 0 due
to (4.3.2) and the definition of Z.
In the Figure 4.3, we display the optimal strategy when only both market orders with small order
size are allowed. There are two regions for the strategy of market buy, active region and inactive
region. Since the control problem is of bang-bang type, optimal intensity is either maximal θ¯ in
the active region or 0 in the inactive region. At the beginning of the trade, she is patient to place
market buy orders. However, as time passed by, she becomes more and more impatient and tries to
place market orders once the number of aggregated orders is less than zero, i.e. the number of sell
more than the number of buy. In market sell side, the strategic trader does not place any orders
to sell since it incurs a permanent loss, which is not the optimal strategy for her.
In the Figure 4.4, we display the optimal strategy when market and limit orders in small order
size are allowed. The strategy in limit buy orders is very similar as market buy orders. At the
same time, she does not place any market and limit sell orders. The reason of no limit sell orders
submitted can be demonstrated by an example as below. For instance, at time t, when the strategic
trader places the limit sell with small order size ls = 1 which is fully filled by the following market
buy with order size k = 1 submitted by noisy traders, the strategic trader suffers the loss when
m = 6 and l = 2 such that
Loss = (p(t, y − lls + k)− v˜)(ls ∧ k) = p(t, y − 1)− v˜.
Since the price of the asset is less than v˜ = 1 for any y and t, the value of the above identity is
non-positive. After posting a limit sell followed by a market buy order with the same size, the
aggregated order is unchanged, i.e. y − 1 + 1 = y, due to the negative one contributed from the
limit sell and the positive one contributed from the market buy. Next the strategic trader places a
market buy order with small order size k = 1 at time t′ > t to obtain the profit such that
Profit = (v˜ − p(t, y + mk))k = v˜ − p(t, y + 6).
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For simplicity, we assume that there is no any other orders coming in between the time interval t
and t′. The net profit is
Net Profit = Profit + Loss
= p(t, y − 1)− p(t, y + 6) < 0.
The negative net profit also happens when she submits limit sell orders followed by limit buy orders.
Hence, submitting limit sell orders is not the optimal strategy as the profit from the market buy
is less than the loss from the limit sell in this scenario. Furthermore, comparing to the strategy in
Figure 4.3, we find that the strategic trader is more patient at early of the trade as she has one
more option, limit buy orders, to make profits.
In Figure 4.5, we display the optimal strategy when market orders with both order sizes and
limit orders with only small order size are allowed. The pattern of the trading strategy is similar
as the previous two scenarios. The main difference is that the strategic trader is the most patient
among these three scenarios as she has the most trading options in the third scenarios.
Now let us consider last two scenarios together. In Figure 4.6 and 4.7, the trading strategies in
market buy, market sell and limit buy orders are similar to three previous scenarios. However, the
values of strategic trader’s profit in the fourth and fifth scenarios, 8.2242 and 8.8654 respectively,
are much larger than values in the three previous scenarios. The main reason is the strategy in
limit sell orders. It is easy to use an example to explain the reason. For instance, at time t, when
the strategic trader places a limit sell order with large order size ls = 2 which is partially filled by
the following a market buy order with size k = 1 submitted by noisy traders, the strategic trader
suffers a loss such that
Loss = (p(t, y − lls + k)− v˜)(ls ∧ k) = p(t, y − 3)− v˜,
which is non-positive. Now the number of the aggregated order is y− 2 + 1 = y− 1 due to negative
two contributed from the limit sell side and positive one contributed from the market buy side.
Next the strategic trader places a market buy order with large size k = 2 at time t′ > t to obtain
a profit such that
Profit = (v˜ − p(t, y − 1 + mk))k = 2(v˜ − p(t, y + 11)).
We also assume that there is no any other orders coming in between the time interval t and t′.
Hence the net profit is
Net Profit = Profit + Loss
= 2(v˜ − p(t′, y + 11)) + p(t, y − 3)− v˜
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= v˜ − p(t′, y + 11) + p(t, y − 3)− p(t′, y + 11).
As the pricing rule is non-decreasing against y and is always less or equal to v˜, the value of
the net profit might be positive when the value of v˜ − p(t′, y + 11) is larger than the value of
p(t′, y + 11) − p(t, y − 3). Therefore, the strategic trader will place market orders with large size
when it happens, which is demonstrated in the fourth plot in the Figure 4.6 and 4.7. In summary,
the strategic trader submits limit sell orders with large size to push the trading price down and
suffers a loss, and places market buy orders with large order size to take advantage of low trading
price and make immediate profit which is larger than the previous loss. Therefore, comparing to
do nothing in the limit sell, the behaviour of “round trip” trading is an optimal strategy for her.
4.4 Appendix
4.4.1 Numerical scheme
In this section, we will consider the details of the numerical scheme to solve the system (4.2.13).
Besides introducing parameters listed in Table 4.1, we defined a truncated function denoted by
ϕ(y) := −MY ∨ (y∧MY ). Now let us define an operator associated to the (4.3.1): given a [0,1]-real
valued function φ on [0, 1]× R, we define
P∆t,∆y,MY (t, y, φ) := φ(t, y) + ∆t
m¯∑
k=1
{
φ
(
t, ϕ(y + k∆y)
)− φ(t, y) + φ(t, ϕ(ym − k∆y))}λk.
We also define an operator associated to the (4.2.13): given a real valued function ψ on [0, 1]× R,
we define
S∆t,∆y,MY (t, y, ψ, φ) := ψ(t, y) + ∆t× Hˆ(t, y, ψ, φ),
where
Hˆ(t, y, ψ, φ) := Hˆ(1)(t, y, ψ) + sup
u∈U
Hˆ(2)(t, y, ψ, φ)
such that
Hˆ(1)(t, y, ψ) :=
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y + k∆y)
)− 2ψ(t, y) + ψ(t, ϕ(y − k∆y))]λk, (4.4.1)
and
Hˆ(2)(t, y, ψ, φ) :=
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y + k∆y)
)− ψ(t, y) + (v˜ − φ(t, ϕ(y + mk∆y)))k∆y]θB,k
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y − k∆y))− ψ(t, y) + (φ(t, ϕ(y − mk∆y))− v˜)k∆y]θS,k
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+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y + (lB − k)∆y))− ψ(t, ϕ(y − k∆y)) (4.4.2)
+
(
v˜ − φ(t, ϕ(y + (llB − k)∆y)))(lB ∧ k)∆y]λk
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y − (lS − k)∆y))− ψ(t, ϕ(y + k∆y))
+
(
φ
(
t, ϕ(y − (llS − k)∆y))− v˜)(lS ∧ k)∆y]λk.
Now we can approximate the solution p in (4.3.1) by the function p∆t,∆y,MY on (tn, ym) ∈
TN × YM solution to the computational scheme
p∆t,∆y,MY (tn, ym) = P∆t,∆y,MY (tn+1, ym, p∆t,∆y,MY )
p∆t,∆y,MY (tN , ym) = P (ym).
(4.4.3)
We can also approximate the solution V in (4.2.13) by the function V h,∆y,MY on (tn, ym) ∈ TN×YM
solution to the computational scheme
V ∆t,∆y,MY (tn, ym) = S∆t,∆y,MY (tn+1, ym, V ∆t,∆y,MY , p∆t,∆y,MY ),
V ∆t,∆y,MY (tN , ym) = 0.
(4.4.4)
The algorithm can be described explicitly in backward induction by the following pseudo-code: for
each ym ∈ YMY ,
• for tN = 1, set p∆t,∆y,MY (tN , ym) = P (ym);
• for n = N − 1, . . . , 0, assign p∆t,∆y,MY (tn, ym) by computing P∆t,∆y,MY (tn+1, ym, p∆t,∆y,MY );
• for tN = 1, set V ∆t,∆y,MY (tN , ym) = 0;
• for n = N − 1, . . . , 0, compute
Hˆ(1)(tn+1, ym, V
∆t,∆y,MY ) and Hˆ(2)(tn+1, ym, V
∆t,∆y,MY , p∆t,∆y,MY ),
and store θB,k,?, θS,k,?, lB,? and lS,? the argmax. Finally assign V ∆t,∆y,MY (tn, ym) by com-
puting
V ∆t,∆y,MY (tn+1, ym)+∆t
(
Hˆ(1)(tn+1, ym, V
∆t,∆y,MY )+Hˆ(2)(tn+1, ym, V
∆t,∆y,MY , p∆t,∆y,MY )
)
.
The convergence of the numerical scheme (4.4.4) is by showing the monotonicity, stability, and
consistency properties of this scheme. The proof is provided below. Now we can confirm that the
solution V ∆t,∆y,MY to the numerical scheme (4.4.4) converges locally uniformly to V on [0, 1)×Z,
as (∆t,∆y,MY ) goes to (0, 1,∞).
4.4. Appendix 92
4.4.2 Proof of convergence
In this section, the proof follows [26, Section 4.2] with proper extension. To ease of notation, we
suppress the parameter v˜ for each function in this section. We denote by C1b the set of bounded
continuously differentiable functions on [0, 1] × R with bounded derivatives, and C1[0,1] the set of
[0,1]-bounded continuously increasing functions on [0, 1]× R with bounded derivatives.
Assumption 4.4.1 To prove the convergence of V ∆t,∆y,MY to V as (∆t,∆y,MY ) goes to (0, 1,∞),
we assume that
i) the functions φ ∈ C1[0,1] and ψ ∈ C1b ;
ii) the solution p∆t,∆y,MY to the numerical scheme (4.4.3) converges locally uniformly to p for
(4.3.1) on [0, 1)× Z as (∆t,∆y,MY ) goes to (0, 1,∞).
Remark 4.4.2 Here we assume that item ii) in Assumption 4.4.1 holds without a detailed proof
as the way to finish the proof is similar as the technique in the proof of the convergence from
V ∆t,∆y,MY to V illustrated below. It is needed to show monotonicity, stability and consistency
properties of the scheme (4.4.3). Combining these three properties, we can confirm that there
exists a convergence from (4.4.3) to (4.3.1) as (∆t,∆y,MY ) goes to (0, 1,∞).
Now let us study the convergence of numerical scheme (4.4.4) by showing monotonicity, stability
and consistency properties of this scheme.
Lemma 4.4.3 (Monotonicity). For any ∆t > 0 s.t. ∆t <
(
2
∑m
k=1(λ
k + θ¯)
)−1
, the operator
S∆t,∆y,MY (t, y, ψ, φ) is non-decreasing in ψ, i.e. for any φ ∈ C1[0,1], ψ1 and ψ2 ∈ C1b , s.t. ψ1 ≤ ψ2:
S∆t,∆y,MY (t, y, ψ1, φ) ≤ S∆t,∆y,MY (t, y, ψ2, φ), (t, y) ∈ [0, 1)× R.
Proof. We see that the Sh,∆y,MY (t, y, ψ) can be written as
S∆t,∆y,MY (t, y, ψ, φ)
=ψ(t, y) + ∆t×
(
Hˆ(1)(t, y, ψ) + sup
u∈U
Hˆ(2)(t, y, ψ, φ)
)
=ψ(t, y) + sup
u∈U
{
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y + k∆y)
)− ψ(t, y) + (v˜ − φ(t, ϕ(y + mk∆y)))k∆y]∆tθB,k
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y − k∆y))− ψ(t, y) + (φ(t, ϕ(y − mk∆y))− v˜)k∆y]∆tθS,k
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y + (lB − k)∆y))− ψ(t, y)+ (v˜ − φ(t, ϕ(y + (llB − k)∆y)))(lB ∧ k)∆y]∆tλk
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y − (lS − k)∆y))− ψ(t, y)+ (φ(t, ϕ(y − (llS − k)∆y))− v˜)(lS ∧ k)∆y]∆tλk}
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= sup
u∈U
{
ψ(t, y) +
m¯∑
k=1
{
− (θB,k + θS,k + 2λk)∆tψ(t, y)
+
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y + k∆y)
)
+
(
v˜ − φ(t, ϕ(y + mk∆y)))k∆y]∆tθB,k
+
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y − k∆y))+ (φ(t, ϕ(y + mk∆y))− v˜)k∆y]∆tθS,k}
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y + (lB − k)∆y))+ (v˜ − φ(t, ϕ(y + (llB − k)∆y)))(lB ∧ k)∆y]∆tλk
+
m¯∑
k=1
[
ψ
(
t, ϕ(y − (lS − k)∆y))+ (φ(t, ϕ(y − (llS − k)∆y)− v˜))(lS ∧ k)∆y]∆tλk}.
From the expression above, it is clear that S∆t,∆y,MY (t, y, ψ, φ) in ψ is monotone once ∆t <(
2
∑m
k=1(λ
k + θ¯)
)−1
. 
Lemma 4.4.4 (Stability) For any ∆t,∆y,MY > 0 there exists a unique solution V
∆t,∆y,MY to the
numerical scheme (4.4.4), and the sequence (V ∆t,∆y,MY ) is uniformly bounded for any (tn, ym) ∈
TN × YM .
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of V ∆t,∆y,MY follows from the backward scheme (4.4.4). Let us
now consider the uniform bounds. Since θi,k, li, λk and p∆t,∆y,MY for i ∈ {B,S} are bounded,
there always exists a constant γ to make V ∆t,∆y,MY < γ. 
Lemma 4.4.5 (Consistency) For all (t, y) ∈ [0, 1)× Z, we have ψ ∈ C1b , φ ∈ C1[0,1] and
lim
(∆t,∆y,MY )→(0,1,∞)
(t′,y′)→(t,y)
φ→ φˆ,
where φˆ is the function on [0, 1]× Z, then we can show
lim
(∆t,∆y,MY )→(0,1,∞)
(t′,y′)→(t,y)
1
∆t
[
ψ(t′, y′)− S∆t,∆y,MY (t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ, φ)
]
= −ψt(t, y)−H(t, y, ψ, φˆ). (4.4.5)
Proof. We have all (t′, y′) ∈ [0, 1)× R,
1
∆t
[
ψ(t′, y′)− S∆t,∆y,MY (t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ, φ)
]
=
1
∆t
[
ψ(t′, y′)− ψ(t′ + ∆t, y′)
]
− Hˆ(t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ, φ).
The first term converges trivially to −ψt(t, y) as ∆t goes to 0 and (t′, y′) goes to (t, y). To com-
plete this proof, we just need to show the convergence of Hˆ(t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ, φ) to H(t, y, ψ, φˆ) as
(∆t,∆y,MY ) goes to (0, 1,∞) and (t′, y′) goes to (t, y). Alternatively, we need to prove the conver-
gence of Hˆ(1)(t′+∆t, y′, ψ) and Hˆ(2)(t′+∆t, y′, ψ, φ) to H(1)(t, y, ψ) and H(2)(t, y, ψ, φˆ) respectively.
Now let us consider the convergence of Hˆ(1)(t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ) to H(1)(t, y, ψ). The convergence of
the first term in Hˆ(1)(t′+ ∆t, y′, ψ) to the corresponding term in H(1)(t, y, ψ) is such that for three
bounded constants η1, η2 and η3,∣∣∣∣ m¯∑
k=1
λk
[
ψ
(
t′ + ∆t, ϕ(y′ + k∆y)
)− ψ(t, y + k)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ m¯∑
k=1
λk
∣∣∣∣ψ(t′ + ∆t, ϕ(y′ + k∆y))− ψ(t, y + k)∣∣∣∣
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=
m¯∑
k=1
λk
∣∣∣∣ψ(t′ + ∆t, y′ + k∆y)− ψ(t, y + k)∣∣∣∣I{y′+k∆y∈[−MY ,MY ]}
+
m¯∑
k=1
λk
∣∣∣∣ψ(t′ + ∆t,MY )− ψ(t, y + k)∣∣∣∣I{y′+k∆y>MY }
+
m¯∑
k=1
λk
∣∣∣∣ψ(t′ + ∆t,−MY )− ψ(t, y + k)∣∣∣∣I{y′+k∆y<−MY }
≤ η1
∣∣∣ψ(1)∣∣∣
∞
(
∆t+
∣∣y + 1− y′ −∆y∣∣ )+ η2 |ψ|∞ I{y′+mk∆y≥MY } + η3 |ψ|∞ I{y′+mk∆y≤−MY },
where ψ is bounded by |ψ|∞ and the derivative of ψ is bounded by
∣∣ψ(1)∣∣∞ because of Assumption
4.4.1. Once (∆t,∆y,MY ) → (0, 1,∞) and (t′, y′) → (t, y), the convergence is proved. Now let us
consider the second term in Hˆ(1)(t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ) such that for a bounded constant η4,∣∣∣∣ m¯∑
k=1
{
ψ(t′ + ∆t, y′)− ψ(t, y)}∣∣∣∣ ≤ m¯∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣ψ(t′ + ∆t, y′)− ψ(t, y)∣∣∣∣ ≤ η4 ∣∣∣ψ(1)∣∣∣∞ (∆t+ ∣∣y − y′∣∣ ),
which converges to 0 as (∆t,∆y,MY ) → (0, 1,∞) and (t′, y′) → (t, y). For the third term, it can
be done as similar as the first term. Hence, combining these three results, we can confirm
lim
(∆t,∆y,MY )→(0,1,∞)
(t′,y′)→(t,y)
Hˆ(1)(t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ) = H(1)(t, y, ψ).
Next let us consider the convergence from supu∈U Hˆ(2)(t′+∆t, y′, ψ, φ) to supu∈U H(2)(t, y, ψ, φˆ).
The convergence of the terms of market buy in supu∈U Hˆ(2)(t′+∆t, y′, ψ) to the corresponding term
in supu∈U H(2)(t, y, ψ) is such that∣∣∣∣∣
m¯∑
k=1
sup
θB,k∈[0,θ¯]
{[
ψ
(
t′ + ∆t, ϕ(y′ + k∆y)
)− ψ(t′ + ∆t, y′) + (v˜ − φ(t′ + ∆t, ϕ(y′ + mk∆y)))k∆y]θB,k}
−
m¯∑
k=1
sup
θB,k∈[0,θ¯]
{[
ψ(t, y + k)− ψ(t, y) + (v˜ − φˆ(t, y + mk))k
]
θB,k
}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
m¯∑
k=1
θB,k
∣∣∣∣∣ψ(t′ + ∆t, ϕ(y′ + k∆y))− ψ(t, y + k)
∣∣∣∣∣+
m¯∑
k=1
θB,k
∣∣∣∣∣ψ(t′ + ∆t, y′)− ψ(t, y)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
m¯∑
k=1
kθB,k
∣∣∣∣∣φ(t′ + ∆t, ϕ(y′ + mk∆y))∆y − φˆ(t, y + mk)
∣∣∣∣∣.
As the control problem is of bang-bang type, the optimal intensity is θ¯ when the coefficients are
positive. Hence applying the inequality
∣∣x+ − x′+∣∣ ≤ |x− x′|, we can obtain the above inequality.
As the convergence of the first and second terms on the right hand side of the above inequality have
been proved in last paragraph, and the convergence of the third term automatically holds due to
Assumption 4.4.1, we can confirm that the terms of market buy in Hˆ(2)(t′ + ∆t, y′, ψ, φ) converges
to the corresponding terms in H(2)(t, y, ψ, φˆ). We can apply the same technique to finish the rest
of proofs. 
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Proposition 4.4.6 (Convergence) The solution V ∆t,∆y,MY to the numerical scheme (4.4.4) con-
verges locally uniformly to V on [0, 1)× Z as (∆t,∆y,MY ) goes to (0, 1,∞).
Proof. Given the above monotonicity, stability and consistency properties, the convergence of the
sequence (V ∆t,∆y,MY ) towards V , which is the unique bounded viscosity solution to (4.2.13), follows
from [9]. We claim that V ∗ and V∗ defined as
V ∗(t, y) = lim sup
(∆t,∆y,MY )→(0,1,∞)
(t′,y′)→(t,y)
V ∆t,∆y,MY (t′, y′),
V∗(t, y) = lim inf
(∆t,∆y,MY )→(0,1,∞)
(t′,y′)→(t,y)
V ∆t,∆y,MY (t′, y′),
which are finite upper and lower semi-continuous functions on [0, 1]×Z, and inherit the boundedness
of (V ∆t,∆y,MY ), are viscosity sub and super solutions of (4.2.13) respectively. If we assume that
the claim is true, we can obtain V ∗ ≤ V∗ by the strong comparison principle for (4.2.13). Since
the converse inequality is obvious by the definitions of V ∗ and V∗, we can show that V ∗ = V∗ = V
is the unique bounded continuous viscosity solution to (4.2.13), hence completing the proof of
convergence.
Next we prove the viscosity supersolution property of V∗. The viscosity subsolution property of
V ∗ can be proved analogously. We introduce (t¯, y¯) ∈ [0, 1) × Z and let ψ ∈ C1b be a test function
such that (t¯, y¯) is a strict global minimum point of V∗ − ψ, i.e.
0 = (V∗ − ψ)(t¯, y¯) = min
(t,y)∈[0,1)×Z
(V∗ − ψ)(t, y). (4.4.6)
By definition of V∗(t¯, y¯), there exists a sequence (t′n, y′n) in [0, 1)×R, and a sequence (∆tn,∆yn,MnY )
such that
(t′n, y
′
n)→ (t¯, y¯), (∆tn,∆yn,MnY )→ (0, 1,∞) and V ∆tn,∆yn,M
n
Y (t′n, y
′
n)→ V∗(t¯, y¯),
when n goes to infinity. By the continuity of ψ and (4.4.6), we also have that
ζn := (V
∆tn,∆yn,MnY − ψ)(t′n, y′n)→ 0,
when n goes to infinity. By the definition of ζn, we have V
∆tn,∆yn,MnY ≥ ψ+ζn. From the definition
of the numerical scheme S∆t,∆y,MY , and its monotonicity, we then have
ζn + ψ(t
′
n, y
′
n) = V
∆tn,∆yn,MnY (t′n, y
′
n)
= S∆tn,∆yn,MnY (t′n + ∆tn, y′n, V ∆tn,∆yn,M
n
Y , p∆tn,∆yn,M
n
Y )
≥ S∆tn,∆yn,MnY (t′n + ∆tn, y′n, ζn + ψ, p∆tn,∆yn,M
n
Y )
= S∆tn,∆yn,MnY (t′n + ∆tn, y′n, ψ, p∆tn,∆yn,M
n
Y ) + ζn
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= ψ(t′n + ∆tn, y
′
n) + ∆tn × Hˆ(t′n + ∆tn, y′n, ψ, p∆tn,∆yn,M
n
Y ) + ζn,
which implies
ψ(t′n, y′n)− ψ(t′n + ∆tn, y′n)
∆tn
− Hˆ(t′n + ∆tn, y′n, ψ, p∆tn,∆yn,M
n
Y ) ≥ 0.
By the consistency property combined with Assumption 4.4.1, and by sending n to infinity in the
above inequality, we obtain the required viscosity supersolution property
−ψt(t¯, y¯)−H(t¯, y¯, ψ, p) ≥ 0. 
4.4.3 Numerical optimal trading strategy
Now we list all of numerical results of the strategic trader’s optimal strategies in different scenarios
listed in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.3: Optimal strategy of 1 market order size only
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Figure 4.4: Optimal strategy of 1 market order size and 1 limit order size
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Figure 4.5: Optimal strategy of 2 market order size and 1 limit order size
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Figure 4.6: Optimal strategy 1 market order size only and 2 limit order size
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Figure 4.7: Optimal strategy 1 market order size only and 2 limit order size
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